



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

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New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Araud	(France)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalčić
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Mr. Salam
	Mexico	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria	Mrs. Ogwu
	Russian Federation	Mr. Churkin
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America	Ms. DiCarlo

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Transition and exit strategies

Letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/67)

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The meeting was called to order at 9.35 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Transition and exit strategies

Letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/67)

The President (*spoke in French*): I would like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Rwanda and Uruguay, in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration without the right to vote in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, the representatives of the aforementioned countries took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support; Mr. Alan Doss, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Mission in Liberia; Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone; Mr. Hans Peter Wittig, Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Germany; His Excellency Mr. Tété

António, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations; and His Excellency Mr. Pedro Serrano, acting head of the European Union delegation to the United Nations.

It is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/67, which contains the text of a letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to the Secretary-General, transmitting a concept paper on the item.

I welcome the presence of the Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Ban Ki-moon, and invite him to take the floor.

The Secretary-General (*spoke in French*): I should like to thank France for having taken the initiative to focus our attention on the crucial question of the transition and exit strategies of peacekeeping operations.

In the broadest sense, our objective should be very clear. The Blue Helmets should themselves strive tirelessly to bring their own work to an end, but of course there is a great deal of time between the beginning and the end of an operation and many phases to go through. The road to follow is strewn with difficulties, dangers, setbacks and problems.

(spoke in English)

Over the years, we have learned many valuable lessons about how best to ensure the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and, ultimately, to societies that can function and maintain stability on their own. Considerable work is under way to strengthen our response to conflict. Last year, the Security Council held a series of valuable debates on mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Member States, the United Nations system and our partners have gained a common understanding of the challenges involved.

I welcome today's debate as a further step in making the best possible use of all our tools and assets. The United Nations must be ready to help national authorities to implement peace agreements, re-establish

core Government functions, restore the rule of law and achieve at least a minimum level of sustainable security throughout their territory. We must promote reconciliation and inclusive political processes, and help to provide basic services and to generate employment and economic activity. All of this is essential to addressing the roots of crises, sustaining peace and achieving a viable exit strategy for United Nations peacekeeping missions.

The United Nations engagement in a country emerging from conflict will closely track the path that country takes. We are usually present well before a peacekeeping operation is deployed. We will usually remain well after the exit of our Blue Helmets. The post-peacekeeping United Nations presence might be a special political mission, a peacebuilding office or some other configuration. It might be large and multidimensional, or small and specialized. Whatever the case, peacekeeping activities must pave the way for what comes next.

For peace to be sustained, there must be an overarching strategy that unites the efforts of all United Nations actors and the international community, and that strengthens national capacity. The past decade has seen a continuous surge in United Nations peacekeeping operations. No one can predict the future, but in the years ahead we are likely to focus not so much on new missions, but on ensuring that current missions and their successor presences can help to consolidate peace and support lasting stability so that they can withdraw.

To achieve this, a peacekeeping mission requires a good entrance. This was emphasized in the 2001 report to the Security Council entitled "No exit without strategy" (S/2001/394). Allow me to recall that one of the authors of that report, Andrew Grene, was among those who perished in the earthquake in Haiti. His legacy lives on in a report whose recommendations remain valid today.

A good entrance means that the very mandate of an operation addresses the root causes of a conflict. It means charting a path out of violence through a solid and sustainable peace process. It means articulating a clear goal that can be jointly owned by national stakeholders and the international community. And it means the timely allocation of enough human and material resources — including, if necessary, the rapid

deployment of standing police and other civilian capacities.

Exits must be equally well considered from the very outset of a mission. In assessing whether and when a peacekeeping operation should be drawn down, we must look at the strength of national governance structures, including for security and the rule of law. We must consider the prospects for socio-economic recovery. We must examine the risk that a country could backslide into conflict, and ask whether the security guarantee provided by uniformed peacekeepers is still needed. We must look at how to reconfigure our presence. Drawing down in one area, such as security, might require temporary strengthening in another.

Peacekeeping missions should not stay longer than necessary, but we should also be wary of withdrawing prematurely only to have to return because of renewed violence. A key lesson of the 1990s was the need for some type of follow-on presence to protect gains and continue the process of building durable peace. In several recent cases, the transition has been made to a United Nations peacebuilding office, but other models, such as regional offices, could also be considered. Such presences may have smaller footprints, but still have complex and demanding mandates. They require resources and the support of the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission and the wider international community.

This year's review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture is thus very timely. We should discuss the transition from the core security components of a peacekeeping mission to longer-term peacebuilding, and we should also reflect on how the Peacebuilding Commission can engage early.

The engagement of United Nations country teams is critical throughout all phases of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, but the United Nations is only one of many international actors in peacebuilding. Regional institutions, bilateral partners and international financial institutions are also engaged. We need all these partners to be working coherently, with a shared sense of purpose. If stakeholders pursue competing individual agendas, all our efforts will suffer. We must guard against this risk. Our collective results will determine when and how a peacekeeping operation can exit. I urge that we explore how to ensure that the Security Council has the necessary benchmarks and information —

including the advice of the Peacebuilding Commission and the input of host Governments — to measure progress.

(spoke in French)

Three of my Special Representatives are with us today to give us the benefit of their great experience of and their thinking on transition and exit strategies. The countries whose missions they head illustrate the different phases in which United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives can find themselves, as well as the different models that exist and the different problems that they have to deal with. The activities of these three missions are invaluable, for they allow us to establish and build peace and give hope to millions of men and women.

I hope that we will be able to learn the right lessons and extract the full benefit of what there is to be learned from all who will speak today.

The President *(spoke in French)*: I thank the Secretary-General for his statement.

I now give the floor to Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

Mr. Le Roy *(spoke in French)*: Our discussion on transition and exit strategies comes at the right time. It is true that in the last few years we have focused mostly on mission start-up and deployment. In the years to come, I expect that we will turn more of our attention to consolidating the progress made and to making a smooth transition as we reduce the size of our missions. That is a prognosis that I think will come to pass.

Today's debate is part of a broader discussion on peacebuilding. The Secretary-General has just recalled the key links between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The New Horizon document describes the peacebuilding efforts that the United Nations peace missions have launched since the beginning of such operations.

Our missions, as we all know, provide a basic level of security that is essential for peace in the future. Such efforts include, in particular, the protection of civilians, the rule of law, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, security sector reform and anti-mining activity. The missions are also charged with supporting political processes and peace agreements, and thus with supporting electoral

processes, constitutional reform and national and local reconciliation.

Beyond that, peacekeeping operations are frequently required to support the restoration of essential government functions such as police, justice and correctional systems. Those operations present an integrated framework for all the efforts of the United Nations. They support other activities essential to peacebuilding, such as the restoration of basic services and the revitalization of the economy.

It is crucial that we arrive at a common understanding, a consensus concerning the link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. That will allow clear foundations on which to plan transitions in a coherent fashion. Based on such clear foundations, and capitalizing on the comparative advantages and areas of expertise of the various players, the United Nations system can join effectively with other actors to more effectively help countries emerge from conflict. As the Council knows, the links between peacebuilding and peacekeeping are important issues and are being examined by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Once our personnel have achieved initial stabilization on the ground, we have to make sure that the collective rebuilding effort continues, so that peacekeeping operations can hand off the job and eventually withdraw. The question is, how do we identify this tipping point? How do we know when the security or stabilization that a peacekeeping mission brings is no longer required? Is there a tendency to overstay?

The long duration of some traditional peacekeeping missions — such as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus — is not an indication of failure. Those operations show, rather, that a peacekeeping mission cannot be a substitute for a political process or for the will of the parties concerned. They challenge all of us to define a more creative and constructive political engagement.

Is there a tendency to leave too soon? In his statement the Secretary-General emphasized the risks inherent in leaving before peace has been consolidated. As the Council knows, there was the experience in Timor-Leste and Haiti, of leaving perhaps too early. There have also been instances where consent to

United Nations peacekeeping operations has been abruptly withdrawn, as in the case of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the United Nations Operation in Burundi.

There are, of course, examples such as Sierra Leone, where the national authorities and the Security Council have worked together to continually adjust the United Nations presence according to the evolution of conditions on the ground. The United Nations thus concluded a peacekeeping operation and created, first, an integrated mission and then a peacebuilding office. Mr. von der Schulenberg will of course provide details.

In every case, progress is never linear. Peacebuilding inevitably encounters obstacles. And in every case it is essential, as Ms. Malcorra will tell you, to align operational and support functions.

(spoke in English)

The debate on staying too late versus leaving too soon is only one dimension. Getting a mission's mandate and structure right from the outset is also critical for a successful transition and eventual exit. We need the right tools to address the quickly evolving dynamics and adjust accordingly.

For example, more formed police units, rather than troops, were needed in Haiti to manage public order and to address the challenge of gangs and policing. But when the challenge is the institutional transformation of national police institutions, formed police units are not the right tool. Instead, institutional transformation requires a combination of individual police officers and civilian capacities that can support and advise the national police and authorities and assist in strategic planning.

We need reliable capacities and capabilities in a range of sectors, including rapidly deployable civilian capacities accompanied by adequate resources. In this area, we are seeking to expand the Standing Police Capacity, complemented by small justice and corrections expertise. Making sure we have the right tools from the beginning requires continuous and constructive dialogue between the Secretariat, the Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries.

The early initiation of peacebuilding efforts may enable an earlier exit for peacekeeping. But we must be clear that the exit of a peacekeeping operation should be part of a coherent strategy to support a country

emerging from conflict, and not an end in itself. To use a medical analogy, we need to be sure it is safe to leave the emergency room — that is, peacekeeping — before leaving others to ramp up longer-term recovery. That of course entails a partnership and shared vision among many actors, including regional and bilateral players. It is a heavy burden on national Governments as well as on the Special Representatives and their leadership teams. And it is a challenge for the Security Council and other Member States bodies.

A durable peace requires progress on many fronts — a reasonably stable security environment that protects the rule of law, a legitimate political order that can mediate differences and avoid renewed violence, improved governance and strengthened institution-building, the resumption of basic services and the start of socio-economic recovery. A number of those areas will not be directly mandated tasks of peacekeeping operations, but they could nonetheless be referenced as conditions for a safe drawdown and exit.

Ultimately, the defining factor for the drawdown of a peacekeeping operation is progress in the peace process and in the capacity of national institutions, including civil society. However, the strengthening of national capabilities cannot be enforced or imposed. States already made fragile by conflict are nonetheless asked to achieve radical and deep reforms across their entire governance systems in a matter of a few years.

Expectations must be realistic. Building capacity is not simply a numbers game. Strengthening civil society is not about holding a set number of workshops. Training hundreds of police becomes meaningless if there is no effective interior ministry to plan and support their work, or no legal and judicial structure for them to operate within. The absorption capacity of national authorities can vary across different sectors and geographic areas. Timing and sequencing need to be carefully considered, particularly with regard to the security sector. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, is challenged by the need to plan for and respond to different degrees of peace consolidation across a vast country.

We need to be able to maintain flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and capacities on the ground, while providing timely information to the Security Council and contributors. This allows us to

respond to shifting obstacles and to maximize opportunities as they arise.

We need to ensure that critical gaps in peacebuilding are reflected in reports to the Security Council. But as the Secretary-General noted, there also needs to be new thinking on how best to measure actual progress on the ground, given the importance of subjective aspects such as legitimacy, expectations and authority. As we know, not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts. Capturing the ebbs and flows of a peace process needs to go beyond benchmarking, and strategic guidance from the Security Council needs to be based on as comprehensive a picture as possible.

National authorities must play a pivotal role in the actual planning for the exit of a peacekeeping operation. Transitions may be a sign of successful peace consolidation, but they are also a very sensitive period. National authorities may have concerns that the exit of a peacekeeping mission may have unintended impacts or coincide with a huge drop in political support or even donor attention. The country may need a security guarantor, as was the case with Sierra Leone. We need to listen to and understand the expectations and perceptions of national authorities and civil society alike. Of course, the Peacebuilding Commission can also play a key role in that respect.

Peacebuilding activities also need to be continued beyond the lifespan of a peacekeeping operation; if they are not, there is a risk that gains made in peace consolidation could be lost. One continuing challenge is the mismatch between the assessed budget and the voluntary funds available to peacebuilding, which can limit the capacities of other actors to step in or increase activities as a peacekeeping mission draws down.

I would like to conclude by setting out some of the initiatives under way in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations aimed at strengthening transition strategies. We are working to initiate transition planning earlier. We are conducting a study on approaches to transitions in peacekeeping settings which considers the cases of Liberia and Timor-Leste. It also examines the experiences of Haiti, as the study was initiated before the devastating earthquake, which as the Council knows, one month ago took the lives of so many of our colleagues and Haitians. As Council members are aware, considerable progress was made in Haiti in terms of peace consolidation through the

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and under the leadership of Mr. Hédi Annabi and Mr. Luiz Carlos da Costa. Their contributions to the peace and security agenda were invaluable, and their insights and wisdom will be sorely missed.

In Haiti, as elsewhere, we are continuing our work to build stronger partnerships with critical United Nations actors, Member States and external partners such as the European Union, the World Bank, the African Union and others so that we can contribute to efforts to build coherent strategies in peacebuilding. We believe that strategic discussions with the World Bank, as called for in the Secretary-General's reports on peacebuilding, could be a useful tool for enhancing transition planning. We are also looking carefully at the experiences of past and ongoing missions and countries that have managed transitions so that we can draw on good practices and better articulate how peacekeeping can contribute to longer-term peacebuilding.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Le Roy for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support.

Ms. Malcorra: It gives me great pleasure to be here today to participate in this very important debate concerning transitions and exit strategies. This follows on naturally from several debates held in this Chamber last year on post-conflict peacebuilding and United Nations peacekeeping.

I offer a different perspective from the other speakers, to be sure, in terms of the challenges that we in the Secretariat face in our engagement with countries emerging from conflict. My department, the Department of Field Support (DFS) — the youngest department in the United Nations — was created in 2007 with the relatively narrow mandate to provide logistics and administrative support for the Secretariat's field operations, whether they are large-scale peacekeeping operations, small political presences or anything in between.

Many of the requirements of a large-scale, multifunctional peacekeeping operation with thousands of troops, military observers, police and civilian staff are, of course, quite different from the needs of the smaller presences, which are mostly composed of functional experts in the areas of governance, rule of law and security institutions, to name a few.

DFS is working hard to calibrate the services it provides according to the mandated objectives of each mission. At the same time, we recognize that there is a high degree of commonality in the support component for each field presence. The support needs to alter over time as the mission goes through its life cycle — start-up and surge, maturity, maintenance, reconfiguration, drawdown and exit — and has to change according to political developments on the ground and the mandates emanating from this Council. As a consequence, we need to be responsive, agile and flexible.

I have mentioned before in this Chamber the particular support challenges we face based on the existing regulatory framework and procedures, which do not always easily provide for such agility. But I assure the Council that my Department is working in close collaboration with other United Nations departments and, of course, with Member States on ways to improve the framework for the support we provide.

In this connection, we have just completed a document outlining our global field support strategy, which will be discussed in the General Assembly later in the year. The proposed strategy is very much intended to enable us to deliver our services better and faster. It would allow us to adapt to the requirements of each field operation as they evolve over time, from start-up until closure and in all transitions in between. Specifically, our proposal to service more than one operation from a regional service centre would facilitate the transformation from one type of mission to another and support that evolution in a much smoother manner.

Since the creation of DFS, we have seen the United Nations presence in several countries go through different configurations that have tested our ability to adapt ourselves within the limitations of the existing framework. The Secretariat's presence in Sierra Leone has transitioned from a fully fledged peacekeeping mission to a small integrated peacebuilding office. Mr. Von der Schulenburg is here today and will describe, I am sure, his effort to make that transition a success and the problems surmounted along the way.

I acknowledge that the path of that particular change was not always smooth from the mission support perspective, but we have learned many lessons that we are now applying successfully in Burundi and

also, as I speak, in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic, where two more changes to the United Nations configuration in-country are well under way. These include better succession planning and targeted staffing of the follow-on presences, which address the requirements of personnel profiles and skill, which are quite different.

We have also supported three transitions in which a long-serving mission either closed or reconfigured itself into a much smaller operation. Last year we supported the liquidation of two quite different missions — the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia — within a very short time span. The two missions, however, had some similar support requirements, such as contingent repatriation, asset disposal and the retrenchment of civilian staff, which required us to move quickly. At the same time, we had to conclude a number of sensitive issues with respect to the host countries.

In Kosovo, we supported the reconfiguration of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. From a support perspective, this involved the progressive retrenchment of over 1,000 civilian staff, who were either separated or reappointed to other missions where their skills and experience were needed. It also involved the disposal of a vast quantity of physical assets, either through redeployment to other missions or through sale or transfer to the European Union.

In addition, we need to be aware of the potential impact of mission drawdown on the local economy and, in particular, on the local labour market of a host country as procurement and staffing needs decrease as the size and geographical configuration of the United Nations footprint change. Among other efforts, partnerships with other international organizations and the local private sector can help our national staff to move on to other employment opportunities.

Each of these cases has reinforced in my mind the need to reconsider how the Organization generates the required civilian capacities, as well as how it finances its field operations. It goes without saying that when the Council decides to adopt a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mandate, it does so in the expectation that the Secretary-General will implement the mandate through an integrated approach maximizing the civilian capacities of the United Nations, the United Nations

country team and their implementing partners. I am sorry to say that we have not always been able to meet the Council's expectations in this regard. At the risk of oversimplifying, I should like to say that this is due in large part to diverse staffing practices among organizations, agencies, funds and programmes. We are working together with the Department of Management and other partners to resolve these issues or, until we have done so, to mitigate their effects on our ability to support the Organization in its response to post-conflict situations.

Finally, I should like to touch on another issue that impacts our ability to deliver — the question of financing. Council members are all aware that peacekeeping operations have a special scale of assessments. When an operation shifts to become a special political mission or peacebuilding office, it is then paid for from the regular budget of the United Nations and is thus financed by and assessed on all Member States accordingly, without the adjustments particular to the peacekeeping scale. The United Nations regular budget, as I am sure Council members know, comes under intense scrutiny and has only a small margin for growth during each biennium. Integrated United Nations offices and country team presences are financed from a separate set of funding streams, often relying on voluntary contributions and earmarked trust funds. An ongoing, predictable source of funding is required if a United Nations presence is to evolve smoothly with all the necessary capacities in place.

I do not offer any solutions to this problem today, and I recognize that resolving it goes beyond the purview of this body, but I would be remiss if I did not signal it as a very real challenge for us in how we think about support to peacekeeping transition and exit strategies. The constructive engagement of the full General Assembly membership will be required to address these issues.

We in DFS stand ready to address the challenges I have laid out with respect to countries in transition and countries emerging from conflict, where our collective efforts to nurture and consolidate peace are so critical. My Department will work closely with our partners within the Secretariat and the broader United Nations common system to ensure that support flows smoothly and reliably throughout the lifecycle of the United Nations presence in these countries.

We have a great deal of work before us to streamline business practices, establish common services and reconcile funding schemes. Unless we address these back-office challenges properly, it will be hard to really service these transitions as required because we will not always have the right tools.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Under-Secretary-General Malcorra for her statement.

I now give the floor to Mr. Alan Doss, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Mr. Doss: Thank you, Mr. President, for having invited me to speak at this meeting. As a graduate of four peacekeeping operations, I come labelled as a practitioner — a term which, in the hierarchy of intellectual achievement, is ranked only marginally above the sobriquet of diplomat. Nevertheless, I have a few frank and perhaps unorthodox thoughts to share with the Council this morning on the issues that have been outlined in the concept paper (S/2010/67).

First, I shall say a word on the way in which mandates are drafted and the degree to which there is clear integration of transition and exit strategies. Rarely, if ever, do we plan the exit strategy at the outset of a mission. If we did, I suspect that we might not want to mount a mission in the first place. The collective mindset of the international community finds it hard to accept that some problems are not amenable to quick, time-bound solutions. Moreover, the United Nations is often pressed to intervene with haste in conflict-affected areas and countries, especially when there is daily media coverage filled with graphic images of human suffering. Yes, ideally our entry strategy would define our exit strategy and set out the benchmarks to guide that process, but reality usually reveals that, in failed or failing States, the predictability of progress is highly tenuous.

Perhaps we need to accept this complexity and uncertainty and recognize that we will often struggle to find the right approach and that persistence and perseverance are indispensable tools in the peacekeeping tool box. Perhaps we need to accept as well that most conflicts are not resolved through single solutions and certainly not in conformity with the timetable ordained by the international community.

We must also acknowledge that peace agreements do not always make peace. In the four countries where I have served in peacekeeping missions, numerous accords were brokered, signed and then discarded. Not unsurprisingly, therefore, peacekeeping missions established in support of peace agreements can quickly become hostages to fortune. In such circumstances, planning for transition and exit can only be an iterative process subject to the vagaries of shifting political and military realities on the ground.

This leads me to say that transition and exit strategies should not be conceived as a linear exercise with one step leading inexorably to another. Progress is neither inevitable nor predestined. Sadly, it is just as possible to go backwards as it is to go forwards. On the other hand, it is possible to move ahead with recovery, State-building and even economic development while there is still active conflict somewhere in a country. Transition strategies therefore have to be flexible and opportunistic.

The next topic is planning with reference to the end state, key tasks and the phased completion of the mission. In my view, planning in United Nations missions today — or at least peacekeeping missions — is largely geared to the reporting requirements of the budget and mandate cycle. In my experience, we do not sit down and think very far ahead. Inevitably, we are pulled into the immediate — the urgent displaces the important. The planning process as it is now practiced is not the best way to think about the future. We tend to get immersed in the details of mandate implementation and fail to see the broader strategic picture.

Planning should ideally start with the assessment of future risk and probability. On that basis, we can plan for a variety of outcomes, not just one. In peacekeeping, we will always be faced with uncertainty, but we should try to look around corners and get a better fix on possible alternative end states and not only the end of the State.

I hope that the development of integrated strategic frameworks will help us move in that direction, bringing together the analytical and operational capacities of the peacekeeping operation and the United Nations country team in a consultative process with national partners and other actors. This is what we are currently doing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Now, if I may, allow me to make a couple of comments on capacities and resources. Resource constraints are a perennial problem of all peacekeeping missions. I doubt that we will ever have adequate resources. We therefore have to frame mandates that are manageable, and then ensure that missions make the best of whatever resources are available to them. As the concept paper points out, missions vary enormously in size and complexity. There is no obvious correlation between surface area, population size and the magnitude of a mission. While we should probably avoid a standard formula for determining mission size, we should try to ensure a reasonable fit between mandate and means.

That is especially important when a mission is mandated to protect civilians, as we are in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). When the Council gives a mission a protection mandate, it must make sure that this is a feasible proposition that can be achieved with the resources and capabilities available to that mission. Sometimes, I must say, there is a disconnect between the two, with the result that we create expectations that cannot be fulfilled.

But there will always be constraints, physical as well as financial. We must therefore also look for capacity multipliers. In MONUC, for example, we have introduced the concept of smart protection, recognizing that we cannot be everywhere all of the time. We are trying out a variety of innovations to better direct our resources to where they can be most effectively used to protect people most at risk.

To do that, however, our operational policies and procedures have to be adapted to get better value out of the resources that are available. Memorandums of understanding with troop- and police-contributing countries need to be more flexible to allow for quicker redeployment as operational situations develop. That also goes for our operational procedures. The way we manage our air operations, for example, is a case in point. Most important, our failure to equip missions with adequate tactical intelligence capabilities seriously reduces our operational effectiveness in conflict situations.

The coordination of international efforts in the field has also been listed as one of the issues for discussion. I am tempted to say that coordination is the holy grail of the international community — much

sought after, but never found. As peacekeeping missions have assumed a wider range of mandated tasks, the complexity of coordination has also increased within missions themselves, among United Nations partners, with Member States, donor partners and, of course, the Governments themselves. A great deal of energy is expended in the name of coordination, and not always with positive results. Coordination should be more than just information sharing.

From personal experience, I would recommend the creation of light but systematic consultation structures. In Kinshasa, we have the so-called Security Council-plus format, which meets at least every two weeks and where we brief and discuss military and political developments and explore and exchange ideas on emerging issues of strategic importance, such as elections, security sector reform and upcoming reports of the Secretary-General to the Council.

A broader coordination mechanism has been established for donors, in which the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund participate. There is also a mechanism for humanitarian coordination. I am not sure, however, that all those initiatives tie up as neatly as we might wish. That is especially of concern in the area of macroeconomic policy, where the impact of economic measures can have a very direct effect on security and stability.

Coordination within the international community needs to be matched by a parallel relationship with national authorities, especially in the area of national security. That is especially important when contemplating drawdown. In Sierra Leone, we met regularly with the National Security Council to make district-by-district security assessments as the basis for decision-making on troop drawdown. Similar assessments were done in Liberia, and perhaps my colleague will speak to that. We will also be doing the same in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as we move forward on contemplating a drawdown.

You have also asked us, Mr. President, to comment on political support for the peace process within the Council and beyond. Creating and sustaining political support for a peace process is a vital but sometimes elusive undertaking. Restoring peace and peacebuilding is an incremental process that rarely follows a straight and narrow path. That produces frequent frustration and occasional despondency.

Most of us in the international community will be associated with a given peace process only for a limited time before we move on, and so we are impatient for success. But often we lack a full appreciation of the historical, cultural and economic factors that created the conflict in the first place. We do not always understand the complex personal relationships that may exacerbate underlying problems. Our institutional memories can be quite short, while the cast of characters is very large.

The Council and its faithful servants, the special representatives of the Secretary-General, therefore have to find middle ground between empathy and firmness as we seek to move a peace process forward. Most important, the messages sent by the Council through its resolutions and statements, and echoed by special representatives, must show a high degree of consistency and political resolve. Frequent changes in tone or intent encourage intransigence, leading spoilers to believe that the Council will quickly back off in the face of adversity or opposition. In mid-2000, when the Revolutionary United Front attacked the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the Council's unanimous and speedy reaction helped to turn the tide. More recently, the Council's determination to persevere with our efforts to put an end to armed violence in the Kivus has made a very significant difference.

Let me add that the alignment of political forces behind a peace process must extend to regional actors. In each of the four countries in which I have been involved with peace operations, neighbouring States have either been part of the problem or part of the solution. They must therefore be engaged, in one form or another, from the outset.

Finally, allow me to conclude with a couple of comments on processes, including benchmarks and the modalities for reporting to the Council on progress towards the achievement of the end state. Measuring and evaluating a peace process and the transition to an end state is not an exact science. Benchmarks, indicators and outcomes are all useful as tools for assessing progress, but they must be kept simple and relatively easy to monitor. They should be accessible and comprehensible to our national partners. Ideally, they should incorporate goals and targets already adopted by the Government concerned and its partners. They need to be consistent and applicable across a variety of sectors. They should serve essentially as a

set of traffic lights that are clearly visible and easily understood.

They should also draw a distinction between core and contextual concerns. Core concerns relate to the security and political mandates of a mission — the goals that must be achieved before a drawdown can be initiated or withdrawal completed. Contextual benchmarks encompass a broader set of goals, such as poverty reduction, that may not be achieved within the lifetime of a mission, highly desirable though they may be.

Albert Einstein once remarked that all knowledge was experience. So I hope that my limited experience, which I have shared with the Council this morning, will serve to expand, if only marginally, our common knowledge about transition and exit strategies.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Doss for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

Ms. Løj: I thank the Security Council for inviting me to participate in this important debate about United Nations peacekeeping. The debate on this issue over the past 12 months in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, as well as internally in the Secretariat, has been not only timely but also necessary to ensure common understanding on how to tackle future peacekeeping challenges. Let me add that, in thinking about these issues, it is not always necessary to develop fresh ideas. Sometimes, it is also useful to revisit long-standing proposals and evaluate them against today's and tomorrow's challenges.

Today's debate has a special focus on how to end peacekeeping operations and how to transition into longer-term conflict-prevention activities. Based on my experience from two years as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Liberia, I would like to focus my remarks on three issues: mandates, implementation and tools.

At the outset, however, let me underline that for all three of those elements, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Each and every conflict and peacekeeping challenge has to be reviewed and the solutions adjusted to the specific challenges characterizing the country or the conflict. There is no recipe that can be applied across the board. Country-specific challenges and

capacities have to be taken into account from the outset, and measures need to be decided and applied accordingly.

First, a few words about mandates. In his report in April 2001 (S/2001/394, para. 6), the then-Secretary-General states "A good exit or transition strategy depends on a good entrance strategy" — with the entrance strategy, of course being embodied in the mandate of the mission. It is therefore paramount that a mission's initial mandate be clear in its priorities, be realistic and leave no room for ambiguity.

In Liberia, some of the day-to-day challenges we face are related to the interpretation of our mandate — with regard to the protection of civilians, for instance. How should "imminent threat of physical danger" and "within its capabilities" be interpreted? These are weak phrases that can be taken as all-encompassing or as nothing at all. Furthermore, in Liberia incidents of mob violence are common and often involve attacks not only on the Liberian National Police but also on civilians. How are such incidents meant to be treated in a peacekeeping mission? How is a mission to deal with an imminent threat when the threat comes from civilians? Such questions need to be well thought through when mandates are formulated.

We need implementable mandates rather than politically correct ones, which I have often more informally called "Christmas trees". Each mandate should be adjusted to the specific context on the ground. What works in one place may be impossible to implement in another. Furthermore, it is important that the Council exercise great care when changing a mission's mandate. If new tasks are being continuously added, the context surrounding the original ones, including the provision of a security umbrella, and the conditions for its transition and exit will become increasingly difficult. If the goal post keeps changing, so to speak, there will be consequences as to when the desired end state can be reached.

Secondly, I would like to make a few comments on the challenges and constraints we face when implementing mandates, especially in integrated missions. Integrated missions are generally tasked not only with keeping the peace but also with assisting to build national capacities to sustain the peace — in other words, peacebuilding. For those missions, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not two separate sequential processes; they are two sides of the same

coin, are closely interlinked and must be pursued simultaneously.

There appears to be conceptual agreement across the United Nations system and among Member States concerning the integrated approach to keep, to build and to sustain the peace, for instance in a country like Liberia. The challenges we face, however, concern how to implement that approach in practice. That is further accentuated by the institutional framework we have established, both in terms of governing bodies and the generation of resources, especially assessed versus voluntary contributions. Let me provide a few concrete examples of these implementation challenges.

While Liberia is not yet a self-starter, delivering as one country — although I expect it to become one soon — the level of integration between the country team and the Mission is very good. It includes innovated approaches such as joint programmes, joint offices and joint use of United Nations assets — but also a general willingness to find pragmatic solutions to common challenges. We are, as we say, working together and trying hard to deliver as one.

Keeping in mind that an exit strategy should form part of every entrance strategy, that integration should be institutionalized early on in the life of a mission. However, due to different governing bodies, budget cycles and even procurement rules and regulations, achieving true integration and delivering as one can be extremely challenging. My plea would be that the various governing bodies and the Member States consider that issue.

Another point has to do with assessed versus voluntary contributions. In my mind, there is no doubt that for peacebuilding activities to succeed, funds other than, and in addition to, assessed funds — whether through the agencies and programmes working with a mission or through bilateral partners — must be available. Security sector reform is more than plans and policies. It is also implementation. If voluntary funds to sustain implementation do not materialize, that creates significant gaps on the ground.

Let me illustrate with the case of the Liberian National Police. The Mission's mandate is primarily focused on training and mentoring. But even the best trained police officer needs the means to function — equipment, transport, etc. Unless the voluntary funds are forthcoming, the police force will not have the desired impact.

A third set of challenges relates to ensuring national ownership — the overarching prerequisite for any transition or exit. Transforming a mission from doers to mentors is the key to sustainability and is probably the hardest task for any mission. Yet without national ownership, no peace can be sustained. The United Nations in Liberia was able to plan its intervention based on clear national leadership and in alignment with national planning frameworks fairly early on.

I wish to conclude with a few words on the tools available to facilitate transitions and exits. First of all, as I have said, exit strategies should be incorporated from the early days of the mission, even if they are not fully formulated. Otherwise, the mission will act like a ship without a clear destination. The development of benchmarks to monitor the consolidation, draw-down and withdrawal of a mission is important and is a vital tool to guide transition.

In Liberia — thanks to my colleague on my left — we have been working with benchmarks since 2006 and have learned how important it is to define clearly what we are measuring. Are we assessing the achievements of the Mission against its mandate, or against overall progress in the country? I strongly believe it should be the latter. If it is, we need to measure not only the impact of the Mission's activities, but also the impact of those being conducted by the entire United Nations family, the Government and other partners.

Finally, Member States and the Council have much focused on reporting from missions. While that is understandable, let me reiterate that nothing beats experiencing the challenges at first hand, in the field. We always welcome visits to Liberia from the Security Council and other Member States at different levels, especially since so many Members are not represented in Monrovia.

Mr. President, thank you once again for inviting me to participate in this debate. Merci beaucoup.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. Løj for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone.

Mr. Von der Schulenburg: First of all, let me thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to this very important discussion. It will have a great impact not only on Member States but also on how we in the field — your field commanders, so to speak — will work. I am therefore glad that the Council has taken this laudable initiative to listen to what we have to say.

As I am the last speaker here, I thought I would only make one clarification and three suggestions. First is the clarification.

Sierra Leone is probably the first example in the United Nations of a full transition from a once very large peacekeeping operation to a now small, fully civilian, integrated peacebuilding mission. There is a similar example in Burundi, but it is somewhat different, so I think that we are the first example. For this reason, I would like to limit my recommendations on this experience.

Therefore, in the recommendations I will use the term “peacebuilding” or “peacebuilding mission” not in the general sense of State-building and that type of activity, but simply as a next phase, a successor arrangement to a peacekeeping operation. This is of course a limited use of the term, but I think it is useful for this purpose.

Let me now come to the suggestions I have to make. The first point is that, if we can prove that integrated peacebuilding missions work, that may facilitate the decision to withdraw peacekeepers earlier. I am very much aware that this is a very touchy suggestion. I am also fully aware that the Council's decision to exit or close a peacekeeping mission will depend on many other factors. I nonetheless would like to maintain that knowing that one have a less risky and less abrupt exit strategy through an integrated peacebuilding mission would make that decision much easier. From my point of view, a peacebuilding mission is basically an interim arrangement between a peacekeeping operation and the normal system of resident coordinators.

If one compares our mandate to the resident coordinator system, the great advantage we have is that we still have a political mandate, and that allows us to make political interventions and promote conflict prevention measures. That is not the case with resident coordinators. I would suggest that, for instance, the way we handled the conflict we had in March of last year would not have been possible had we not had a

political mandate. In a situation where there are no more peacekeepers, having a political mandate allows one to act.

If that is possible, such a thing would have considerable financial benefits for Member States. Here again, I want to use the example of Sierra Leone. At the peacekeeping mission's peak, in 2004, we still had about 20,000 staff, of which 17,500 were peacekeepers. The total cost at the time was well over \$600 million. Four years later, with the new integrated peacebuilding mission — and of course there is a slow transition with these things — we had only 77 staff members, of which half were actually national staff. The total costs had sunk to \$15 million in 2009, a mere 2.5 per cent of the previous cost.

That means that we can prove, with functioning integrated peacebuilding missions, that if the Council makes a decision even six months earlier — and I am not saying that this is the core of the whole thing — we could ensure considerable savings for Member States. We could, basically, for the cost of six months of operations, run 20 years of an integrated peacebuilding mission. However, I am not suggesting that we stay 20 years.

In Sierra Leone there is also another aspect related to early withdrawal. I think Sierra Leone is probably one of the countries where we decided very quickly to draw down — and that might be for completely different reasons, of course. I think that the conditions I see when I go through the country today and the very positive image we still have in Sierra Leone, despite having been engaged there since 1991, have to a very large extent to do with the fact that we did not keep soldiers for a longer time than they were absolutely needed. We all know that large contingents of soldiers also have negative effects, and those negative effects were largely prevented in Sierra Leone. So I think there is an additional advantage in peacebuilding missions. They are less intrusive and less visible and hence more acceptable to the population in host countries.

Let me come to the next point, which I think is even more important. If we have integrated peacebuilding missions, we must not see them as simply smaller peacekeeping missions without peacekeepers. They must develop their own character. That is exactly what we have tried to do in Sierra Leone. We are only one example and are not

necessarily the model case, but there are a number of points I want to raise here.

The first issue one has to raise, once all the soldiers have gone, is where is an Assistant Secretary-General getting his political weight from? Suddenly all the trappings of power that come with large peacekeeping operations are gone. The many soldiers, the helicopters, the cars and the huge chunk of resources that go all around the country — where have they gone? How does one maintain one's influence?

I have come to some conclusions about how we should build an integrated mission. I want to mention here some of the most important aspects of it.

We have to realize that the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding is a change in focus from peace and security to peace and development. The shift is really therefore from security to development. That is not to say that we do not have peacebuilding operations already under peacekeeping operations, but the focus has to change, and that change in focus is fundamental for understanding the other points.

Peacebuilding missions will be successful only if they are based on a national agenda. That is why I have always been opposed to the peacebuilding frameworks drawn up by the Peacebuilding Commission. It has to be a national agenda. We cannot come from outside and develop another agenda. In the case of Sierra Leone, it is the Government's Agenda for Change. I think it is something that will work. What we have done is to build our strategy on top of that one, saying how the United Nations system as a whole can support it. That is what we call the Joint United Nations Vision.

Peacebuilding requires the full integration of the political mandate of the mission with the various development mandates. I do not want to dwell too much on those, but the Council is aware that in Sierra Leone we have agreed for quite some time now, and with the help of the Peacebuilding Commission, that we will only have one strategy, that is the joint United Nations strategy. There is not a separate one for the political mission, a separate one for the development agencies and so forth. We have all agreed on this one. It is a very simple strategy, only seven pages, so everybody can read it, and 18 agencies have signed on to it.

This is a very important thing. We are no longer talking about negotiating conflicts; we are talking

about State-building. There is always a political and a development aspect to this, and they are so intertwined that we cannot separate them.

We have tried from the very beginning to encompass all development partners in peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is not an issue only for the United Nations missions. For that reason, we have taken the lead in donor coordination. It is also equally important that we provide considerable logistics and other services for Member States in order to make their work in the field much easier. Our regional field offices, the use of the helicopter, the use of our communication infrastructure, the medical clinic and many other things will help all the other countries in their work in Sierra Leone. We are therefore really acting as a Member States organization, on behalf of Member States.

Another point that I would like to make is that an integrated peacebuilding mission, if it is properly designed, makes an exit strategy actually relatively easy. In fact, the exit strategy in Sierra Leone is the Joint Vision. The Joint Vision is so geared towards development that a gradual transition into the development agenda, slowly leaving the political arena, will almost go unnoticed. The transition from a peacebuilding mission to the normal resident coordinator system is therefore much easier than it is when there are large military forces and a very visible change must be made.

This is the conclusion I would like to make here: that when you talk about exit strategies, it would probably be better to always talk about transition strategies. It is a transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding — if you want to put things in boxes — and from peacebuilding to the resident coordinator system. That would probably make some of the Council's decisions much easier.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Von der Schulenburg for his statement.

In accordance with the understanding reached among Council members, I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate the texts in writing and to deliver a condensed version when speaking in the Chamber.

I shall now give the floor to members of the Council.

Sir Mark Lyall Grant (United Kingdom): I thank you, Sir, for instigating this important debate today. I also thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the Special Representatives for their important remarks and for bringing their expertise to the Council.

We have been looking at peacekeeping issues in a more systematic way for over a year now, and we have made some progress in this Council, but today's speakers have identified an issue that goes to the heart of the Council's role in peacekeeping, which is how the United Nations presence should evolve to support a country's progress from conflict through post-conflict to peace consolidation. We have heard today about how this is an essential challenge to three important United Nations mission — in Sierra Leone, where a series of successful transitions have taken us from a peacekeeping operation to an integrated peacebuilding mission; in Liberia, which has begun the process of drawdown and transition; and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the forthcoming strategic review will be an important opportunity to set a new course for peace consolidation.

I have one strategic point and five practical suggestions to make.

The strategic point is that transition — as Ms. Løj explained — is not about a linear progression from one kind of activity — peacekeeping — to another — peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is the objective at the outset, and a peacekeeping operation is often important but only a part of achieving that objective. Thus, peacekeeping and peacebuilding must form part of a single, comprehensive and integrated plan. And that plan should have a political settlement at its heart. As all three Special Representatives have stated, it should unite the efforts of all United Nations actors and the broad international community, and it should strengthen national capacity.

All actors must understand the overall objective and their role in contributing to it. Ms. Løj has worked hard to ensure that we have such a strategy in Liberia under the United Nations Development Assistance Framework. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the staff of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) have created such a plan in the first integrated strategic

framework. In Sierra Leone, we have the joint vision drawn up by Mr. Von der Schulenburg. Without these overall strategies, peacekeeping efforts can lack coordination and risk duplicating effort in support of some priorities, while neglecting others.

In our view, to make this work in practice, we need five things. First, we need a clear understanding from the outset of the outcome we seek from the peacekeeping operation. The overall objective should be to help create the conditions for a peace process to prosper. The Council needs to get better at defining what that success will look like in each individual case. As Mr. Doss said, sometimes we concentrate too much on the urgent at the expense of the important, and we need to ensure that the Council has enough time to discuss and monitor at a strategic level what a United Nations operation is trying to achieve.

Secondly, we need a clear and prioritized set of tasks that fall to the peacekeeping operation and a way to measure their progress. I think that we are getting better at this, including through the use of benchmarking, but we still have a long way to go in developing flexible but effective ways of evaluating success.

Thirdly, we need to be clear about what peacekeepers can do and cannot do. There is much that peacekeepers can do to support peacebuilding, as the Secretary-General set out in his report. This can include providing a minimum level of sustainable security or helping to restore core Government functions, but peacekeepers cannot deliver an entire peacebuilding strategy.

Fourthly, the Security Council needs to focus its attention on the critical obstacles to achieving the strategic objectives. Sometimes we will need tougher political messages; sometimes we will need to reconfigure the mission, as we have done in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We spend too much time talking about what is happening now and not enough about what is required to get to sustainable peace.

Lastly, I think we need to make better use of the Peacebuilding Commission. At its conception in 2005, we wanted the Commission to help the Council manage the drawdown and transition of successful peacekeeping operations, and it has done a lot of admirable work. But like the Secretary-General, we would like to see an even sharper focus on what

concrete action needs to be taken by the Council, by peacekeepers and by the rest of the United Nations system to achieve that strategic objective. There is a broader point here. We need to draw in advice more regularly from across the range of military, police, development and other expertise available.

We should celebrate the many successes of United Nations peacekeeping. It has been a remarkable institution, but we often ask too much of it and expect it to deliver what only national authorities can deliver: security and prosperity. We should give the peacekeepers clear and achievable goals, and recognize when their work is done and it is time for others to take up the burden. That will often involve a degree of risk, and we must be realistic about that risk. But the alternative is overstretch and failure to achieve the unachievable. And that, in our view, is the biggest threat to United Nations peacekeeping.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his concision and the good example he has set for the Security Council as a whole.

Mr. Salam (Lebanon) (*spoke in French*): I will set another good example today by speaking in French.

Our delegation welcomes your initiative, Sir, to convene this important thematic debate. I also thank the Secretary-General for his participation today, and express our deep appreciation to the Assistant Secretaries-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for their valuable contributions.

My delegation associates itself with the statement to be made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

My delegation has closely followed the Security Council's efforts over the past 15 months simultaneously to promote the maintenance and building of peace. Lebanon is convinced that successful United Nations peacekeeping operations and their transition and exit strategies require partnership between the Security Council, the Secretariat, the troop-contributing countries and host countries, as has often been noted.

As you note, Sir, in your concept paper (S/2010/67), peacekeeping missions have reached an all-time high in recent years, with over 96,000 men and women in uniform deployed in 15 missions and a

budget of about \$7.8 billion. These figures are unprecedented. We therefore need to ensure adequate resources, which are presently disproportionate to the complexity of activities of the peacekeeping operations. It is also vital that the objectives of the operations be well defined; they must clearly help to resolve conflicts and to establish lasting peace through a successful exit strategy.

In the Middle East, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian territories is at the heart of the conflict and must be resolved if we are to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the region and the successful drawdown of the United Nations missions there.

It is mostly through a comprehensive and inclusive political process that peacekeeping operations are able to help protect civilians and achieve sustainable peace. A successful transition also depends on defining clear and achievable mandates and on adequate financing. In the southern part of my country, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is an example of how the clarity of objectives has been translated into close cooperation and coordinated action between the Lebanese Army and the mission.

The scope and complexity of peacekeeping operations are currently incompatible with existing capabilities. We must therefore set realistic goals and ensure that missions enjoy adequate financing and appropriate logistical support that will facilitate successful transition and exit strategies. Lebanon stresses the close link between the maintenance and building of peace. Indeed, recovery and peacebuilding activities are essential from the earliest phases of peacekeeping. They must be undertaken in coordination with host Governments and through development programmes, as well as by strengthening national institutions and the rule of law. In this regard, we very much appreciate the role that UNIFIL is playing and call on international partners to assist in building the capacities of the Lebanese armed forces.

We also stress the importance of the consulting role of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and call for regular coordination with the Commission. Indeed, peacebuilding efforts made right from the start of peacekeeping will help to ensure stability, especially in the area of economic recovery, which will help strengthen security and build trust in peacekeepers and their mission. In this regard, a post-conflict country's

initiative to prioritize its peacebuilding needs is essential to constructive dialogue and effective partnership with the international community. The involvement of the PBC in Burundi and Sierra Leone has facilitated the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, largely through the support of integrated peacebuilding strategies defined and implemented by national Governments.

In Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic, the involvement of the PBC has resulted in a new generation of integrated United Nations offices. Lebanon welcomes the PBC's review exercise, which will open a unique opportunity to strengthen its role in the countries where it is operating.

Finally, we note yet again that the success of peacekeeping missions and their transition and exit strategies require genuine partnership among all stakeholders. We also draw the Council's attention to the key role played by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in developing political plans, and the role of the General Assembly's Fifth Committee in providing adequate financing.

Mrs. Ogwu (Nigeria): My first words must be to thank you, Mr. President, for your initiative in organizing this thematic debate. The concept paper accompanying the discussion (S/2010/67) has also proved invaluable in crystallizing perspectives for the debate. I welcome the presence of the Secretary-General and thank him for his useful statement. I would also like to thank the Under-Secretaries-General and Special Representatives for their invaluable contribution to the debate.

My intervention will focus on six key elements. First, with respect to mandates, I believe that we could be more precise in the drafting of mandates to include clear transition and exit strategies. Such clarity should cover mission objectives, mandates and strategies. The Council should be clear and firm on the need to link exit and transition strategies to the achievement of stated objectives. Mandates should be realistic and achievable, allowing for flexibility in their interpretation, and we should not overlook the moral imperatives that impel peacekeeping operations in the first place. Exit for its own sake would be counterproductive, if not prejudicial, to peacekeeping missions. We want neither to see a repeat of the mistakes in Rwanda and Srebrenica nor to relive the painful memory of their tragic consequences.

Secondly, planning must be comprehensive and provide for an integrated approach that allows peacekeeping operations to dovetail with peacebuilding and peacemaking. Lessons should be drawn from the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), especially during its forthcoming review, to guide future planning. We support a broad and integrated approach, with a phased completion of peacekeeping missions. We believe that there should be wider consultations with relevant stakeholders, particularly troop- and police-contributing countries, on the planning and deployment of missions.

Thirdly, we believe that capacities and resources must be adequate and predictable. Our experience has affirmed the point well articulated in this Chamber today that resources for peacekeeping operations are often disproportionately allocated, resulting in an abundance of resources where there is the least need and a shortage where the need is greater. Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are cases in point.

On the other hand, the strengthening of national capacities on which a successful exit strategy will depend does not receive sufficient and sustained support. It is therefore necessary for the Council and, indeed, for Member States to attach greater importance to building and strengthening capacities, and to allocate adequate and predictable resources to promote quick-impact programmes and, ultimately, sustainable development in its integrated economic, social and environmental dimensions.

Fourthly, the challenge of coordination is manifested not only in security sector reform, but in all phases of United Nations operational activities, especially at the country level. The capacity of the United Nations to lead international efforts in peacekeeping should be strengthened. Accordingly, the Council should intensify its promotion of coordination and synergy among the various actors and stakeholders.

The United Nations goal of acting and delivering as one will be tested on its ability to coordinate effectively. More importantly, the United Nations must give practical expression to the notion of national ownership of development priorities and needs. Our support must be sequenced to take into account such identified priorities and needs, with a view to

promoting coherence in the actions of international actors.

Fifthly, sustained political support for peace processes is essential if peacekeeping operations are to succeed and, indeed, pave the way for an orderly and honourable exit. The discordance and lack of consistency in the political support given to different conflict situations call for profound rethinking. Here, consideration should be given to other mechanisms, notably preventive diplomacy, as soon as the signs are clear that conflict is imminent. The capacity to respond, especially at the regional and subregional levels, should be built and, indeed, strengthened. The growing cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States could provide useful lessons to draw on in designing operational models and frameworks.

Sixthly, all this will depend on the processes we put in place with regard to measurable performance benchmarks, reporting systems and evolution of results. Mandatory reporting to the Security Council and review of results will be necessary if members of the Council and, indeed, the international community are to have a better appreciation of the exit and transition targets that will be established. We would warn against a precipitate exit and transition strategy that does not take into account the significant achievement of the set objectives of peacekeeping missions. The Council should also resist the temptation to exit simply because a mandate requires an exit by a set period or an exit motivated by other extraneous factors. The United Nations should endeavour to go in early and stay long enough, if need be, to give hope to the hopeless and succour to the millions of helpless, distressed and displaced victims of conflict.

Mr. Mayr-Harting (Austria): We welcome your initiative, Sir, in organizing today's debate on transition and exit strategies. We thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the Special Representatives present here today for their important and thought-provoking contributions to this discussion. We are convinced that this meeting can also serve as an important opportunity for troop- and police-contributing countries to share their highly relevant experience with Council members and the Secretariat.

Austria aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the representative of the European Union

later in this meeting, but let me make the following additional points.

The draft presidential statement before the Council rightly underlines that the overarching objective of successful United Nations peacekeeping operations should be the creation of conditions for sustainable peace on the ground, ultimately allowing for a mission's reconfiguration and withdrawal. For a successful transition from peacekeeping to continued peacebuilding or other forms of United Nations presence, it is necessary that effective national capacities for the provision of security, basic services, rule of law and long-term development be put in place in an integrated manner by national authorities, in close cooperation with international stakeholders. Mr. von der Schulenburg has underlined the key role of the national contribution. Peacebuilding and peacekeeping efforts need to go hand in hand from an early stage, based on a common and integrated strategy.

That approach should also guide future mandating of United Nations missions. Clear, credible and achievable mandates must be oriented towards a desired outcome or, as Mr. Doss has suggested, at least towards alternative outcomes. We also need clear benchmarks and a clear prioritization of tasks. I must say that I sympathize with the criticism expressed by Ms. Løj, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, regarding the Council's calls that missions should fulfil protection mandates within their capabilities. The Council must ensure — at least, this is our opinion — that mandates are matched with the resources required for their full implementation from the very start.

In order to avoid premature closure of operations, however, both benchmarks and objectives must be field-driven and shared by all parties. Moreover, those tools for monitoring progress must be reviewed regularly and aligned with the needs on the ground.

Against the background of increasing, and increasingly complex, operations, cooperation with regional and subregional organizations and other international actors, in particular in a transition context, will become ever more important. The Council has already discussed this. But to give one example from one of the cases being discussed today, the European Union has for several years actively supported the transition process in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo under the framework of the security sector reform launched by that country's Government.

More often than not, the active involvement of regional and subregional organizations is essential for ensuring the sustainability of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities undertaken by the United Nations. There is therefore a need to ensure close coherence among peacebuilding plans and programmes launched by those organizations, Member States and the financial institutions, as well as the United Nations presence on the ground.

In line with Security Council resolution 1894 (2009), the protection of civilians must be duly taken into account throughout the life cycle of peacekeeping operations, including in the transition phase. That is a very important angle of our discussion here today. The ability and willingness of a State to protect its own civilian population is a precondition for sustainable peace and thus for the withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation.

Creating a favourable protection environment goes beyond protecting civilians from physical violence and must be complemented by activities in the fields of security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, rule of law, transitional justice, human rights and empowerment of local society. Early coordination of these activities and a common strategy among all actors involved will be crucial for success. Let me also emphasize that the full participation of women in all processes has to be ensured, in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000). Liberia, for instance, is clearly a model case in that regard.

We welcome the clear link made in the draft presidential statement between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and sustainable development, an interconnection Mr. Von der Schulenburg pointed out very eloquently in the model case — and it is truly a model case — of Sierra Leone. This interrelationship must also be taken into account in the ongoing Peacebuilding Commission review process. Early economic recovery and the delivery of a peace dividend are crucial incentives for societies to invest in peace and stability. In this context, let me also point out the significant contribution peacekeeping missions can make to socio-economic development in their areas of deployment, not least through local procurement.

And let me say that my delegation is very supportive of the work of Under-Secretary-General Malcorra in this field.

Over the past years, several peacekeeping operations have been closed and followed by other forms of United Nations engagement, in many cases by integrated peacebuilding offices. We agree that the time has come to draw lessons learned from those examples. Therefore we welcome the decision of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to address in the coming months key lessons learned from past and current missions regarding the successful implementation of transition strategies. We believe that continued dialogue between the Working Group and troop- and police-contributing countries will contribute to this exercise.

Mr. Rugunda (Uganda): I thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this important debate. I would like to thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support for their useful statements, as well as the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General who have given us their field experiences and advice.

This debate on transition and exit strategies comes at an opportune moment. We have had extensive deliberations on how peacekeeping can be made more effective, including through strengthening strategic partnerships with regional organizations and troop- and police-contributing countries. The United Nations and the wider international community have sustained efforts to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. However, those endeavours are being put to the test by new threats to global peace and security such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and organized crime. The situation is further complicated by the increasing activities of non-State actors and dire humanitarian consequences for innocent civilian populations, including women and children.

Peacekeeping is an essential and indispensable tool available to the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is therefore important to ensure that peacekeeping operations are carried out in an effective manner, with built-in transition and exit strategies. Their primary and key objective should be to create conditions for sustainable peace on the ground so that the reconfiguration or

withdrawal of United Nations peacekeeping missions can be carried out with minimal or no risk of relapse into conflict.

We are convinced that to be successful, any transition or exit strategy must be underpinned by five essential considerations.

First, there must be careful planning that entails a thorough understanding of the causes of the conflict and how existing local or internal structures can be utilized in the search for a solution. Secondly, clear and situation-specific peacekeeping mandates should be developed, kept under review by the Security Council and varied as may be necessary, based on the dynamics of the situation on the ground.

Thirdly, a programme with timelines and benchmarks for priority activities, including reconciliation, stabilization and consolidation of the peace, should be developed and owned by the national authorities. It should focus on key priorities such as support for building the capacity of national institutions, including security sector reform.

Fourthly, some peacebuilding activities should be planned and implemented at the earliest stages of peacekeeping. It is important to ensure that people afflicted by conflict receive tangible peace dividends through provision of basic services such as health care, education, shelter and improvement of their standards of living. To this end, more resources need to be allocated to programmes and activities that improve the welfare of the people.

Fifthly, we reiterate the need for the United Nations system to ensure greater coherence in peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and development activities. In our view, it is time that the United Nations system and the broader international community commit more resources to peacebuilding activities. The Peacebuilding Fund is an important instrument for the provision of flexible funding to countries on the Peacebuilding Commission agenda and other countries in need. However, its total financial resources are limited to about \$350 million, and yet the budgets of some peacekeeping missions amount to \$500 million or even \$1 billion per year.

In conclusion, Uganda reiterates the need to further strengthen the partnership between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations. This is critical if we are to optimize their contributions

to conflict prevention, conflict mediation, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Ms. DiCarlo (United States of America): I should like to express our appreciation to you, Mr. President, for having organized this important debate. I should also like to thank the Secretary-General and Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra for their valuable insights, and Mr. Doss, Ms. Loj and Mr. Von der Schulenburg for having provided their unique perspectives from the field.

Over the past year, the Council has devoted considerable attention to ways to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping. Today's debate on transition and exit strategies will enhance this effort.

In numerous debates, the Council has noted that, with the growth in volume and complexity of peacekeeping operations, United Nations peacekeeping is under severe strain. We have also noted that we are placing multiple demands on a finite supply of well-equipped and trained troops and police. We must keep these factors in mind before renewing peacekeeping mandates or establishing new operations, especially where conditions on the ground are ill-suited to successful peacekeeping.

But we must not forget why the Security Council establishes peacekeeping operations in the first place. United Nations peacekeeping saves lives and delivers real results. Many countries are far more stable today because of past and current United Nations peacekeeping efforts. Sierra Leone and Burundi are both consolidating hard-won peace; Liberia is on a promising track. But we must stay the course.

But we have also seen what can happen when we are too swift to terminate a mission, as in Timor-Leste. We must resist the temptation to withdraw peacekeepers prematurely or to downsize or terminate missions on the basis of arbitrary timelines and false readings of progress. Hard-won progress can unravel swiftly if peacekeepers depart precipitously without leaving behind the foundations for a sustainable peace.

In its presidential statement of August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24), the Security Council recommitted itself to improving the overall performance of United Nations peacekeeping and to addressing the challenges it faces today. The measures outlined in that statement and those in the draft statement before us today provide us with tools to strengthen peacekeeping in the interest

of helping countries make a swift transition to a durable peace. I should like to comment on a few of these measures today.

Firstly, as other speakers have noted, at the outset we must develop credible and achievable mandates for peacekeeping operations. Mandates and means must be better aligned, and we must be realistic about what we can achieve. We are improving our ability to measure progress through the use of benchmarks that are tailored to the circumstances of each conflict and reviewed periodically for their viability. But we can do better.

Secondly, it is important to work together to breathe new life into faltering peace processes in countries where peacekeeping operations are deployed. Peacekeeping must be accompanied by vigorous peacemaking efforts; it is not a substitute for them. International leverage may at times be needed to revive stalled negotiations, and we may wish to consider whether informal mechanisms, such as the Core Group for Timor-Leste, have practices that can be helpfully applied to other situations.

Thirdly, we need to help expand the pool of capable and willing military and police forces. Therefore, bilateral programmes that train and equip potential contributors are essential. The increased communication among troop- and police-contributors, the Council and the Secretariat has been helpful, but we should do better if we are to make informed decisions regarding future mandates and eventual drawdown.

Finally, it is critical that we do more to build up host Governments' security sectors and rule of law institutions. The United Nations Security Sector Reform Team can play a useful role in serving as a focal point for technical support in this area. Other relevant peacebuilding activities should also be an essential element of any new mandate. Earlier and enhanced cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission is also needed.

As Ms. Løj stated, one size does not fit all, and our peacebuilding strategies, just like our overall peacekeeping strategies, should be tailored to the needs of the country in question. As we consider revising mandates or downsizing some missions, we will have to augment others, as we just did in Haiti. A few months ago, we had hoped that the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) would

soon be in the position to begin successfully downsizing. Instead, MINUSTAH is now important than ever, serving as a critical lifeline to millions of Haitians in desperate need.

I should like to underscore the continued support of the United States for United Nations peacekeeping and express our gratitude for the contribution that United Nations peacekeepers make around the world.

Mr. Churkin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We thank the delegation of France for having organized today's meeting on the timely theme of United Nations peacekeeping operations. We welcome the participation of the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the leaders of three important United Nations missions. We listened carefully to their assessments.

Russia attaches the highest importance to the role of United Nations peacekeeping in maintaining international peace and security, and seeks to build up its capabilities for peacekeeping operations. United Nations peacekeeping is now more necessary than ever, and it is quite possible that the demand for peacekeepers will only grow.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are undergoing not only quantitative but also qualitative changes with the growing complexity of peacekeeping mandates. Many peacekeeping operations are given a whole range of varied duties, such as helping to advance political settlements, monitoring compliance with peace agreements and identifying tasks to strengthen national capacities. In addition to military and political stabilization in zones of conflict, peacekeepers also provide support to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the building of durable governing institutions and the completion of other complex tasks of State-building.

The challenge before us is how to further improve the work of United Nations peacekeeping. Addressing that challenge will require our collective efforts and productive cooperation among the Security Council, General Assembly and Secretariat. A major line of action should be aimed at increasing the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations. They should be undertaken in strict conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, with unfailing respect for the Security Council's primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. That is

the political guarantee of the successful conduct of peacekeeping operations.

The lack of financial, logistical and technical resources dictates the need to enhance the quality of management of peacekeeping operations and to make optimal use of existing potential in that respect. A relevant issue is the need to ensure the effective transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding functions for the purpose of consolidating stabilization achievements.

It is important to clearly delineate between peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, which should be clearly defined in mandates. United Nations peacekeepers should be given only initial recovery duties, while, for peacebuilding processes and interventions of a purely socio-economic nature, we should more actively involve United Nations specialized agencies, regional and subregional organizations and the donor community.

In developing and adopting peacebuilding decisions, we need to consider the interests of all parties, respect the sovereignty of States and encourage national responsibility for implementing relevant programmes. Such programmes must be implemented solely with the consent and in coordination with national Governments.

The problem of ensuring the required level of military expertise in the Council's peacekeeping decisions deserves particular attention. We believe that, along with related initiatives, it remains relevant to consider the Russian proposal on reinvigorating the work of the Military Staff Committee, with a full complement of 15 Council members and the flexible involvement of leading troop-contributing countries. The assessments of the Committee with regard to the situation in countries where peacekeeping operations exist, its recommendations on operational aspects of peacekeeping and its participation in and cooperation with the Secretariat in missions and in defining the preparedness of contingents and the infrastructure of peacekeeping operations would provide the Council with reliable and timely information and build up the military expertise of United Nations peacekeeping.

The scope of the challenges to contemporary peacekeeping requires effective interaction between the United Nations and regional organizations. Experience has shown that more active use of the potential of regional organizations and subregional mechanisms is

justified so long as they operate in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their relations with the Organization, and with the Security Council in particular, are governed by the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

Good opportunities for establishing cooperation with the United Nations in the area of peacekeeping are emerging as a result of the establishment of the peacekeeping capabilities of the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO). The upcoming adoption, on the initiative of Russia and other CSTO members, of a General Assembly resolution on cooperation between the United Nations and the CSTO will provide further impetus in that regard.

Of particular significance is the development of strategies for the drawdown of peacekeeping operations once their Security Council mandates have been implemented. We believe that a discussion on the exit of operations and a transition from peacekeeping operations to other types of United Nations presences will help us to address this challenge.

We were interested to acquaint ourselves with our partner's concept paper (S/2010/67) on the theme "United Nations peacekeeping operations: Transition and exit strategies". We believe that a wide range of its ideas and concepts could serve as a reasonable basis for further discussion aimed at achieving concrete results. Of course, the major criterion in planning such strategies must be to ensure that peacekeepers create favourable conditions for advancing the process of political settlement.

We thank the delegation of France for preparing the draft presidential statement to be adopted today. We also appreciate the flexibility and constructiveness shown by colleagues in discussing the draft statement, which is a substantive and useful document.

Mrs. Viotti (Brazil) (*spoke in French*): I shall follow the example of the representative of Lebanon by speaking in French.

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this debate. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General for his statement. We very much appreciate the briefings by Mr. Le Roy and Ms. Malcorra, as well as the valuable contributions by Mr. Doss, Ms. Løj and Mr. Von der Schulenburg.

In discussing transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping operations, we must not lose sight of the

fundamental objective of such operations. Their ultimate goal is to contribute to the consolidation of sustainable peace. Transition and exit strategies are therefore always a means to an end, and never an end in themselves. That distinction is not academic; it is political. That means that such strategies should respond to political dynamics on the ground.

The transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding should be an undertaking for the entire United Nations system. Peacekeeping exit and transition strategies must be coordinated with the wider United Nations presence on the ground in a coherent manner. That requires system-wide coordination from the earliest stages of peacekeeping. We therefore need to work on three main areas: intensifying the Council's political support for peace processes, improving United Nations structures for dealing with those situations, and securing the necessary human and material resources.

A minimal level of political stability is the *sine qua non* condition for an exit strategy. We must continue to gather lessons learned and improve our efforts in such areas as capacity- and institution-building, improving the ability of States to provide basic services, protecting civilians, revitalizing the economy and creating jobs. Local actors must be constructively engaged in peace, reconciliation and reconstruction processes. The crucial task of peacekeeping is to help them to embark upon and proceed along that path.

Re-establishing peace should be a priority for the Council as it sets mandates and reacts to developments on the ground. To that end, the Security Council should improve its ability to monitor peace processes. The establishment of benchmarks in several missions is a positive innovation. I should like to thank Mr. Doss for the clarity he has brought to our discussion in that regard.

The transition from peacekeeping is a systemic undertaking that requires the Council's cooperation with other relevant parties. The General Assembly, in particular its Fifth Committee and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), is a crucial stakeholder in that regard. The Council should take advantage of the breadth of membership and level of expertise of those bodies in order to make peacekeeping more effective and transparent.

The relationship between Security Council decisions and the work of the Organization's development bodies needs further attention. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding should not be considered sequential stages of the United Nations presence in a given country. Whenever possible, development-related entities should be active on the ground from the beginning of the post-conflict phase so that, once peacekeepers leave, the socio-economic conditions for peace are firmly in place.

The Peacebuilding Commission is another potentially important actor. The latest report of the C-34 (A/63/19) recognizes the value of the Commission's advice on the peacebuilding aspects of peacekeeping mandates. The roles and responsibilities of the Commission vis-à-vis the Security Council should be further clarified. The Commission's review is an opportunity to strengthen its capacity to dispense such advice.

The Secretariat must also have at its disposal the structures and expertise required to allow it to adequately address peacebuilding elements of peacekeeping. In that regard, social and economic aspects of peacebuilding must receive greater attention.

There have been positive developments recently with regard to human and material resources for peacekeeping as such. Little progress, however, has been made in securing resources to help implement sustainable transition and exit strategies. The well-known problems that undermine the effectiveness of international aid are the same that must be overcome when it comes to official development assistance to post-conflict countries. Donors, international financial institutions and the United Nations itself must work more vigorously to free up significant funds — from the outset of and throughout the entire process — in a predictable, flexible and coherent way. Coordination and programmatic coherence could both contribute to reducing duplication and filling existing gaps, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of funds invested.

We must also strengthen the ability of peacekeeping operations to liaise with United Nations country teams on the ground and to mainstream peacebuilding concerns in their day-to-day operations, especially when transition and exit strategies are being implemented. The special representatives of the

Secretary-General and resident coordinators have a key role to play in this regard.

In conclusion, we should see transitions as a step on the road towards helping countries achieve sustainable peace and inclusive socio-economic development. In so doing, we will be strengthening international peace and security.

The President (*spoke in French*): I think the whole Council will agree that the statement made by the representative of Brazil was exceptionally clear in nature, an attribute that she shares with the representative of Lebanon, and that I am sure she will also share with the representative of Gabon.

Mr. Barbačić (Bosnia and Herzegovina): Bosnia and Herzegovina would like to thank France for putting this important debate on the Security Council's agenda. We would like to thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra. We would also like to thank Special Representatives of the Secretary-General Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, Mr. Alan Doss and Mr. Michael von der Schulenburg for their clear briefings.

Bosnia and Herzegovina wishes to align itself with the statement to be made by the acting head of the European Union delegation to the United Nations, Mr. Pedro Serrano.

We would finally like to reiterate our gratitude to the personnel of United Nations missions for their dedicated work and daily commitment to advancing peace and security.

As a police- and troop-contributing country — a country, moreover, with critical experience of United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts — Bosnia and Herzegovina is particularly cognizant of the vital importance of this debate. Allow me to make a few brief remarks.

It is a long road from an initial peace agreement to sustainable peace. Travelling this road to the endpoint requires clear and adequate mandates, strategic planning and coherent implementation, as well as the commitment of the host country. Only through all this can the transition to peacebuilding succeed.

This process begins with mandate design. To achieve a successful transition, it is vital for mandates

to be clear, appropriate and sufficient to addressing both immediate and long-term needs. A key part of that mandate design is the definition of a desired outcome that, as the draft presidential statement recognizes, reflects the need to create conditions favourable to sustainable peace. Appropriate and sufficient mandates allow the United Nations mission to take full advantage of the narrow window of opportunity to effect rapid change in the immediate post-conflict environment.

Furthermore, mandate renewal should not be automatic, but rather sensitive to and conditioned upon the evolution of in-country circumstances. This presupposes a sustained focus by the United Nations on cognitive capacity, that is, the ability to collate, examine and interpret all the necessary data to assess the mission's impact. The Security Council would benefit from the availability of clear and precise recommendations from the Secretariat, as referred to in the draft presidential statement, at least one month prior to mandate renewal.

At the same time, Bosnia and Herzegovina attaches the utmost importance to defining exit strategies for United Nations peacebuilding missions. A clear exit strategy must be founded on a thorough evaluation of the situation on the ground and an accurate assessment of whether peacebuilding processes have reached a lasting, irreversible stage. We should not allow inaccurate assessments to prevail and lead to the premature termination of missions.

Mandates must be matched from the start by sufficient resources. It is widely recognized — and the trials of our own experience bear this out — that early investments are effective investments. Bosnia and Herzegovina consequently endorses the precedents relating to resources and achievable goals expressed in the presidential statement of 5 August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24) and the Secretary-General's report of 20 April 2001 (S/2001/394).

Bosnia and Herzegovina stresses the significance of including, wherever possible, integrated strategic planning and benchmarks. Clear and carefully calibrated benchmarks can help improve the Security Council's strategic oversight of a mission's progress towards sustainable peace. Such benchmarks will be meaningful in direct proportion to the cognitive capacity of the United Nations. We endorse the further development of existing benchmarks for the United

Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the creation of a strategic integrated plan for the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

To achieve a successful transition, coordination among various actors and the coherence of complex, integrated missions are of vital importance. Bosnia and Herzegovina shares the common belief that regional organizations, such as the European Union and the African Union, can play a constructive role in transitions. Most peacekeeping and peacebuilding environments will involve an extensive array of stakeholders. Drawing upon their best abilities is essential to the success of the peacebuilding missions. The peacebuilding initiatives that worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina were marked by synergy between multiple actors and, most important, between civilian and military endeavours.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is of the belief that the quality of dialogue among stakeholders can be further improved. The Security Council, its Working Group of the Whole on Peacekeeping Operations, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission and the police- and troop-contributing countries are all salient in planning and implementing United Nations missions. In particular, the Security Council could rely more upon the advice of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Finally, it has been exactly 18 years since the United Nations Protection Force was deployed at the very outset of the post-cold war period of peacekeeping. Since that disastrous beginning, the United Nations has notably improved the effectiveness of its peacekeeping. It has entered into a new phase of peacebuilding operations, which has had greater success in achieving objectives, such as the sustained peace in El Salvador.

Facing the challenges of an unprecedented degree of global deployment of United Nations missions will require further improvements, with particular reference to mandate design, strategic planning, cognitive capacity and coherence. The task will continue to demand the political will of host countries and Member States alike as an ineluctable prerequisite for successful transitions and exit strategies. Bosnia and Herzegovina stands ready to share its experiences and

looks forward to contributing fully to post-conflict peacebuilding processes.

Mr. Issoze-Ngondet (Gabon) (*spoke in French*): I would like to join previous speakers in thanking you, Mr. President, for having convened this informative debate on peacekeeping operations. Their role, although crucial — as attested by their proliferation — is increasingly being questioned today as a result of the difficulties that they face in achieving their objectives and the limited capacities of the United Nations.

The main point of holding this debate on our quest for a pragmatic approach to the transition from peacekeeping operations to peacebuilding is, we all agree, to enable the United Nations to deepen its consideration of the ways and means to make peacekeeping operations more effective, of shorter duration and more predictable in terms of their end date. In so doing, as was rightly underscored by the Secretary-General, our Organization should be able to usefully reduce its presence in the security sector and increase it in other, more decisive areas of peacebuilding.

Indeed, it is not the length of a peacekeeping operation that guarantees its success. In fact, a great many peacekeeping operations of egregious duration have not achieved significant progress. The reasons for this failure — or paradox — were underscored by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy. Establishing a good mandate for a good exit from a crisis requires more constructive political commitment at the outset and, of course, a more forward-looking approach in laying the foundations for a country to emerge from crisis.

It is obvious that the key to a good exit strategy lies in the mandates of peacekeeping operations. It thus seems to be important, as the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809) recommends, to rethink them in an objective way in order to have a clear idea about the changes that are needed in their design and structure.

It is true that for a few years now, the United Nations has significantly improved the design, conduct and implementation of peacekeeping operations. It is also true that these developments have essentially led the United Nations to into account the need to clearly define clear, credible and achievable mandates that can guarantee the success of peacekeeping operations.

Rethinking peacekeeping mandates involves revisiting both the philosophy and the process of their implementation. As many speakers have stressed, a good mandate must take the causes of a conflict into account, and its implementation should be underpinned by robust planning of its various phases and sequences, and by the identification of criteria that define the appropriate moment for exit. It is clear that mandate implementation should be marked by realistic stages, accompanied by anticipated achievements, quantifiable benchmarks and well-defined priorities to prevent the United Nations from being bogged down and resources from being wasted that would be more useful in other sectors.

Mandates should also include mechanisms for cooperation with neighbouring States to prevent possible incursions by destabilizing forces. Let us not forget that the crises we face too often have regional implications, which of course can be managed only through an approach that takes this aspect into account. I note that this crucial phase in the drafting of a mandate should be subordinated to the dispatch to the field of multisectoral and multidisciplinary scouting teams to identify precisely the optimal conditions for the conduct of the mission. It would be equally useful to systematize the establishment of a technical evaluation mission to determine a peacekeeping mission's exit strategy.

The end of a peacekeeping operation increasingly requires, on the one hand, that security conditions be satisfactory and, on the other, the restoration of a modicum of a functional State, characterized by the resumption of basic systems of governance, such as judicial institutions, police forces, penitentiary services, civil administration and public services. Elections are often considered to be the conclusion of post-conflict transition. However, they can lead to the withdrawal of the United Nations presence only if the prior conditions are fulfilled. We must therefore ensure that a country's stability is irreversible and that the restoration of Government has been concluded.

We must also ensure that peace agreements concluded between the parties concerned have been applied and implemented in good faith to the satisfaction of the parties, and that the immediate causes of the conflict have been addressed. It is clear that the progressive reduction and drawdown of a peacekeeping operation and its transition to the consolidation and peacebuilding phase depend to a

large extent on evaluation of progress achieved in relation to the objectives laid out in the mandate.

We believe that, in order to better take these stages of a mission into account, any peacekeeping mandate should provide for a civil component that would, in cooperation with local Government, assess progress achieved by the mission pursuant to fixed objectives, and that would propose a transition towards peacebuilding. During the transition, the capacity-building of security and defence forces should be accelerated to ensure that national forces are in a position to assume responsibility for the mechanism deployed by the peacekeeping operation.

We believe that the success of a peacekeeping operation also requires additional coordination efforts within the United Nations to strengthen peacekeeping partnerships. The Secretariat, the members of the Security Council, the General Assembly, the troop-contributing countries, donors and other partners within and outside the United Nations system are all called on to play a critical role in that respect. Similarly, the United Nations should strive to strengthen partnerships between the Government in a crisis situation and international actors.

These, in our view, are the elements necessary to the establishment of effective transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping operations leading to the peacebuilding phase. In conclusion, I express our support for the draft presidential statement presented by France.

Mr. Takasu (Japan): At the outset, I would like to express my deep appreciation to the Secretary-General, the two Under-Secretaries-General and the three heads of very important missions for their informative briefings and lessons learned.

I also pay tribute to France for its very important initiative. United Nations peacekeeping operations are sent to monitor ceasefires and assist national efforts to restore security and stability. Our primary focus, therefore, should be on how effectively peacekeeping operations can achieve the objectives mandated by the Security Council rather than on discussing how soon to exit. Such an approach is in fact more effective in achieving transition.

Peacekeeping operations are one of the most valuable and indispensable tools available to the Security Council for peace and security. I would like to

stress the importance of considering the role of a peacekeeping mission in the much broader context of a continuum from the end of conflict to social and economic stability.

In launching a new mission, the Security Council needs to exercise self-restraint in the wording of mandates. It is important for the Council to set clear, concrete and achievable goals from the outset, which will help in planning a smooth transition. For instance, complex mandates such as the protection of civilians need to be defined more clearly for implementable, specific tasks in mission planning. There should also be a clear priority among a set of mandates. We also need to set benchmarks against which progress is monitored and adjustment made in a timely manner, taking into account the changing situation on the ground. Such an approach would contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, thereby achieving a smooth transition.

The main challenge that many operations face is the lack of capacity of the host country to provide for basic security and to deal with urgent issues in the post-conflict situation. To address this challenge, it is essential to promote the institution-building of the host country and the training of its nationals.

The instability of the security situation and a lack of productive economic activity are two major impediments to transition. Transition — in other words, the completion of the main task of peacekeeping operations to ensure a stable security situation — depends on the extent of the progress made in security sector reform and the establishment of the rule of law.

An equally serious challenge to transition is the absence of a peace dividend and a lack of social and economic stability after the end of a conflict. A prerequisite for durable peace is to secure basic services, including electricity, to every household and to facilitate the reintegration of people affected by the conflict and reconciliation and coexistence in isolated communities. Above all, the reintegration of former combatants into normal civilian life and the creation of job opportunities for younger people are vitally important to ending the vicious cycle of conflict and poverty. Thus, we need to establish a comprehensive and integrated strategy of peacebuilding towards transition.

Peacekeeping operations are expected to maintain peace and security in the host country to create an environment for peacebuilding activities. In considering transition, there are three types of relationships between peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding activity. In the first type, the mandate of a peacekeeping operation itself contains some elements of peacebuilding activity, such as in East Timor. The second is the type in which a peacekeeping operation does not include a mandate for peacebuilding activities, while other United Nations entities carry out peacebuilding activities in the country of operation. The third is the type in which peacebuilding activities are carried out after a peacekeeping mission completes its mandate. This type applies to countries taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), such as Burundi and Sierra Leone.

We should be more sensitive to these different types of relationship. We should consider what type of peacebuilding activity could be implemented within the mandate of a peacekeeping operation in the future, and how such operations can support peacebuilding activity when another organization is in charge of that aspect. We believe that such considerations will help to make transition strategies more effective.

Up to now, the PBC has been in charge mostly of the third category of mission. We should be mindful that peacebuilding as a whole is a broad concept involving large-scale activities in various post-conflict or fragile situations, and it is totally unrealistic to expect that the PBC can be responsible for and engaged in every peacebuilding need in the world. However, we might consider the possibility that the PBC should give advice on peacebuilding to the Security Council in cases of the first type, and also of the second type, in which peacekeeping and peacebuilding are implemented simultaneously. At the same time, we must all be very clear as to the kind of advice and added value that the PBC may be able to provide in those cases.

One can hardly overemphasize the importance of formulating strategic goals for peacebuilding at an early stage. The opportunity to take advantage of the golden hour immediately after a ceasefire is very frequently lost and never comes back. We need to promote activities to achieve strategic goals along a road map with a clear timeline, as well as to identify the stakeholders responsible for each goal. An

integrated and coordinated approach is therefore key to success.

For instance, the successful implementation of security sector reform and the rule of law are critical to stability and transition. Security sector reform cannot be completed merely by strengthening the institutional capacity of the national police or by downsizing, disarming and demobilizing the military. It must be accompanied by support for security personnel, the reintegration of former combatants and the creation of economic opportunity for young people.

Peacebuilding activities require more varied expertise and civilian specialists than peacekeeping operations. They are tied to diverse programmes with differing implementation procedures and funding sources. The United Nations may not necessarily be the strongest player on the ground. It is therefore essential to strengthen coordination mechanisms according to an integrated plan and to ensure active interaction among all stakeholders, including, of course, the Security Council, the PBC, the host country, donor countries, troop- and police-contributing countries, international financial institutions and the private sector.

The Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, which Japan chairs, has agreed to discuss, first, key gaps in capabilities, resources and training; and secondly, key lessons learned from completed and current missions about the successful implementation of transition strategies. I would like to conclude by reaffirming Japan's very strong interest in developing effective transition strategies.

Mr. Apakan (Turkey): I would first like to thank you, Sir, for organizing this debate. I also wish to thank the Secretary-General and his Under-Secretaries-General, as well as his Special Representatives, for their thought-provoking briefings.

The views expressed so far reflect the common will and determination of this Council to improve, in consultation with partners, its response to the needs of United Nations peacekeeping. Turkey is certainly committed to contributing to this endeavour. Over time, we have already accumulated a wealth of lessons learned on how we can further enhance the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping. It is now the right time to analyse those lessons and to develop a clear strategy that will help us chart a viable road map to peace in conflict situations.

Much of what I want to say has already been said by the previous speakers, particularly the briefers, so I will not repeat them. Moreover, the draft presidential statement that we are going to adopt today also contains all the right elements, allowing me to be rather brief.

The only point I wish to stress further is the need for an integrated political strategy that will merge peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding tools into a single framework. Undoubtedly, such a strategy can succeed only if all partners are willing to back it. It must therefore reflect the shared vision of all stakeholders and address all phases of a peace mission: the entry and, perhaps even more important, the post-conflict recovery phases, including, of course, transition and exit.

As Under-Secretary-General Le Roy said, peacekeeping can be seen as the emergency room of a hospital, where the patient should continue to be treated in the aftermath of a recovery phase. But there is no doubt that transition and exit strategies should be part and parcel of this overall strategy. Unless we determine at the beginning what we want to achieve in the end, we can neither properly set the course of the mission in terms of mandates and task prioritization, nor answer the question of how we are going to achieve it.

In the development of an integrated strategy, it is important that we should first agree on the end state that we want to achieve through peacekeeping missions, as well as their role and place within the bigger picture of sustaining peace. Only then, and in consultation with troop- and police-contributing countries, can we develop clear and credible mandates providing a sound political directive to our troops. In this critical process, the input of regional organizations should also be given the utmost attention. The Security Council's cooperation with the African Union is a good example of such a relationship.

We should also agree on a shared vision of what constitutes success. Indeed, one of the perennial questions facing us is how the Council can assess when a political and security situation has stabilized sufficiently to warrant a significant transition. To this end, we can make better use of benchmarks to measure progress in achieving tasks and as a tool for reviewing mandates.

Yet we should also be careful to avoid creating benchmarks that are solely Council-driven, which could result in a lack of local ownership. This is also important in setting priorities, which ought to reflect the unique conditions and needs of a country. It is in this frame of mind that we look forward to the review in the coming months of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Indeed, given the evolution of the situation in that country, this is going to be an important challenge for the Council, and we need to get it right this time.

In conclusion, I once again reiterate the vital importance of an integrated approach to conflict situations. Indeed, the coherence and coordination of broader international efforts in an area of conflict is key to helping countries succeed in their efforts to sustain peace. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in particular could play an earlier and enhanced role in that respect. In that regard, we look forward to the comprehensive review of the PBC and express our commitment to contributing actively to that process. Moreover, for better coordination among Member States and other partners, we can also make use of the clearinghouse type of mechanisms to promote synergy and complementarity in our peacebuilding activities. I agree with Mr. Doss as to the difficulties of coordination and the need to streamline our existing arrangements.

Last but not least, I would like to emphasize that the real challenge lies in the creation of a suitable foundation on which the transition from the phase of the strategic use of security to that of the strategic use of development can take place, because the exit or withdrawal of United Nations troops cannot be an end in itself. We have to think beyond the lifecycle of a peacekeeping mission, as security is not the only element of peace and stability.

In this regard, there is no linear relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and thus the early integration of peacebuilding elements into our peacekeeping strategies becomes crucial. After all, the inextricable link between development and security compels us to do so. As the Secretary-General pointed out on an earlier occasion, there can be no security without development, and vice versa. So our efforts on both accounts should go hand in hand from the very outset. Turkey commits itself to further advancing the implementation of such an integrated approach.

Mr. Liu Zhenmin (China) (*spoke in Chinese*):

The Chinese delegation thanks the French delegation for organizing today's thematic debate. I welcome Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and thank him for his statement. I also welcome the presence of the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General Michael von der Schulenburg, Under-Secretaries-General Le Roy and Malcorra, and Special Representatives Doss and Løj and thank them for their briefings.

After more than six years of continuing development, peacekeeping operations have become the most important of United Nations measures for maintaining international peace and security. In recent years, rapidly changing situations have raised the bar to success for peacekeeping operations and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has faced severe challenges. Tensions between scale and efficiency, resources and demand, and mandates and capacities have hindered the development of peacekeeping operations, and there is a widening gap between peacekeeping operations and the expectations of Member States. It is imperative that experiences be comprehensively assessed in order to overcome shortcomings and improve peacekeeping operations.

In these circumstances, it is urgent and necessary for the Security Council to discuss peacekeeping reform, addressing transition and exit strategies as a starting point. Transition and exit strategies not only involve improved management of peacekeeping operations, but are also important for the overall coordination of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Therefore, when devising transition and exit strategies, the Council must work from the perspective of a peacekeeping strategy.

I would like to focus on the following points. First, coordination between peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be strengthened. Important as they are, peacekeeping operations are not a panacea. The Security Council should attach equal importance to the political settlement of armed conflicts and the deployment of peacekeeping operations. We can eliminate post-conflict destabilizing elements only by strengthening the promotion of political dialogue and reconciliation processes, thus establishing a peace to keep and laying the foundation for transition and exit strategies. In addition, the Security Council must bring into full play the good offices of the Secretary-General and his special envoys, and support the peace

initiatives of the regional and subregional organizations concerned.

Secondly, the division of labour between peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be further improved, and coordination and cooperation between the two strengthened to ensure implementation of the transition and exit strategies. In order to smoothly and successfully transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, the Security Council should consider peacebuilding issues when it takes decisions on peacekeeping operations, and at the same time clarify the division of labour. In the transitional stage, peacekeeping operations should create conditions conducive to peacebuilding and facilitate implementation of exit strategies, without duplicating the work of either peacekeeping or peacebuilding.

The parties concerned should take the opportunity of the upcoming comprehensive review of the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to further consider the role of the PBC; mobilize the participation of all United Nations operational departments, the international financial institutions and the relevant regional organizations; and strengthen exchange and interaction between the PBC and the Security Council in order to fundamentally assist the countries concerned to end conflicts and establish lasting peace and stability.

Thirdly, the Security Council and the Secretariat should strengthen cooperation at the mandate, deployment, planning and administrative levels of peacekeeping operations. In deploying peacekeeping operations, the Security Council must comprehensively consider the host country's situation and the available peacekeeping resources, formulate a clear and targeted mandate, identify priorities and set goals for the various stages.

The Security Council should closely monitor and follow up implementation of the mandate and formulate an exit strategy in a timely manner. In the implementation of a mandate, attention should be paid to capacity-building of the host country so as to avoid the overdependence on the peacekeeping operations that could make implementation of the exit strategy impossible.

Fourthly, strong partnerships must be established to ensure the participation and cooperation of all parties concerned.

Continued adherence to the Hammar-skjöld principles of peacekeeping is an important foundation for the success of United Nations peacekeeping operations at the deployment, transition and exit stages. The host country's opinion must be accorded important consideration, while fully taking into account the active participation of the countries concerned. The support and cooperation of troop-contributing countries, donor States and regional organizations are also very important, and their roles must be fully integrated to strengthen coordination and cooperation and to pool their strengths in order to ensure the success of the peacekeeping operation.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809) and the fifth anniversary of the founding of the PBC. The Security Council, the Secretariat, the major troop-contributing countries and all of the other parties have quite high expectations for the reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. China is willing to join efforts with all parties concerned in engaging in in-depth consultations to seek consensus on the question of the reform of peacekeeping operations and to promote the improved organization and efficiency of peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Heller (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): We are grateful for the presentations of the Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra, Special Representatives Alan Doss and Ellen Margrethe Løj. We are also grateful to have Executive Representative Michael Von der Schulenburg in the Council today. Mexico welcomes the initiative of France to pursue the analysis and discussion of the various ways in which peacekeeping operations can be improved, as well as how to design transition and exit strategies — an issue that undoubtedly represents one of the main challenges to the Security Council in fulfilling its fundamental role of maintaining international peace and security.

In the light of lessons learned in recent years, it has been recognized that peacekeeping operations must incorporate a number of essential elements if they are to meet their main objective of attaining sustainable peace. Among the most important of these elements is the drafting of clear, credible and achievable mandates supported by the material resources, troops, police and civilian capacities required to fulfil their functions. The unequivocal commitment of the parties to achieving a negotiated solution to the conflict is also necessary.

Other essential elements are the existence of a general peace agreement that also addresses the underlying causes of the conflict, and an understanding on the part of the parties to the conflict and the population in general of the benefits of achieving the mission objectives, which they should also perceive as their own.

Likewise, with respect to these elements, there is consensus that objectives should be established with defined timeframes at every stage, including a transition and exit strategy, and that peacekeeping missions should adopt an integrated approach that takes peacebuilding considerations into account from an early stage. To achieve this, it is imperative for the Security Council to establish an efficient planning and coordination mechanism involving special representatives of the Secretary-General and those responsible for the coordination and direction of the military, civil, financial and humanitarian components of missions.

Within the framework of the United Nations, we reaffirm the importance for the Security Council to continue to promote ongoing and substantive dialogue among the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission, troop-contributing countries and major financial donors to peacekeeping operations, especially given the current international economic climate. The aim of such dialogue would be to afford these actors greater input in the process of drafting, adopting and revising mandates.

In this regard, we recognize that there has been positive progress in the dialogue among these actors. However, greater coordination can still be achieved. That is why we stress the importance of following up on resolution 1353 (2001), and commend the work of the Working Group of the Whole on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to offer recommendations with a view to improving cooperation and coordination mechanisms throughout the entire lifecycle of a peacekeeping operation.

Moreover, we encourage the Security Council, in drawing up peacebuilding strategies, to cooperate with regional organizations and such informal mechanisms as the groups of friends of the Secretary-General, in recognition of their broad experience, knowledge of the

specifics of a conflict and interest in guaranteeing the transition to stability for the country and the region.

It is essential for a host country to cooperate with a peacekeeping operation throughout the entire length of its deployment, on which the successful transition to a peacebuilding process depends. A peacekeeping operation cannot be perceived as having been imposed by the international community alone. The reconfiguration of a United Nations presence should also be accompanied by a high degree of coordination between the United Nations system and other international actors, including financial institutions and civil society organizations on the ground.

It is also important to explore mechanisms for strengthening cooperation between the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission in order to ensure coherence in mandates between peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development activities so as to establish conditions conducive to peacekeeping transition strategies. Consideration of this issue could help to strengthen the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in the context of its review later this year.

We cannot ignore the fact that no two operations are the same. We have to take into account not only the nature of the conflict, but also and above all the institutional structure present in the host country of the peacekeeping operation. Let us not forget that we frequently face situations in which there is an institutional vacuum or extreme fragility that calls for the United Nations to perform a support role that goes beyond simply ending the military aspect of the conflict. Where there is no State, the international community must take on the responsibilities of a State in support of and consultation with national authorities. What rule of law can we speak of when there are no sustainable national institutions?

The Security Council should closely monitor the situation at all stages of a peacekeeping operation. That would help to ensure that the transition from one stage to another occurs in the most effective way possible and to incorporate timely modifications into the mandate, including in terms of logistical and operational capacities, always with the aim of adapting to events on the ground.

In this context, we support the use by the Security Council of follow-up mechanisms, such as benchmarks, which help to improve the relationship

between peacekeeping operation mandates and their due implementation, underscore the achievement of objectives, and help to more clearly define the lifecycle of each operation.

Finally, we reaffirm the importance of the Secretariat and the Security Council pursuing periodic consideration of ways to improve peacekeeping operations, and we encourage the relevant Working Group to continue its consideration of transition strategies and to make recommendations in that area.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of France.

I wish to thank all the participants in today's debate. My thanks go, of course, to those who have travelled a great distance — in particular, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, who came to share their experience with us. My thanks go, too, to those without whom the various phases of peacekeeping operations would not be possible: the contributors of the troops and police who carry out activities on the ground; the Peacebuilding Commission, which is called upon to play an increasingly important role; the international organizations that contribute directly to the implementation of mandates; and, of course and perhaps above all, the men and women who serve, often in difficult conditions, in all United Nations operations.

Why have we organized this debate? Our fundamental aim, which is quite evident, is to make operations successful. Today, we are, however, confronted by two contradictory trends.

First of all, the operations that have been established in recent years have relied entirely on a Secretariat whose resources we know to be modest, not to say limited. In addition, in recent months prospects have emerged for reductions in several operations. We should therefore be prepared to succeed in such transitions.

We must succeed, because we are talking about the condition for lasting peace on the ground following the departure of our forces. And we must succeed in a complex, progressive transition towards a situation in which the host country fully carries out all the functions normally performed by a sovereign State, without a foreign presence on its territory. Several

operations have already served as the stage for overall successful transitions, including Cambodia and Sierra Leone, to which Mr. Von der Schulenburg has referred.

In the concept paper that we distributed prior to this meeting (see S/2010/67), we identified the factors that seem to us to explain the difficulties we sometimes encounter in trying to carry out successful transitions. In that regard, we think that there are numerous elements that are crucial for success, and we should consider them.

First — and I am far from being the first to mention it — there is the issue of the quality of mandates. How can we ascertain if United Nations efforts have achieved their goals and must now gradually be brought to an end while benefiting the host country, if the desired objectives and end state are not clear? It goes back to a mandate that is clear and concise. It was Ms. Løj who referred to the real "Christmas tree" that our resolutions often are. I recall the resolution on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 41 missions.

It is then up to the Secretariat, on the basis of its mandates, to carry out careful planning and to report in a way that makes it possible to clearly understand where a mission stands with regard to the completion of its mandate.

It is very important to maintain an ongoing exchange between missions and the Council.

Clearly, the availability of resources is a crucial element. We all know that resources are limited in several key areas — including in security sector reform, which is undoubtedly essential in a transition. Anything that can contribute to increasing resources is to be welcomed.

Lastly, many times the Secretariat rightly reminds us of the need to strengthen peace processes.

On the basis of those common-sense considerations, the Council has arrived at an agreement on a draft presidential statement that sets out our desire to improve our efforts in the area of transition by, as we say in French, getting our own house in order. In particular, we will endeavour to better define the expected outcome in our mandates, set out tasks hierarchically and strengthen dialogue between the Council and the Secretariat by improving the reciprocal provision of information and better utilizing such tools

as strategic frameworks and plans that make it possible to measure progress in carrying out a mission. As a consequence, the Secretariat will be able to plan for the various stages of a mission and develop timetables. In order to better take post-conflict reconstruction into account at earlier stages of a mandate, the Council will, among other things, turn to the Peacebuilding Commission. Lastly, the Council will make every effort to support peace processes.

With those commitments we are not going to change either the essentially political character of the situations brought before the Council, or the long period of time required for peace and reconciliation processes. But we do hope to contribute to a process that is more thought-out and more responsible, both in the Council itself and in our dialogue with the Secretariat.

I believe that the decisions that we are prepared to take are both simple and make good sense. We have agreed to carry out an assessment of these efforts at the end of 2010. As members of the Council are aware, my country is committed to maintaining the reform momentum and to tirelessly work to strengthen the valuable partnership that links us to the Secretariat and the main peacekeeping stakeholders.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Peter Wittig, Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Germany.

Mr. Wittig (Germany) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to address the Security Council in my capacity as Chairperson of the Peacebuilding Commission. Allow me to thank you in particular for your initiative to bring us together to discuss peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the Security Council.

(*spoke in English*)

May I recall that a core mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission is to promote coherence among all relevant actors. That is all the more important for peacekeeping and peacebuilding actors on the ground in order to ensure an integrated, sustainable and consistent approach to the post-conflict response.

Ideally, therefore, the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding should not be approached as an issue of reducing the mounting costs of peacekeeping operations. Rather, we should take an approach aimed at protecting the enormous investments in peacekeeping by introducing a peacebuilding perspective early on. Investment in peacekeeping will be optimized by securing sustainable and long-term engagement by the United Nations and other international, regional and subregional actors through an early peacebuilding perspective.

As noted by Special Adviser Brahimi in his landmark report on peace operations,

"Although multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations may be required to initiate a limited number of critical peacebuilding activities, they are neither designed nor equipped to engage in longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts."

In other words, while peacekeepers are early peacebuilders, they are not long-term peacebuilders. That is why it is so important that the Security Council draws on the experience of, and works closely with, the Peacebuilding Commission.

Let me briefly highlight the objectives of peacebuilding and the role of peacekeepers therein.

In his report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the Secretary-General underlined that

"The immediate post-conflict period offers a window of opportunity to provide basic security, deliver peace dividends, shore up and build confidence in the political process, and strengthen core national capacity to lead peacebuilding efforts." (*S/2009/304, para. 3*)

The Secretary-General's report specifically identified five peacebuilding priority areas in the immediate aftermath of conflict, namely, support for basic safety and security, support for the political process, support for the provision of basic services, support for restoring core Government functions and, finally, support for economic revitalization. Peacekeeping can assist in laying the foundations for socio-economic recovery and long-term development through work in the first two of those priorities. Indeed, it is through their work in supporting those

priorities that peacekeepers lay the foundation for stability and development.

From the perspective of the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, the key challenges in transition lie in searching for the right timing and sequencing among the many other priorities in post-conflict situations. Prioritization needs to take place within the framework of a coherent strategy. Timing and sequencing are also closely linked to setting indicators and benchmarks for transition to longer-term peacebuilding engagement.

While peacekeepers contribute to peacebuilding, their transition and exit strategy should be conceived in terms of peacebuilding's core function of stabilization, including overseeing the implementation of peace agreements. The drawdown and withdrawal of peacekeeping missions should not be conceived as a sign of dissipating international attention and engagement but rather as a transition to longer-term peacebuilding that should indeed upscale the international and United Nations engagement.

Finally, let me point out the opportunities and potential for a role for the Peacebuilding Commission in a transition situation and period. The period before the drawdown and withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation should be the ideal moment for peacebuilding engagement with the Commission and the country. Especially at that time, the Commission can offer an inclusive and flexible platform for engaging all relevant actors and advising the Council on approaches to secure a coherent and integrated approach in this critical transition in United Nations engagement. For the same reason, the Commission's advisory role can be crucial throughout the life of a peacekeeping mission.

Concretely, the Peacebuilding Commission could potentially play an early and critical role in four major areas. First, the Commission could provide early peacebuilding perspectives in the design and review of, or transition from, peacekeeping mandates. Secondly, the Commission should be able to identify and promote country-specific sustainability factors. That is particularly critical in jumpstarting early efforts for institution-building and national capacity development in the areas of security, governance and economic generation.

Thirdly, the Commission should be able to catalyze early partnerships with the international

financial institutions and regional and bilateral political and economic actors. Finally, the Commission may benchmark for and monitor the progression from stabilization to transition and consolidation, which is essential for a well-informed exit strategy for peacekeeping operations.

All this suggests that the Peacebuilding Commission would report periodically to the Security Council on progress in peacebuilding in countries where peacekeeping operations are also deployed.

Let me conclude by saying that the early and consistent engagement of the Peacebuilding Commission in the design, review and drawdown of peacekeeping mandates would increase the chances of sustaining our collective attention and our engagement with countries emerging from conflict.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Witting for his statement.

After the statement of Mr. Serrano, we shall suspend the meeting for lunch — the Council does understand that a French president requires a hearty lunch — and will resume the meeting at 3 p.m.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Tete Antonio, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations.

Mr. Antonio (*spoke in French*): Mr. President, I would like first to thank you for pronouncing my name correctly. I wish to express my great satisfaction at participating in this debate and to congratulate the French presidency of the Council for having chosen a topic so important to the African continent, one which constitutes one of the challenges that we must meet but whose recipes for success remain to be clearly determined.

I also wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all speakers who preceded me for proposals that will enrich the experience that the African Union is working to develop.

As far as we are concerned, one could not have chosen a better time to debate a topic so vital to thousands of Africans who daily endure the consequences of armed conflict. The African Union has just concluded its summit at Addis Ababa. It has thought a great deal about issues of peace and security in Africa and declared 2010 the year of peace and security in Africa. Indeed, for the African Union this

debate constitutes a substantial contribution to that objective, which is aimed at seeking lasting solutions to the conflicts in the African continent. It is a continent where thousands of men and women are deployed as part of United Nations political and peacekeeping operations and where the Peacebuilding Commission is sparing no effort to ensure that peace becomes a lasting reality in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and the Central African Republic.

As African heads of State indicated in the Tripoli Declaration, Africa is determined to put a definitive end to the scourge of conflicts and violence, aware of its shortcomings and its errors but motivated by the will to mobilize all means and human resources necessary and to seize every opportunity to promote and advance the agenda for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as for post-conflict reconstruction.

Therefore we cannot but seize the opportunity afforded us by today's exercise to share the varied experiences that can enrich the action of the African Union, which has itself gone through a number of important stages in its efforts to meet, in a comprehensive and global way, the challenges of the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts in Africa. Efforts include the setting up of the Peace and Security Council, the development of the necessary normative and institutional frameworks, including the continental peace and security architecture, and the adoption of numerous instruments on human rights, governance, the rule of law, democracy, elections, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, terrorism, and policies of good-neighbourliness.

Those instruments constitute a consolidated whole of norms and principles, respect for which will significantly reduce the risk of conflicts and violence and will contribute to peacebuilding. We believe that a number of elements of that consolidated whole, developed by the African Union, are also necessary for the successful transition for countries emerging from conflict.

As this Council well knows, the African Union is present in Darfur, alongside the United Nations, through the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The African Union has also deployed a force in Somalia, which is currently 5,500 men strong, to protect the institutions of that country — the only country in the world that

has had no State, no institutions for close to 20 years and has been abandoned by almost everybody. It is therefore natural that our organization should be interested in today's debate and in exit and transition strategies.

In Darfur, the report drawn up by the panel led by the former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, which was presented to the Security Council (S/2009/599, annex I), contains important elements for an integrated approach for crisis exit and transition management.

A question that is often raised here in this Chamber is that of how to reduce the boundaries between peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding. A number of ideas have been raised here today concerning the forecasting, from the initial phase of peacekeeping operations, actions for peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. It would be useful to re-enforce the idea of a hybrid formula, by which peacekeeping operations would be bolstered by significant peacebuilding actions aimed at strengthening national capacities, including the creation of conditions conducive to establishing strong State institutions. It has been demonstrated in a number of cases that deterioration of the State usually leads to degradation of other components of the economic and political apparatus, and even of the social fabric of the country.

We also need to reflect on an increased role of civilian personnel during this phase, as underscored by the delegation of Gabon, including recourse to the diaspora of the States concerned, in cooperation with local authorities.

In addition, at a time when there are signs of impatience to see Blue Helmets leave certain countries, including African countries, there is a need for us to address the issues of timelines, without questioning the achievements in the field of peace and stability in those countries.

The implementation of exit and transition strategies must start, as indicated in the concept paper that the French delegation has so kindly shared with us (S/2010/67), by defining a clear and credible mandate in order to preserve the prestige of the mission in the eyes of the public it serves. Our approach to peacekeeping, including through the Peacebuilding Commission, is silent on this matter, and it is high time that these bodies, whether it be the peacekeeping

operations or the Peacebuilding Commission, address it.

We also believe, along with Brazil, that we must strengthen the concept of development and lay the foundation for development during the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases. Indeed, peacebuilding requires timely assistance to meet immediate needs. However, there are often difficulties in moving from emergency to substantial development assistance. Introducing such innovative elements will contribute to a successful exit and transition strategy, as it will enable peacekeeping operations and the Peacebuilding Commission to leave behind a solid basis for stable peace in countries emerging from crisis.

The African Union has included the concept of development into its approach to post-conflict reconstruction. In that context, in decision 228 (VII) of the Executive Council, the Commission was asked to develop the African Union Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, based on the relevant provisions of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council and on experiences accumulated on the continent. As a result, the African Union Commission has undertaken a number of initiatives that led to the adoption of the decision endorsing the African Union Policy Framework.

The African Union is also working on the development of guidelines on policy revisions at the national and regional level, as well as on the creation of a database for African experts on post-conflict reconstruction and development, which will be made available to member States emerging from conflict. The African Union is also working on mobilizing resources to that end and on capacity-building, including through the use of volunteers.

In conclusion, I would again like to thank the French presidency of the Security Council for this initiative and express the hope that our deliberations today will lead to recommendations that will advance our collective peacebuilding efforts in countries emerging from crisis situations.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to Mr. Pedro Serrano, acting head of the European Union delegation to the United Nations.

Mr. Serrano (*spoke in French*): Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for having invited the European Union to this timely and important debate. In

accordance with your instructions, in order to expedite the Council's work I will make an abridged statement. The full text of the European Union statement will be distributed in the Chamber.

(*spoke in English*)

The candidate countries Turkey, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Armenia and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

Peacebuilding provides the vital bridge that helps create the conditions for peacekeeping missions to be drawn down, laying the foundations for longer-term efforts to consolidate stability and achieve sustainable development. At the heart of this process are efforts to strengthen national capacities to manage conflict and early investments in economic recovery, basic services and national institutions. The sooner such efforts start, the quicker they can contribute to building long-term stability and reduce the risk of a relapse into war.

The peacebuilding tasks in peacekeeping missions — such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, rule of law, good governance and human rights — have a critical role to play and should feed into the broader peacebuilding efforts. In pursuing these tasks, attention must be placed on strengthening local capacities and civil society, encouraging the participation of women in peace processes and peacebuilding, and promoting dialogue among stakeholders. Special efforts should be undertaken in assisting national authorities in the protection of civilians from acts of violence.

We have listened today to statements from some of the most highly qualified professionals and experts on these issues, starting with the Secretary-General. I would like on my part to share some views based on the experience of the European Union (EU) in the field.

First, the success of peacekeeping efforts requires a comprehensive, holistic and inclusive approach. To this end, early and comprehensive planning to integrate peacekeeping and peacebuilding is essential. The integrated mission planning process and the development of integrated strategic frameworks are, in the EU's view, essential tools for the coordination and

prioritization of the security, political, development and humanitarian activities undertaken by the United Nations.

Secondly, peacebuilding tasks need to be taken into consideration in mandates from the outset. At the same time, The Security Council has to make sure, in cooperation with contributing countries, that missions are mandated and equipped with the adequate capabilities to carry out these tasks. Where relevant, peacekeeping missions should be requested to include information on progress in peacebuilding in their regular assessments of mandated tasks in order to identify and draw attention collectively to critical gaps and to harmonize future steps. In this context, peacebuilding actors, including the Peacebuilding Support Office, should be involved from the earliest stages of a peacekeeping mission.

Thirdly, effective peacebuilding needs strong coordination. The United Nations could play an even more important role in this regard, including through the Peacebuilding Commission, which could help to generate a more coherent and coordinated approach, including beyond the United Nations system, and to maintain a framework of mutual accountability between the host Government and its partners. The European Union hopes that the forthcoming session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Peacebuilding Commission review process will provide opportunities to elaborate and enhance those linkages.

Fourthly, to ensure that the peacebuilding agenda bears fruit on the ground, it is essential that personnel responsible for peacekeeping be aware of the importance of this supportive work. An efficient in-country coordination mechanism must be in place to facilitate close communication between these agents and peacekeeping personnel. Equally, peacekeepers have to play their part in supporting confidence-building in the political process and delivering initial peace dividends.

Fifthly, a critical element required for a sustainable exit from conflict is economic recovery. The European Union has seen this clearly in theatres

ranging from Aceh to Guinea-Bissau. Peacekeepers play a critical role in helping to stabilize the situation. They can also play a small but significant role through the implementation of quick-impact projects, such as undertaking interim repairs of infrastructure. They also play a key role in the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and initial support for their reinsertion into civilian life. In this regard, the EU underlines the importance of improving the pace at which and the way in which we approach the reintegration of ex-combatants, including the rehabilitation of former child soldiers and the specific needs of girls, which is a major issue in many of today's conflicts, in particular in Africa.

Lastly and fundamentally, the European Union believes that local and national ownership of the peacebuilding process is the single most important element in bringing about a successful transition from conflict. Responsibility for building a peaceful and stable society rests first and foremost with communities themselves. From the outset of a peacekeeping mission, the international community should focus on supporting this responsibility. That requires the development of an operational strategy to assess needs and identify local capabilities and partnerships, including with neighbouring countries.

We dissect the crisis management and peacebuilding processes into their security, political and development dimensions in order to structure the work and ensure coordination of the different international actors involved. But it is only when such projects are joined under one goal capable of uniting a society — a project for living together, in the words of the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset — that they acquire their full meaning. The European Union is ready to continue working with the United Nations, other crisis-management actors and the countries affected by conflict in pursuit of this comprehensive approach.

The President (*spoke in French*). There are a number of speakers remaining on my list. I therefore propose, with the consent of the members of the Council, to suspend the meeting until 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6270th meeting

Friday, 12 February 2010, 3 p.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Araud/Mr. De Rivière	(France)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Heissel
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Vukašinović
	Brazil	Mrs. Dunlop
	China	Mr. Long Zhou
	Gabon	Mrs. Onanga
	Japan	Mr. Nakashima
	Lebanon	Mr. Ramadan
	Mexico	Mr. Vargas
	Nigeria	Mr. Lolo
	Russian Federation	Mr. Filatkin
	Turkey	Ms. Erdoğan
	Uganda	Mr. Nkayivu
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Green
	United States of America	Mr. Donegan

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Transition and exit strategies

Letter dated 3 February 2010 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/67)

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The meeting resumed at 3.10 p.m.

The President (*spoke in French*): I wish to remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously.

I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco.

Mr. Bouchaara (Morocco) (*spoke in French*): On behalf of the Kingdom of Morocco and my Ambassador, allow me to commend and thank you, Sir, for taking the initiative to hold this important debate. I also thank Mr. Le Roy, Ms. Malcorra, the Special Representatives and the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for their important contributions to this debate.

(*spoke in English*)

I have the honour to address the Security Council on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Allow me to begin by warmly congratulating the French presidency on placing peacekeeping at the core of its monthly debate. Few days separate us from the upcoming crucial session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, during which we hope to have a substantive discussion on the ways to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping.

NAM attaches great importance to the founding principles of United Nations peacekeeping, namely, consent of the parties, the non-use of force except in self-defence, and impartiality. The principles of sovereign equality, the political independence and territorial integrity of all States, and non-intervention in matters that are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction should also be maintained. The tenth anniversary of the Brahimi report (S/2000/809) provides us with an opportunity to celebrate and to renew our commitment to these founding principles.

United Nations peacekeeping operations should be provided from the outset with political support, full and optimal human, financial and logistical resources, and clearly defined and achievable mandates and exit strategies. This means that United Nations peacekeeping operations should not be used as a substitute for addressing the root causes of conflict, which should be dealt with in a coherent, well-planned, coordinated and comprehensive manner, using other

political, social, economic and development instruments.

I should like also to stress that transition strategies are most effective when the relationship between the host Government and the peacekeeping mission is based on active cooperation. This entails regular consultations and the setting up of coordination mechanisms to allow for a dynamic communication throughout the lifecycle of the peacekeeping mission. Moreover, the success of a transition from a peacekeeping environment to an exit phase necessitates that due consideration be given by the United Nations to the manner in which its overall efforts can be carried out from the early stage of its engagement in post-conflict situations and continue without interruption after the departure of the peacekeeping operation, so as to ensure a smooth transition to lasting peace and security.

In this regard, the increasingly complex environment in which United Nations peacekeeping missions operate requires the building of an anticipatory approach that would allow the components of the mission — be they civilian, military, humanitarian or other — to be prepared for unintended consequences and to coordinate efficiently among themselves. This, in turn, calls for an increased integration of efforts and strategies to facilitate coherence throughout the lifecycle of a peacekeeping operation.

While it is important to debate exit strategies, the closely related need for entry strategies must also be stressed. This means that when the mandate of a peacekeeping mission is being designed, adequate means and resources should be made available. Equally vital to an entry strategy is a pre-existing political process supported by the parties concerned. A peacekeeping mission cannot be deployed in an environment where there is no peace to keep. The Security Council is vested with the responsibility to intensify efforts to revive faltering peace processes.

Exit is not usually an event but a process of transition. An exit is facilitated by successful mandate implementation and the ability to refine the mandate to fit the circumstances on the ground as they evolve. This requires a degree of flexibility and coordination that is often difficult to achieve in a multidimensional and complex peacekeeping operation.

There is no single recipe for a successful exit, but one can easily conceive that the success of a peacekeeping mission depends on its capacity to shoulder the implementation of early peacebuilding activities, which deliver immediate peace dividends to the population. However, these early activities should be conceived of within broader peacebuilding efforts. That would guarantee that the transition and subsequent exit of a peacekeeping mission is seamless and successful.

The transition from a volatile environment to a secure post-conflict context in which security is guaranteed and conflict management mechanisms are in place must be managed with the full involvement and ownership of the host Government. In this regard, mission strategies must have the flexibility to adapt to realities on the ground and should be geared to securing and retaining the support of the national authorities in carrying out their mandates.

Indeed, one area that needs further attention is the process by which mandates are set and reviewed. The mechanism for triangular cooperation among the Secretariat, the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) can be improved in order to ensure successful transitions by building on the first-hand experience of TCCs in developing clear and achievable mandates. Greater consultation and cooperation between the Security Council and TCCs can help address this issue, as stressed in the presidential statement of 5 August 2009 (PRST/2009/24), and incorporate transition and exit strategies into mandates.

A central challenge for effective peacekeeping is to make full use of the synergies between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict (S/2009/304) stresses the importance of early peacebuilding action. Early advice from and engagement by the Peacebuilding Commission would ensure early and consistent peacebuilding and a sustained engagement beyond the life of the peacekeeping mission. The Commission has a clear comparative advantage as it engages national Governments in defining their respective needs and priorities, thus enhancing national ownership. The Commission also adopts a tailored, country-specific approach. Equally important is the flexibility of the Peacebuilding Commission to reach out to international financial institutions and other development actors

within and beyond the United Nations actors, which are vital partners for broader and longer-term efforts to sustain peace.

Success factors for early peacebuilding activities in a peacekeeping context include national ownership, which remains essential. Peacebuilding is a national challenge and responsibility. Moreover, the United Nations needs to enter each new context with a specific plan, coordinated with national authorities and other actors. These plans need to be developed in stages and through a participatory approach.

In determining its priorities and jumpstarting early peacebuilding activities, the peacebuilding component of a complex peacekeeping mission should aim to achieve the earliest possible transfer of responsibility to local and national authorities. The international community should support and assist sustainable development. This means that more attention must be given to the peacebuilding and development priorities that should accompany peacekeeping.

Before closing, I should like to stress that transition and exit strategies are but components of the lifecycle of a peacekeeping operation. The conditions for setting up new peacekeeping missions are equally vital. The transition from one step to another needs to be carefully planned, properly resourced and given the necessary political support, without which the risk of mission creep becomes high. Peacekeeping is a means to an end. That end is sustainable peace and development.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now call on the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. Sial (Pakistan): This restricted debate on exit and transition strategies, convened under the French presidency, is a timely initiative, especially in view of the ever-increasing United Nations peacekeeping engagements and the global financial crises, which demand optimal resource utilization at the United Nations. We thank Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra, and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for their excellent briefings. We also appreciate the dedication of their teams in advancing the peacekeeping work of the United Nations.

Pakistan aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The United Nations as an institution derives its inspiration from our common quest for peace and security. However, the multiplicity of situations and the wide variety of contributing factors make the proposition of total and lasting peace impossible. We therefore see the persistence, recurrence and new eruption of conflict situations in various parts of the world. In spite of the perpetual nature of the challenges on the peacekeeping landscape, we Member States have contributed to the noble objective of peacekeeping in a wide variety of ways.

Pakistan has remained committed to the United Nations collective approach to the maintenance of international peace and security. Our commitment to collective endeavours for peace has led us to become a top contributor of uniformed personnel to United Nations peacekeeping missions. Today, over 10,000 Pakistani uniformed personnel are working in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Our unflinching commitment to United Nations peacekeeping operations has been tested time and again. More than 100 Pakistani peacekeeping troops have sacrificed their lives in the service of the United Nations.

The inherent correlation between policy formulation, planning and implementation necessitates a comprehensive approach to individual peacekeeping situations. In tandem with our field contribution, we have invested our efforts in the area of policy planning and formulation. Our successful advocacy of a comprehensive approach, in collaboration with the endeavours of other Member States, resulted in the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission.

We have seen that some missions have been successful while others have had several shortcomings. That calls for an urgent re-evaluation of our policy formulation, planning and implementation concepts, processes and parameters.

The fundamental flaw in policy formulation is that policymakers succumb to the temptation of creating parallel institutions and systems in peacekeeping situations instead of investing in existing national structures. Thus, from the very beginning, most peacekeeping operations start as competitors of local systems and, by virtue of being in a position of

power, contribute to the decapitation of local structures.

The monopoly on policy formulation and planning is also a huge impediment to ensuring the success of United Nations peacekeeping missions. The rhetoric of triangular cooperation is often repeated in United Nations peacekeeping debates, but with little accommodation. In addition, how can one claim that triangular cooperation involving the Security Council, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and the Secretariat is all encompassing while the parties on the ground — the real stakeholders — remain outside the process? The clear commitment of those parties and their affinity to the objectives of a peace mission are not only desired, but should be mandated through an inclusive policy formulation process. Meaningful quadrangular engagement at the very beginning, when a peacekeeping operation is being conceived, will therefore guard against the pitfalls that we very often encounter.

The mechanics of the process itself, which are also discussed in the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809), necessitate the orderly closure of a mission. We are of the view that brainstorming and consultations aimed at determining clear and achievable objectives should come first. That requires a thorough study of realities on the ground, engagement with the parties in the field and an assessment of resource needs and availability. The presence of TCC-origin senior officials in the Secretariat could be of great help at that stage in setting achievable goals against the backdrop of the most efficient use of resources.

Secondly, a peacekeeping mission should always be built through a phased and staggered planning approach that underpins the interconnectivity of planning, execution and achievements under the overarching rubric of a mission's main objectives.

Thirdly, we agree with the observation made in the presidency's concept paper (S/2010/67) that there is insufficient attention to and early investment in the area of building national institutions. However, in that connection, we would like to underscore that peacekeeping, reconciliation and peacebuilding go hand in hand and are not mutually exclusive.

The pre-eminence of political reconciliation after the initial restoration of peace, within mutually agreed parameters, is of paramount importance. The prospects for peace are often better in the beginning, as third-

party intervention checks the hand of the aggressor or the one at fault. It also opens doors for give-and-take opportunities and strengthens the position of the third party as an acceptable arbiter of peace.

The opposite of reconciliation would be the driving of a wedge between parties by supporting one over the other. Parties derive their existence mostly from demographic realities that cannot be undone through defeat or elimination. Peacekeeping without reconciliation would mean rare success stories and more sordid sagas. Yet, unfortunately, that Charter provision has failed to command respect.

The integration of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities through institutional arrangements is more a question of managerial efficiency and managerial possibility. The nature of big and cumbersome administrative structures limits top management's ability to see through the system. It also clouds the need for transparency. Hence, coordination must be strengthened and overlaps must be eliminated. But that should not happen at the cost of institutional efficiency and transparency.

The mandates of peacekeeping missions should be commensurate with ground realities. We have seen the evolution of mandates from traditional to multifaceted ones. Gaps between Chapter VI and Chapter VII mandates are often covered through different mandate variations. Pakistan supported such variations during our most recent tenure on the Security Council in order to ensure peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement in the cases of Côte d'Ivoire, Haiti, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, such missions without adequate resources are an anomaly, for hosts as well as for Member States, including TCCs. Therefore, all mandates must be matched with adequate resources, including a sufficient number of well-trained and well-equipped troops having rapid-deployment capacities, tactical and strategic reserve capabilities and the requisite logistical support.

Failure sometimes ushers in perfect success, if one is ready to rethink and readjust his engagement strategies. Therefore, a delay in the successful completion of a mission should not force us to abandon a peacekeeping mission. In such a situation, we must be guided by a deeper prognosis of the ground situation, effective engagement with the parties, human ingenuity and an unflinching commitment to the

mission. Failure is not an option in the domain of international peace and security. We look forward to further in-depth examination of the important theme of transition and exit strategies in a relevant forum, such as the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

In conclusion, we would like to pay homage to the men and women who recently sacrificed their lives or suffered injuries while performing United Nations peacekeeping duties in Haiti.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

Mr. Momen (Bangladesh): Let me begin by congratulating the French presidency on placing peacekeeping operations at the core of this open debate. I also take this opportunity to thank Mr. Alain Le Roy, Ms. Susana Malcorra and especially you, Mr. President, for inviting my delegation to participate in this important event. I hope your able leadership will guide our deliberations to meaningful and effective transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping operations.

My delegation aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Article 43 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that:

"All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities".

Bangladesh has been and is always ready respond to this call with whatever means and capacity it has. In this context, I reiterate the views of the Honourable Prime Minister of Bangladesh, which she expressed during the meeting between the United States President and peacekeeper-contributing countries in New York on 23 September 2009:

"Bangladesh takes pride in contributing to the United Nations effort in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is our constitutional obligation as well."

We remain committed to United Nations peacekeeping as one of the most universal tools for

helping societies in conflict and post-conflict situations and helping people to rebuild their lives. We subscribe to the view of the Non-Aligned Movement that:

“United Nations peacekeeping operations should be provided from the outset with political support, full and optimal human, financial and logistical resources and clearly defined and achievable mandates and exit strategies”.

In this regard, the often stretched peacekeeping mandates deserve special attention. As we all know, peacekeeping is no longer simply standing between conflicting parties to end hostilities. Peacekeeping has evolved into a complex of activities involving military, police and civilian elements to preserve peace, assist in humanitarian and development activities and thus construct the foundation of sustainable peace through the peacebuilding process. It is therefore critically important to ensure that the countries providing peacekeepers become an integral part of the decision-making process while drawing up the mandate of a particular peacekeeping mission by the Security Council.

They should also be engaged at the decision-making level in the peacekeeping missions. This will allow the United Nations to ensure that the mandate is achievable, manageable and truly effective. At the same time, mandates should be accompanied by sufficient resources, including human, logistical and financial resources, at the disposal of the peacekeepers.

We agree with the Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission when he says that “peacekeepers are early peacebuilders”. We emphasize, however, that peacekeepers’ role should not be ended abruptly at any exit point. In terms of the comparative advantages in particular areas, my delegation firmly believes that peacekeepers are uniquely positioned to assist in identifying and drawing on the most relevant capacity requirements on the ground in post-conflict countries. For example, disarmament, demobilization, reorientation and security sector reform are recognized as two key elements in the peacebuilding process. However, these two elements are also included in the mandates of peacekeeping missions. Thus, any experiences gained and lessons learned in peacekeeping operations could significantly assist in and complement the peacebuilding process.

In this regard, we would like to recall the ninth paragraph of the Security Council’s presidential

statement of 5 August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24), which underscores the importance of introducing peacebuilding elements into peacekeeping operations before a transfer to the Peacebuilding Commission. This, in reality, has yet to be translated in any country-specific context. My delegation therefore emphasizes the need for strong synergy between peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates.

Peacekeepers nowadays are entrusted with some non-conventional tasks, including electoral assistance, human rights situation monitoring, the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, the provision of safe passage to United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, security sector reform and the training of security personnel, the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups, providing medical and emergency care, women’s empowerment, and assisting in the development of the legal system and community involvement. Thus, United Nations peacekeeping can be considered as an important precursor to peacebuilding missions in many respects.

We need to ensure the proper synergy between the processes in order to achieve the end goal of sustainable peace. We also need to ensure unity of purpose and action for success in the process. The entire United Nations membership — the Security Council, the General Assembly and the peacekeeper-contributing countries — must have a shared and holistic vision about what we wish to achieve and how.

Now, let me turn to some specific areas in which Bangladesh can and is ready to contribute to the cause of sustainable peace and security. Bangladesh has extensive electoral experience. The Election Commission of Bangladesh completed electronic voter registration and national identification for a staggering 80-plus million voters before the most recent general election in December 2008. We are ready to share this experience with other countries, particularly in post-conflict countries.

Microcredit financing has been playing a critical role in Bangladesh, including in income generation, poverty alleviation, youth employment and women’s empowerment. This model has been successfully replicated in many countries as part of their development planning and in post-conflict situations — for example, Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone, just to name a few.

Microcredit financing, however, must be supplemented by other essential poverty alleviation and job creation tools, such as building rural infrastructure, human capacity build-up, the development of microenterprise and provision of primary health care and universal education, including non-formal adult education, which can create an environment in which access to financial capital can add significant value. Microcredit financing can be useful if it is seen as a means rather than a goal.

Bangladesh also has the expertise of community involvement in nation-building efforts, and its non-governmental organizations have proved to be a successful agent of change. Bangladesh is ready to share its best practices and experience at any time.

We have also established the Bangladesh Institute of Peace Support Operations Training as a training centre for peacekeepers from around the world. It has state-of-the-art facilities, and Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy has visited and was pleased with it. In line with the recommendations of the Brahimi panel, Bangladesh strongly feels that the Institute should be recognized as a regional peacekeeping training institute. We would be happy to welcome potential peacekeepers for training at the Institute and returning peacekeepers for debriefing.

Before concluding, allow me to stress that the success of transition from a peacekeeping environment to an exit phase requires due consideration of the whole process, from mandate creation to drawdown and the exit phase. Transition from one phase to another needs to be planned carefully, with due emphasis on overlapping activities between phases. Experience acquired in previous steps must be used in subsequent steps to ensure the efficient and effective use of human, financial and logistical resources. The exit phase must be preceded by work adequate to fostering sustainable peace and development and the involvement of the local community to avoid creating a vacuum in which undesirable elements can take over, or so that the community feels let down, with no light at the end of the tunnel. It is imperative that exit strategies create an environment of hope and a feeling of stability and empowerment on the part of the local populace, so that the peacekeepers' exit leaves behind no vacuum or hopelessness.

The President (*spoke in French*): I call on my colleagues to kindly limit their statements to five

minutes for their own well-being, if they wish to leave for the weekend.

I now give the floor to the representative of India.

Mr. Hardeep Singh Puri (India): We would like to thank the French presidency for organizing this thematic debate on the issue of peacekeeping. This is the fourth time in seven months that my delegation is speaking in the Security Council on peacekeeping, a fact that attests to the centrality of this activity in the United Nations. I would also at the outset like to thank the French delegation for its recent efforts, which have led to improvements in the consultative mechanisms of peacekeeping. My delegation appreciates the spirit behind these initiatives.

We also note with appreciation the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to reach out to Member States in the ongoing work of developing operational concepts. I am optimistic that this spirit of cooperation will find reflection in the forthcoming deliberations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

The concept paper (S/2010/67) circulated by the French presidency for today's debate is both comprehensive and useful. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to align itself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Council today has to manage its primary responsibility of responding to threats to international peace and security in an environment that has changed very substantially since 1945. The Council has to deal with situations that have complex, multidimensional aetiologies. They cannot be easily labeled or categorized. They have also proved very tenacious and have defied straightforward solutions.

We are in this situation because every so often the Council has mandated operations without a clear understanding of what was required. In the rush to do something, it has got into situations where objectives have been confused. Mandates have been unrealistic; time frames have been too ambitious. A band-aid approach has been used and the resources allocated to the task — financial, logistical, and above all, human — have been pegged at minimal levels. Our conclusions are reinforced by the joint study by the DPKO and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, entitled "Protecting civilians in

the context of United Nations peacekeeping operations", which states that "Confusion over the Council's intent is evident in the lack of policy, guidance, planning and preparedness". It is evident that the Council requires a new paradigm and new approaches if it is to discharge its responsibilities.

We first need to recognize that there are no shortcuts to peacekeeping. We are not dealing with classic belligerents who are looking for a quick victory. We are dealing with forces that have a stake in continuing instability. We are dealing with forces that flourish in the absence of the rule of law and in the presence of violence and intimidation. We cannot deal with these forces unless we are committed to the long haul. Transition and exit strategies need therefore to be approached accordingly.

Eighty per cent of United Nations peacekeeping resources, financial and human, are deployed in post-colonial societies. The problems they face are not unique and have been confronted in many nations in Asia and Africa. It stands to reason that successful post-colonial nation-building experience is the most relevant to understanding how to approach the successful management of complex peacekeeping operations.

I am proud to represent a nation that has been an active participant in United Nations peacekeeping since 1956 and has contributed more than 100,000 peacekeepers to 40 United Nations operations. I also speak on behalf of a country that is a well-established and successful democratic polity that responds to the aspirations of one of the most diverse populations of the world and that is among the fastest growing economies of the world. Imperialist thinking at the height of the colonial era described all such countries as ungovernable. Facts and history speak otherwise.

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding are not mutually exclusive. It is our understanding that both need to continue simultaneously over extended periods of time. Precipitate withdrawal of peacekeepers is a recipe for disaster and a temptation that should be avoided at all costs. As a peacekeeping operation gathers momentum, it requires more resources, not fewer. The military component will have to be supplemented, and not supplanted, by police and rule-of-law capacity and by a capacity for development administration. By development administration capacity, we mean the ability to respond

to the basic aspirations of the people beyond law and order.

It is also important to remember that United Nations operations are essentially in aid of national authorities and national capacities. National authorities usually have a good idea of what they require. The Council and the Secretariat must not just listen more to national Governments; they must also listen carefully. There is no substitute for national capacities. The only role the United Nations can play is to help in creating conditions where these capacities can be exercised. We believe that support for national authorities is key in two areas. One is security sector reform and the other is in providing primary inputs for socio-economic development.

Security sector reform, in particular, needs far greater coordination, cohesiveness and unity of purpose. The training, equipment and working methods of national police and other rule-of-law institutions must be structured in a manner that is consonant with the wishes of national authorities and not the priorities of donors. In the case of economic development, national authorities, as the experience of the Peacebuilding Commission indicates, are capable of developing strategies and plans. What they need is resources and social investment.

Peacekeeping, which is the main contribution of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security, has a budget of \$7.8 billion. This is a little more than 0.5 per cent of worldwide military expenditures. As the concept paper circulated by the President points out, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has a ratio of one peacekeeper to 3,500 inhabitants. This is also the equivalent of one peacekeeper for every 120 square kilometres. It needs very little imagination to grasp the utter insufficiency of 17,000 peacekeepers in the task of providing support to national authorities in an area of responsibility roughly the size of western Europe. It is evident that resources for peacekeeping are utterly inadequate.

It stands to reason that an increase in the number of quality troops is the first requirement. It also stands to reason that troops require proper equipment and enablers. We would like to see an increase in the deployment of police and rule-of-law capacities. The current composition of the DPKO as it exists today does not have the capacity to plan for the nation-

building activities that are central to peacebuilding. This capacity must be developed and will require a multidisciplinary approach involving the development pillar of the United Nations and greater cooperation with countries in the global South.

It is very difficult to use objective parameters to determine an exit point from complex peacekeeping operations. A peacekeeping operation will have succeeded if there is durable peace. Durable peace can follow only from a successful peace agreement. The conditions that can lead to a successful peace agreement are also difficult, if not impossible, to define. Peace processes and political settlements cannot be subjected to budgetary discipline and evaluation by administrators. The creation of peace, as we are all learning in many different parts of the world, is not a business process. It is a complicated political undertaking with many imponderables. The Security Council is not bound by benchmarks on when and where it decides to intervene. Each decision is unique and subjective judgments are involved. Similar subjective judgments will have to be involved on when an operation can be wound up.

I would like to conclude by referring to the issue of accountability. Should there not be an accountability requirement for those who mandate? Surely, their responsibility cannot end with the generation of mandates. If unachievable mandates are generated for political expediency or if adequate resources are not made available, who should bear responsibility? A deficit in the willingness and ability to enforce mandates is leading to an erosion of the credibility of the United Nations itself.

Let me thank you again, Sir, for organizing this debate. India pays tribute to peacekeepers who have fallen, most recently in Haiti, and reiterates its commitment to contributing, through its peacekeepers and its national capacities, to the promotion of peace and security and to the role of the United Nations.

The President (*spoke in French*): I call on the representative of Egypt.

Mr. Abdelaziz (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I should like to thank you, Sir, for calling for this important debate and for the attention given by France to the ongoing deliberations on the future of United Nations peacekeeping operations and on addressing their challenges. I also thank you for the concept paper prepared by your Mission (S/2010/67) as

a basis for this debate on strengthening the drafting of Security Council mandates by providing resources and capabilities, developing exit strategies, and achieving the smooth and gradual transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and the long-term sustainable development of countries emerging from conflict.

I would like also to thank the Secretary-General for his statement early in the debate and the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support for their briefings. I also thank Japan for its efforts to enhance the interaction of the Security Council with troop-contributing countries through the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

In our capacity as the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, we fully associate ourselves with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Movement.

While the United Nations is proud of the steady increase in the number of its peacekeeping troops and police, that increase also reflects the weak ability of the Organization to reach successful political settlements of existing disputes in host countries. It also reflects in most instances a lack of interest in developing the dimensions of peace settlements, through cooperation with United Nations organs and other entities, to create urban communities that provide decent lives for belligerent forces and persuade them to lay down arms and devote themselves to building their country and to preventing it from descending yet again into conflict.

Unfortunately, this phenomenon is most clear in peacekeeping operations, at least 75 per cent of whose budgets is allocated to reimbursing troop and equipment costs, leaving less than 25 per cent to development activities, to promoting peaceful settlement efforts and to strengthening peacebuilding efforts on the ground. That is a perfectly unacceptable ratio that does not reflect the required balance between peacekeeping, peace settlement and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Egypt has repeatedly stressed the need to prevent peacekeeping missions from being transformed into missions that manage rather than settle conflicts. Egypt has also indicated the importance of focusing on building the national capabilities of host countries from the outset of a peacekeeping operation through parallel efforts in peacebuilding. That will contribute to ending

the growing reliance of host countries on the role of peacekeeping missions in support of national capacities in the areas of defence, security and the rule of law, particularly in the light of the consequences of prolonged peacekeeping missions in the absence of a national alternative capable of performing the same tasks and of protecting and consolidating whatever stability has been achieved. All of these issues must be taken into consideration in our search for a vision of sequential transitions, with defined phases, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, based on the need to achieve comprehensive economic development as a basis for such transitions.

In a contribution to defining a number of elements that can be addressed in the context of developing and implementing transition and exit strategies for peacekeeping missions, I wish to stress several important aspects that can be helpful to formulating a new strategy in this regard.

First, there is a need to focus greater attention on strengthening the Organization's political efforts, from preventive diplomacy, mediation and reconciliation through peacekeeping, peacebuilding and support for the development capacities of host countries, in cooperation with United Nations organs and international financial and economic institutions, to the organized end phase of missions. That should be done within a framework of respect for the basic principles of peacekeeping operations reflected in the consent of the parties, national ownership, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence or to implement a Security Council mandate.

Second, the Security Council must draft mandates that are clear, achievable and based on a technical assessment and sound political and military planning. The Council should also indicate precisely what goals are to be achieved and the role of each component of the mission in achieving them. This must be done in such a manner as to guarantee the required gradual transition from peacekeeping to comprehensive peaceful settlement, and in the light of clear development plans for the transition to post-conflict peacebuilding and the withdrawal of the United Nations in coordination and cooperation with the host country once it is able to assume its responsibility for defence, security and enforcing respect for the rule of law. The strategy should also take into account the evaluation set out in the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809) regarding the need for multidimensional

United Nations peacekeeping operations to launch a limited number of critical peacebuilding activities, pursuant to a phased plan for the smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

Third, we must enhance trust between peacekeeping parties represented in the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat, and strengthen coordination on the ground between the Security Council's special political missions, regional organizations, and financial and economic institutions operating in host countries in order to ensure unity of purpose and consistency in addressing the political, military, economic and development dimensions.

Fourth, institutional cooperation between the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council must be consolidated in order to take advantage of the Commission's advice in planning the peacebuilding activities of United Nations peacekeeping missions, taking into consideration the results of this year's upcoming review of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Fifth, we must pursue the development of relevant Secretariat bodies and increase coordination and interaction among them within the two Departments of the peacekeeping sector, and with the Department of Political Affairs and the Peacebuilding Support Office, in order to achieve an integrated and coherent vision that ensures unity of purpose and action on the ground, in consultation with Member States and within a framework of transparency and ongoing dialogue aimed at overcoming problems related to insufficient personnel and equipment and at ending the lack of coordination of United Nations activities on the ground.

Sixth, we must enhance resort to regional and subregional organizations in addressing post-conflict peacekeeping issues, without prejudice to the Security Council's competence but within a framework of joint efforts to achieve peace and stability. Foremost among such organizations is the African Union, which already plays a lead role that deserves appreciation and support.

Seventh and lastly, we must avoid addressing peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues from the perspective of reducing costs and disputing the competences of the Security Council and the General Assembly, represented respectively by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the

Peacebuilding Commission. The Economic and Social Council also has to play a more dynamic role in strengthening the capabilities of countries emerging from conflict to relaunch the sort of effective economic activities that guarantee an end to conflicts and promote development.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Nepal.

Mr. Acharya (Nepal): My delegation greatly appreciates the French initiative to hold discussions in the Security Council with all the relevant stakeholders on transition and exit strategies and for the succinct concept paper on this important issue (S/2010/67). I feel that a debate like this at the Security Council level with troop- and police-contributing countries would also help to add substantive value to our efforts to make United Nations peacekeeping operations more effective and efficient, thereby helping us ensure an orderly transition and exit.

I thank Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Mr. Alain Le Roy, Ms Susana Malcorra, the two Under-Secretaries-General and the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for their morning presentations. Before I begin, I associate myself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

As a country participating consistently over the past five decades in peacekeeping operations, we have seen great transformations in such operations in that time. Today, they are more diverse, more proliferate and more challenging. But we also see that there are also opportunities to contribute to peace and security through successful peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

Devising transition and exit strategies should be an integral part of any peacekeeping mission. It should be planned at the earliest phase of the mission, while keeping in view the end objective, provisions of the comprehensive peace agreement signed by the parties to the conflict, and the nature and complexity of the problem in a realistic manner. We need to have firm and clear discussions with the parties on the ground about transition and exit around the time of the comprehensive peace agreement itself, and clear political and security objectives should be formulated with benchmarks for each phase of the mission's life so as to streamline the transition process. As exit strategy is largely influenced by the political and security

situation in the host country, a balance should be maintained between an untimely exit and the possibility of relapse into violence.

Besides the ground reality, how the mandate is drafted, what it includes, what and how much resources are allocated, and whether or not necessary political support is consistently rendered at the critical moment have a great bearing on the evolution of United Nations peacekeeping missions. In this context, the close coordination and consistent involvement of the troop-contributing countries would also strengthen the effective operation of peacekeeping operations as well as their successful completion. This was also clearly put forth in the Brahimi report (see S/2000/809), the New Horizon paper and the report of Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations led by Japan. After all, the way the peacekeepers respond to the various evolving situations on the ground should lead towards the successive progress of the situation, which in turn depends very much on how we drafted our mandate in the beginning. The specific and synchronized integration of peacebuilding elements into peacekeeping operations has immensely contributed to ensure a smoother transition and exit.

We should effectively start the integrated concept of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as a seamless evolution in some of the situations. As we have seen around the world, the coordinated delivery by the United Nations system under one umbrella with one integrated framework, national ownership, the building of national institutions, matching resources as per the mandate, and strong and consistent political support, together with cooperative regional support, would ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and eventually towards the normal developmental activities of the United Nations.

I would like to stress that in order to make peacekeeping operations an effective stage towards the peacebuilding phase, the formulation of the concept of operations and strategic guidance should focus on the implementation of mandates and identified key tasks. Based on the reports from the field, the Security Council, in consultations with the troop-contributing countries, should then review the mandates and resources with a view to examining whether they are matched with each other and whether there is a need for an added impetus to the mission's effectiveness, leading towards the desired progress.

Similarly, the Security Council should ensure the timely availability of allocated resources, especially air assets and enabler components, for the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates within the stipulated time. More often, we do not see an equal level of commitment to providing support, especially lifting capacity, when the area of coverage is large and extensive and the situation precarious. Their timely availability helps make peacekeeping operations immediately operational and more effective, which will lead towards early transition to the next phase.

In considering the transition issue, security, peace and development have to be considered as an integrated whole. Security is paramount to peace and development, but they have to be promoted simultaneously in order to make peace sustainable and to ensure the peace dividend so that it reinforces strong national ownership of the process. National leadership is critical to long-term peace, development and progress. The conceptual framework on capacity-building, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security sector reform should be agreed upon at the outset with the parties concerned in the conflict to ensure its smooth implementation, which also ensures effective exit later.

We believe that the coordination of international efforts is a must to establish an effective framework for the protection of civilians in the mission area. This is an overarching factor in the implementation of Security Council mandates. But it should also be pointed out that United Nations peacekeeping operations cannot have an unlimited area of responsibilities without a proportionate level of deployment and resources. Otherwise, we would create a level of expectation that cannot be fulfilled and which in the long run would undermine the credibility of United Nations efforts themselves.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Jordan.

Mr. Al-Allaf (Jordan): At the outset, allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for this month and to wish you every success in fulfilling the tasks entrusted to you. I would also like to thank the previous president, the Permanent Representative of China, for the efforts he had made during his presidency.

I thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Alain Le Roy, and the

Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ms. Susana Malcorra, for their comprehensive and candid briefings this morning. I also thank their staff and salute all United Nations colleagues who labour tirelessly in the field on behalf of the Organization, recognizing their good work in challenging and hazardous conditions.

The initiative of France to hold today's important debate is very welcome. It comes at a timely moment as the United Nations is involved in a systemic exercise of reviewing peacekeeping and peacebuilding. While Jordan aligns itself with the statement made by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, allow me to make additional observations on the key aspects underlined in the concept paper prepared by the French delegation (S/2010/67).

United Nations peacekeeping is an instrument important to the maintenance of international peace and security. It cannot be, however, a substitute for a permanent solution or for addressing the underlying causes of conflicts. United Nations peacekeeping operations should be accompanied by an inclusive peace process that is well planned, carefully designed and supported by the consent and adherence of the parties concerned. The Security Council should also sustain its political support for the process.

Peacekeeping operations have been mandated to assist, in many different ways, countries torn by conflict, to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeeping operations have also come to take on a broader and more complex range of important new tasks. That having been said, it is important to note that no peacekeeping operation is intended to continue indefinitely, and that the lifecycle of any peacekeeping operation must at some point include an exit and, or, a transitional phase.

We strongly concur with the view that exit and transition strategies are key elements of the success of any mission and that they ought to be strengthened. However, an exit should only be considered the result of achieving mission objectives and not a departure from the goals supported by the international community and set forth in Security Council resolutions. Exit strategies should come into play when a comprehensive settlement has been implemented and sustainable peace achieved. Nevertheless, exit strategies should also be flexible and adjustable to deteriorations in any given area.

As many of the previous speakers have articulated, a good exit strategy is facilitated by a good entrance strategy. Therefore, peacekeeping operations must have clear, achievable mandates, realistic goals and end states that are not linked to artificial deadlines or based on decisions that are irrelevant to the political and security realities on the ground. To fully achieve this task, the special representatives of the Secretary-General and troop- and police-contributing countries have to be involved in the decisions of the Security Council at the various stages of peacekeeping operations. The expertise and experience of troop- and police-contributing countries, objective information provided and the situation on the ground should be taken into consideration.

Moreover, adequate resources should be provided at all stages of peacekeeping. Budgetary pressures should not result in the premature termination of a mission or in scaling it down in a manner that would make it incapable of performing its tasks efficiently.

Good integrated planning is at the heart of a coherent response to the needs of countries emerging from conflict. An effective transition following the conclusion of a peacekeeping mission must be factored into the planning process from the outset as part of a system-wide approach. Planning must specifically incorporate a comprehensive peacebuilding approach that addresses the causes as well as the symptoms of the conflict. Moreover, there should be a clear idea of what conditions are necessary for transition at the end of the peacekeeping phase of a mission. The planners should also take into consideration the significant planning demands an actual transition will impose. Transition into peacebuilding requires an examination of the political, financial, institutional and bureaucratic implications for all parties, including the Security Council.

The achievement of a self-sustaining peace in countries emerging from conflict requires a unified, long-term effort involving the relevant parts of the United Nations system as well as other key external partners, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and regional organizations. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations constitute one piece of a broader puzzle and must always be deployed as part of a long-term strategy.

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is intended to play a key role in fostering greater

coherence at the strategic level between the various players involved in efforts to assist war-torn countries. Hence, earlier engagement by the PBC might provide a means for the Security Council to explore an earlier but still sustainable exit from the military phase of peacekeeping.

There are no hard and fast criteria, measures or indicators that can determine when to close down a peacekeeping operation. Since each situation is unique and has specific problems, Council decisions will, of course, have to be based on evolving realities and considerations. The objective assessment of a given situation in both the medium- and the long-term perspectives is required for both exit and transition. Such an assessment should take into consideration the political, military, humanitarian and human rights aspects, the views of parties, and the regional dimension.

Although it is the prerogative of the Security Council to decide when a mission has fulfilled its mandate, close consultations with the troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat remain essential to any objective assessment of the progress made towards laying the foundations of a self-sustaining peace and the likely consequences of a significant reduction in or the total withdrawal of the peacekeeping presence.

Peacekeeping operations must aim at achieving the earliest possible transfer of responsibility to other actors — first and foremost, local and national authorities, but also international actors that will remain behind to assist with development and other issues. In this regard, some key benchmarks may be used in determining at which point the process of consolidation can be safely handed over to the national authorities, assisted where necessary by international actors, including United Nations agencies. These benchmarks may include, for example, the absence of violent conflict, the return of displaced persons, progress made in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the successful holding of elections and formation of legitimate political institutions, and progress made in the establishment of governance and rule-of-law mechanisms.

The specific set of benchmarks used will vary from one situation to another, depending on the underlying causes of the conflict and the dynamics in

play. Whatever the benchmarks adopted, they should be regarded as interim objectives in the broader effort to build a self-sustaining peace.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Rwanda.

Mr. Ndabarasa (Rwanda): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. I should also like to join others in commending your delegation for having convened this apt and propitious debate on an issue of critical importance to the future conduct of peacekeeping operations and for the instructive concept paper (S/2010/67) circulated to facilitate this discussion.

We are grateful for and welcome the opportunity to contribute to this debate, and thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for their presentations this morning, and all those who have put forward recommendations that we believe will greatly enhance our consideration of these issues.

Peacekeeping operations, their conception, authorization, implementation and eventual transition are more likely to succeed if a number of key factors are considered. These include a viable peace process or a peace to keep; political will, commitment and clarity of purpose on the part of all stakeholders; clear and achievable mandates; the impartial implementation of mandates; adequate and predictable financial, human and logistical resources; and distinctly defined transition and exit strategies. The very helpful concept note circulated by the French delegation to facilitate this dialogue examines some of these issues and raises a number of questions that my delegation will endeavour to address.

One issue raised is the drafting of mandates. All stakeholders must work together to ensure that we arrive at clear and achievable mandates that include a desired end state, benchmarks and adequate resources.

In addition, due to the volatile environments in which peacekeeping missions often operate, mandates should allow for enough flexibility to adapt to changes. The views and perspectives of the host country, troop and police contributors and other relevant stakeholders are critical to that end. To enable the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, mandates should also

seek to reflect the lead role of a viable national Government, as well as the role of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Planning should commence at the conception of a peacekeeping operation. It is imperative that an integrated planning process be in place, with strategic and operational objectives, in addition to clear benchmarks that allow for evaluation and accountability.

With regard to capacities and resources, peacekeeping operations should focus on fostering national ownership and building the capacity of the host country to better respond to, and address, the security challenges it faces. Those efforts should be matched with appropriate resources that will ensure long-term sustainability and allow for well-timed transition and exit strategies.

With regard to the coordination of international efforts, peacekeeping missions are often blighted by duplication of effort and contradictory initiatives. The coordination of international efforts is imperative to developing successful transition strategies. Coordination is key in fostering the credibility of planning and implementation strategies. The buy-in of key stakeholders can be achieved through coordination and consultation.

With regard to process, the development of viable transition and exit strategies is dependent on the presence of clear benchmarks that allow for evaluation and accountability. The Secretary-General's reports on peacekeeping missions should reflect the progress made in the implementation of mandates. At the same time, clearly established benchmarks should be balanced with the need for flexibility — in effect, to be able to change course when necessary.

In conclusion, it is important to point out that successful transition and exit strategies are not an end in themselves but, rather, offer the possibility for comprehensive conflict resolution.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Uruguay.

Mr. Cancela (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): First of all, I would like to express my gratitude for the important statements made this morning, in particular by the Secretary-General and by Under-Secretaries-General Alain Le Roy and Susana Malcorra.

Allow me to join others who have preceded me in thanking you, Mr. President, for this timely initiative. It is timely, first of all, because of the current situation on the ground, in which complex scenarios and missions require integrated approaches and strategies from the United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding system. Secondly, it is timely precisely because the link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding will soon be considered by the entire membership in two different contexts, namely, the process of reviewing the Peacebuilding Commission and at the next session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

"No exit without strategy" is the title of a report on this issue that the Secretary-General prepared in 2001 at the request of this organ (S/2001/394). In our judgement, several of its recommendations are still valid, including, for example, the one that says that "a good exit or transition strategy depends on a good entrance strategy" (*para. 6*).

In that regard, it is important to take into consideration lessons learned in the preparation of such strategies. The work that the Council's Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations has decided to carry out on the experiences of various completed missions therefore seems to us highly relevant. In that connection, based on our very positive experience as a troop contributor participating in meetings of the Working Group in 2009, we reiterate our full readiness to contribute to that undertaking on the basis of our experience in a number of peacekeeping missions.

Having said that, however, we believe that there is no sustainable exit or transition strategy that does not include a serious and consistent consideration of the underlying causes of a given conflict — be they ethnic or political reasons or disputes over territory or control over natural resources, among others. To that end, the first step is to thoroughly understand the causes of a conflict. In that regard, it is worth pointing out that the change in the focus of many missions in recent years from inter- to intra-State conflicts makes the problems we must face even more complex.

A peacekeeping operation is hard pressed to resolve all the sources of conflict. Nor do we believe that this should be its purpose or its benchmark in deciding on the termination or transition of a mission. What is crucial, however, is that, from the very outset, a mission work to strengthen national institutions and

capacities so that they can begin to manage these problems in a peaceful manner, thereby making a reality of the principle of national ownership, which we all endorse, and effectively laying the foundations for a future transition.

In that regard, it is crucial to strengthen institutional capacities in the areas of security and the rule of law. We therefore encourage the Council to continue to incorporate that element in the mandates of peacekeeping missions. However, that is not the only area in which peace operations have capabilities and in which they can have a positive influence.

While taking into consideration the specificities of each case, it could be very important if, from the beginning of a mission, emphasis were placed on other tasks linked to early peacebuilding activities such as, among others, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the rebuilding of infrastructure and quick-impact projects that produce tangible peace dividends. In addition, actions aimed at addressing the causes of conflict should not be put off. These could include, for example, increasing political participation, electoral system reform, respect for ethnic identity and agrarian reform.

There certainly seems to be broad consensus on the benefits that peacekeeping operations can include in their mandates and early peacebuilding tasks, in particular in the areas of security sector reform and the rule of law. However, the same cannot be said of the role of the peacekeeping system with regard to socio-economic aspects of peacebuilding. That is true in particular when it comes to efforts aimed at medium- and long-term economic recovery, which is necessary for ensuring that peace and security are sustainable and that, once a mission comes to an end, its benefits are not lost and the risks of a relapse are minimized.

In that regard, it is important to analyse the types of economic development that provide for a clear exit strategy and to foster the conditions necessary to a return to growth from the outset. In general, we must be cautious and take into account the level of social and economic devastation in the country or region in question.

The actions and areas of focus that will promote sustainable transitions through the different types of United Nations presence on the ground, ultimately leading to a complete handover of responsibilities to

the host States, require a serious effort of integration and coordination, beginning within the United Nations system. It is essential that there be certainty regarding the roles that each body and agency must play, as well as the leadership of these coordination efforts on the ground.

In this context, we believe that there is an important role for the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the body created a few years ago to deal specifically with post-conflict activities. If it is to play that role, however, the PBC must be strengthened. This would call for more resources, which could well give rise to legitimate doubts as to the advisability of such an approach and on the true ability of the United Nations to ensure sustainable transitions.

Fortunately, in the past few years, various studies have demonstrated the great imbalance between the costs of conflict without a United Nations presence and the estimates for a peacekeeping operation that meets its goals effectively. Conflicts without a United Nations presence are four times more expensive than our peacekeeping operations. Moreover, we have all witnessed successful examples of transition and should keep those lessons in mind. We therefore believe that it is worth committing ourselves to peacebuilding from the outset, providing the system and its entities with the resources necessary to fulfil its purpose.

Finally, allow me to reiterate three ideas that we consider to be important in this process. First, there must be clear objectives and exit strategies from the beginning of a mandate's discussion. Secondly, there must be coordination of United Nations action on the ground under the leadership of a representative, lending the overall effort coherence and purpose. Thirdly, peacebuilding tasks must be prioritized with adequate human and financial resources.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Italy.

Mr. Ragaglini (Italy): I thank you, Sir, for promoting a useful debate on peacekeeping that focuses on the actual effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, based on the capacity to assist a country in its transition from conflict to peace. I also thank you for inviting Italy, the most important European troop-contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions, to add its reflections to this debate. I also wish to fully align myself with the statement delivered by the representative of the European Union.

A debate on transition and exit strategies requires a focus on at least three different levels. First is the strategic level, here in New York, with the participation from the start of the Peacebuilding Commission and the troop-contributing countries in drafting mission mandates and planning; second is the involvement, whenever possible, of the regional organizations most affected by the crisis; third are national contributions, which should be focused, among other priorities, on building the security conditions indispensable to any transition.

On the first point, Italy considers it essential that the main protagonists, present and future, be brought in at the very first stages of forging a peace mission. These are the countries that contribute military and police forces, and the Peacebuilding Commission, a body conceived specifically to coordinate efforts to consolidate institutions in States emerging from conflict. Only integrated participation, a strategic vision and shared responsibility from the outset among the various actors of a peacekeeping operation will permit timely preparation for the changing of the guard between military Blue Helmets and peacebuilders deployed to help a country stabilize. Such joint efforts will unfailingly promote clearer mandates and fill present transition gaps.

Members know that this is not a totally new idea. In its presidential statement adopted in August, the Security Council underlined the following conclusion:

"The Security Council... re-emphasises the need for coherence between, and integration of, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development to achieve an effective response to post-conflict situations from the outset" (*S/PRST/2009/24, p. 3*).

In the same statement, the Council recognizes that a peacekeeping mission should be a complement, not an alternative, to a political strategy. Bearing in mind the very wide deployment of United Nations troops around the world, we believe that the moment has come to shape concretely the coherence required by the Security Council in that statement.

The five-year review of the Peacebuilding Commission offers us the chance to move from words to deeds. It is an opportunity to establish new working methods, more cooperation and greater synergy between the Security Council and its national and institutional partners, which are called on to share the

burden of a responsible transition. In this context, we cannot ignore the issue of strengthening the status of the Peacebuilding Commission in the framework of the United Nations institutional architecture.

On the second point, recent history illustrates the growing role of regional organizations in the international context. Sharing the burden of peacekeeping with them maximizes the global effectiveness of the United Nations, rationalizes the resources available, and often increases the possibilities of a successful transition. One example should suffice: with the status of Kosovo clarified, the United Nations is gradually passing the baton to the European Union. Similar cooperation has proved useful with the African Union, an organization that should be encouraged and supported to share the burden of peacekeeping.

With their shared geopolitical interests, economic and trade relations, historical ties and cultural affinities, the regional organizations are natural partners, with the greatest interest in managing a crisis afflicting one of their members or neighbouring States. They are also increasingly institutionalized international actors, as the recent Lisbon Treaty has shown for the European Union. We thus need to encourage a deeper and more structured partnership between regional organizations and the United Nations, foster adequate recognition of them, and structure better cooperation and working methods with the Security Council. The African Union-United Nations Panel has made important efforts in this direction.

The Secretary-General has reminded us that transition and exit strategies are dependent on countries assuming responsibility for their own security. Security and the rule of law are thus crucial to assuring the handover from the Blue Helmets to peacebuilding workers. The police component of peacekeeping missions, which have dramatically increased in the past few years, and the inclusion of a civilian capacity, particularly in the area of the rule of law, are indispensable to helping a country work towards resuming full national ownership and responsibility.

Italy provides a key contribution in this area. The deployment model for Italian peacekeepers, especially carabinieri, is to help re-establish State control and security over the territory. But it is accompanied by an ability to relate to the local population and an approach

that integrates the civilian components of a mission. The perception of police forces in relation to training projects, infrastructure protection, reconstruction and liaison with local authorities naturally increases trust in peacekeepers. If we add to this the training activities done in Italy to assist foreign police units assigned to United Nations peacekeeping missions, the effectiveness of this approach increases even more.

Italy, together with the European Union, will continue to make its contribution, in the conviction that, under the leadership of the United Nations, a comprehensive approach at the strategic level combined with national ownership are the essential ingredients to ensuring a successful transition strategy for peacekeeping missions.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Philippines.

Mr. Davide (Philippines): I hope that the Philippines, as the second-to-last speaker on the list, will be given more than five minutes.

Let me start, Sir, by extending to you my delegation's warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of February 2010 and for organizing this debate on transition and exit strategies, which underscores the special importance that the French presidency places on peacekeeping. I also wish to thank you for inviting the Philippines to participate in the discussion.

The Philippines associates itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, as a troop- and police-contributing country, the Philippines wishes to make the following points on the issue under consideration.

First, peacekeeping is in a constant state of evolution. In the past 60 years, we have seen how our efforts to keep the peace have metamorphosed from the more traditional form of separating warring States and maintaining ceasefire lines to more complex and multidimensional operations involving various stakeholders, which have come to include even non-State actors. The unprecedented surge in the demand for peacekeeping in areas of conflict worldwide during the past several years cannot be expected to end. While the cost of keeping the peace may be staggering — it was estimated at \$7.8 billion in the past year alone — we cannot afford to fail. It is

thus incumbent upon all States Members of the United Nations to ensure that we succeed in our efforts to deliver and maintain the kind of peace that is needed to allow people caught in conflict to move on and build.

Secondly, the role of the international community is to promote and facilitate the handover of responsibilities for lasting peace and the sustainable development of a post-conflict area to its people. That makes exit strategies for missions both sound and necessary. Logic and reason therefore dictate that, before we step in to help keep the peace, we should also know when to step out and prepare the transition towards that end. It is therefore imperative that a clearly defined exit strategy be put in place in formulating the mandate of any peacekeeping operation. That means that the Security Council should provide mandates that are not only clear and achievable but are also provided with the proper resources to accomplish the missions.

Thirdly, the Security Council must be able to set a realistic time limit for the transition of any peacekeeping mission. Critical tasks or identifiable benchmarks before mission drawdown should accompany the given deadline. A timeline will provide us the ability to measure progress throughout the mission and to protect the gains of years of peacekeeping operations. However, such a timeline should be based on existing realities on the ground and on consultations with various stakeholders. Efforts must be exerted to avoid a repetition of the premature exit in Timor-Leste in 2005.

Fourthly, in setting and reviewing mandates, the existing consultative mechanisms involving the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries must be strengthened and reinforced. The Security Council could benefit from the actual experience on the ground of troop- and police-contributing countries in formulating new mandates and in reviewing existing ones. Cooperation among various stakeholders, especially among the actors involved in the conflict, is necessary to create an environment conducive to the success of our peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. Close cooperation and coordination between regional organizations and the United Nations system are necessary to ensure the effective execution of exit strategies.

Fifthly, efforts to keep the peace must go hand in hand with efforts to build peace. It is imperative that peacebuilding activities be incorporated in the initial stages of a peacekeeping mission, to empower and prepare national and local authorities for the eventual transition and exit.

Finally, to put everything in place, in the light of the inputs put forward today by delegations, the Security Council may now consider the creation of a special ad hoc working group exclusively tasked with preparing — after open-ended, transparent and inclusive consultations and a thorough review of the history of United Nations peacekeeping and previous mandates — a working paper on general plans, programmes, activities and strategies, which may be in the form of rules and regulations, on the entry, transition and exit of peacekeeping operations. That would make the process transparent and accountable and avoid ad hoc solutions, which could be affected by temporary interests. Of course, the rules and regulations can include flexible clauses to respond to extreme emergency situations.

The President (*spoke in French*): I understand that the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations would like to make a further statement. I give him the floor.

Mr. Le Roy (*spoke in French*): I would just like to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this debate. I believe it has been very productive and that every statement has been very useful for each of us — for both the Security Council and of course for us in the Secretariat's Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support. I think that we entirely share the idea that peacebuilding activities should begin as soon as possible in the context of peacekeeping efforts, as we have very clearly said in the New Horizon study. I also think that today's debate validates everything we proposed in that study. It is for us to make use of all the integration tools at our disposal — such as the Integrated Mission Task Force, the integrated mission planning process and the integrated strategic framework — to ensure that the whole host of peacebuilding activities are integrated as soon as possible into peacekeeping efforts. I think that there is consensus on this. Once again, we proposed it in the New Horizon paper, and we are very pleased to take note of today's consensus. Thank you, Mr. President, for making this debate possible.

The President (*speaks in French*): I thank the Under-Secretaries-General for their statements and for their participation in today's debate.

Following consultations among the members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council.

"The Security Council reaffirms the statement of its President of 5 August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24) and its continued commitment to enhance further the overall effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping.

"The Security Council stresses in particular its commitment 'regularly to assess in consultation with other stakeholders, the strength, mandate and composition of peacekeeping operations with a view to making the necessary adjustments where appropriate, according to progress achieved or changing circumstances on the ground'. The Council stresses that the overarching objective should be to achieve success through creating the conditions for sustainable peace on the ground, thereby allowing for reconfiguration or withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping mission.

"The Security Council underlines that an advanced peace process is an important factor in achieving successful transition from a peacekeeping operation to other configurations of United Nations presence. It also highlights the importance of a host State protecting its population, managing political disputes peaceably and providing for basic services and long-term development.

"The Security Council recognizes the importance of supporting political processes and national institutions, in particular for rule of law, security and peacebuilding assistance at the earliest stage. In this regard, the Council reiterates the urgency of improving United Nations peacebuilding efforts and achieving a coordinated United Nations approach in country as highlighted in the statement of its President of 22 July 2009 (S/PRST/2009/23) and in the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding (S/2009/304).

"The Council underlines the importance of national ownership, constructive dialogue and

partnership between national authorities and the international community in helping to address priority peacebuilding needs and the underlying causes of recurring instability. Further improvement can be made in Security Council practice, supported by the Secretariat, to ensure successful transitions, by developing clear, credible and achievable mandates, to be matched by appropriate resources.

The Security Council

"undertakes, whenever possible, to include in peacekeeping mandates a desired outcome of the implementation of mandated tasks and a clear prioritization of tasks to achieve it, reflecting the need to create favourable conditions for sustainable peace;

"stresses the importance of an appropriate level of military expertise for Security Council decisions;

"stresses the need for precise and clear recommendations to be made available by the Secretariat at least a month before mandate renewals, on the content of the mandate and any necessary adjustments, taking into account developments on the ground and the views of the host country, relevant troop- and police-contributing countries, and other parties as appropriate;

"requests the Secretariat to plan military, police and other peacebuilding tasks in phases with clear objectives and taking into account local conditions that should be attained to allow mission success and transition from a peacekeeping operation, taking also into account the recent lessons learned from transitions to integrated peacebuilding offices;

"recognizes the utility of strategic workplans and will consider extending their use in peacekeeping operations. Progress in achieving priority tasks laid down in Security Council resolutions should be measured, as appropriate, through benchmarks that can be easily monitored by the Council;

"recognizes the importance of ensuring that mandated peacebuilding tasks

are implemented as early as possible in a peacekeeping operation in coordination with the United Nations country team and with due respect for security concerns and the priorities of the host Government, taking into account pre-existing programmes and policies implemented before the inception of the operation. In this regard, the Council reaffirms the need to fully implement the Integrated Mission Planning Process, and also notes the importance of the Integrated Strategic Frameworks. The Council also notes the importance of the civilian capacities review now being undertaken by the Peacebuilding Support Office;

"undertakes to enhance coordination with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and looks forward to the 2010 review of the PBC and the recommendations on how its role can continue to be enhanced;

"welcomes the adoption by the Security Council's Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations of its programme of work, and commends in particular its decision to address key lessons learned from past and current missions about the successful implementation of transition strategies, with a view to improving Council practice;

"recalls the necessity to take into account the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict, as and when mandated, throughout the lifecycle of United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions, in line with Security Council resolution 1894 (2009).

"The Security Council commits to regularly monitoring progress and achievement of the different stages of a given peacekeeping operation. The Council stresses the importance to maintain an efficient reporting and information collection system.

"The Security Council reaffirms its belief that United Nations peacekeeping is a unique global partnership that draws together the contributions and commitment of the entire United

Nations system. The Council is committed to strengthening this partnership and acknowledges the key role of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the General Assembly's Fifth Committee in that regard. The Security Council recognizes the need for continuous review of the Secretariat's military planning, police, judicial, rule of law, and institution-building capabilities to ensure their effective utilization and coordination.

"The Security Council recognizes the contribution of regional and subregional organizations to transition. The Security Council calls upon all Member States and regional, subregional and international partners to promote coherence and coordination of their peacebuilding plans and programmes with those of the United Nations peacekeeping operation and the wider United Nations presence on the ground.

"The Security Council undertakes to provide the political support necessary to ensure the effective implementation of peace processes, in order to promote the success of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

"The Council stresses the importance of considering early peacebuilding in its own deliberations and of ensuring coherence between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding to achieve effective transition strategies. The Council looks forward to further discussing the implementation of this integrated approach and requests the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts in this regard.

"The Security Council remains committed to improving further the overall effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, including through the recognition and enhancement of linkages with wider peacebuilding efforts, and will conduct a further review of progress in this regard in late 2010."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2010/2.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded its work.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6271st meeting

Tuesday, 16 February 2010, 10 a.m.

New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Araud	(France)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalić
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. La Yifan
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Ms. Ziade
	Mexico	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemoia
	Russian Federation	Mr. Churkin
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Parham
	United States of America	Mr. Wolff

Agenda

The situation concerning Iraq

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009)
(S/2010/76)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.



The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation concerning Iraq

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009) (S/2010/76)

The President (*spoke in French*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Iraq, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al Bayati (Iraq) took a seat at the Council table.

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Ad Melkert, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Melkert to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

I draw the attention of Council members to document S/2010/76, which contains the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009).

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Ad Melkert. I now give him the floor.

Mr. Melkert: This is a significant moment at which to brief the Council on developments and prospects in Iraq. When I spoke here three months ago, the electoral law that had just been adopted by the Council of Representatives after a complicated set of negotiations was vetoed by Vice-President al-Hashemi. That set in motion another round of deliberations that eventually were concluded with an amended law with stronger and broader support than the first version. That was very much constitutional democracy in action, with the United Nations in a position to respond to calls from the wide spectrum of representatives to assist in building bridges towards consensus. It was an important moment for Iraq to rally broad support behind the 7 March election date, which will mark the transition from the first full term of a democratically elected Parliament to the next term.

There are still forces against that national agreement that seek to interfere violently in the reconstruction and reconciliation processes that the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people would like to succeed. While, regrettably, those forces continue to kill and target innocent pilgrims, public servants, police officers and election candidates, they cannot reverse the progress that is taking place in Iraq. The determination of Iraqis to resist the return of the perils of the past is real and strong — stronger than the heinous forces behind the attacks. However, more international attention and engagement are needed to allow the people of Iraq to determine their future in their own way. Allow me therefore to share some thoughts on the forthcoming elections and the transition to the next Parliament and Government.

First, I would like to caution against the persistent skepticism and impatience that characterize much of the discourse and reporting on Iraq. Yes, it is not difficult to note imperfections, gaps and contradictions in the ongoing process, but that is not the heart of the matter if one considers the decades of conflict and crime that have gravely affected Iraq's society, economy, administration and international standing. The crux is now to see whether there is a genuine effort under way to reconstruct and innovate. That is what, in many different ways, is happening. It deserves to be seen and properly understood, unprecedented as it is in the course of a long and distinguished history.

Secondly, it is important that lessons be learned in the process and properly applied in the future in

order to minimize the re-emergence of contentious issues. From the perspective of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), it will be highly relevant to advise the new Government on the general fundamentals of electoral legislation and parliamentary procedures, as well as to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the three powers, as that is necessary to strengthen the authority of the institutions.

Thirdly, there has been much attention paid to the so-called de-Baathification of candidates for the elections. It should be noted that the principle of drawing a line between a former dictatorial regime and a newly developing democratic order has been seen in other places. The application of the principle is entirely an Iraqi responsibility. What has made matters complex, however, from the perspective of general international standards for preparing free and fair elections is the lack of transparency that has marked the process from the outset. UNAMI has consistently emphasized the due process requirements and abstained from judging the outcomes.

While reason for concern remains with regard to their impact, decisions on the candidate lists should be assessed in the context of the electoral process as a whole. What eventually will matter most is the acceptance by the Iraqi people of the election results. We will continue to do our utmost to advise and remind all stakeholders of the need to respect fundamental standards and to strive for consensus-building in reconciling the polarized past with a more harmonious future.

A fourth and different point in preparing for the transition has been the adoption of the budget. It is expected that this will allow for short-term support commitments by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in order to deal with the setback of oil price decreases during the past few years. However, transforming the budget into a strategic instrument for prioritizing and directing expenditures and investments remains a big task ahead.

The integrated United Nations Mission is preparing its advice and support to the new Government. It is doing so by seeking closer cooperation with the World Bank in particular. It is hoped that everyone will step up to the plate. Iraq needs fewer projects and more strategic advice. It needs to be connected to global standards of governance that will be of great benefit to the business

climate, and it should urgently respond to the social deficits that squarely put the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals high on the agenda as a moral imperative and economic necessity, as the skills of its workers will define whether and when Iraq can live up to its full potential.

Fifthly, full transparency and combating corruption in revitalizing the oil industry would have a major impact on the future and will improve investor confidence.

It should be welcomed that Kurdistan Regional Prime Minister Saleh has taken the initiative to address the issue of transparency with regards to the contracts signed by the Kurdistan Regional Government. Clarifying the competencies between the federal and the regional governments is an indispensable aspect of transition towards a more stable future. At the same time, with the successful conclusion of important oil contracts, urgency has returned to the stage of avoiding the pitfalls of monoproduction and the quick-win exploitation of resources. After all, stability and prosperity are closely intertwined.

I would like to say a few words on the role of the United Nations in the important priority areas.

First, on the preparations for 7 March, elections are not only about politics, but require a lot of hard work on the ground. The United Nations electoral team has continued to play a key role in advising and technically supporting the Independent High Electoral Commission. As a result of a huge collective effort, the infrastructure is in place to allow approximately 18.9 million Iraqi voters to visit 48,000 polling stations on election day. Preparations are also under way for out-of-country voting in 16 countries that host large Iraqi communities in diaspora.

Security is a vital consideration for these elections, in relation both to the integrity of the process and to voter confidence. The Government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces have the lead in this important area.

Furthermore, observation of the electoral process plays a pivotal role in ensuring the credibility of the elections and their oversight. The United Nations is playing an active role in assisting civil society to assume this role through the funding of an initiative that has trained over 29,000 domestic observers. International observers are being coordinated through

the good offices of the European Union in cooperation with the Independent High Electoral Commission. Although UNAMI will not observe the elections due to its role in supporting the Commission, our Mission will undertake its own poll-watching activities, sending teams to different locations in the country as a confidence-building initiative.

Acceptance of the results is of paramount importance and will be the litmus test for the success or failure of the process. UNAMI is supporting the Independent High Electoral Commission in developing a robust and timely complaints mechanism to ensure that the credibility of the results is not eroded by a delay in adjudication of complaints. While it is expected that preliminary results will be published in the days following 7 March, final results could take considerable time, with the Federal Supreme Court certifying the election results once all appeals have been resolved.

The next point I would like to make is on the national coexistence agenda. For the near future, cementing long-term stability between the federal State of Iraq and the Kurdish region is of paramount importance. Different signs of goodwill, including on joint security arrangements, seem to signal potential for further progress.

In the High-level Task Force that has continued to meet under UNAMI auspices, progress has been made to address issues that stand in the way of normal life and business in disputed areas, including property matters. I recently traveled to Kirkuk to support the work of the Kirkuk property committee in their inaugural meeting. In my visit to local multi-ethnic communities, I got a strong impression that daily issues are the same for all communities and that much of the discussion on boundaries and competences is considered "higher" politics, not necessarily connected with the average citizen's practical concerns about living together. This should hopefully serve as a reminder and inspiration for the inevitable "high" political dialogue that is ahead of us.

UNAMI intends to interact with key representatives of the different communities in order to encourage progress on outstanding questions that are fundamental for security, stability and economic and social progress in Iraq as a whole. The coexistence agenda and the process towards solutions will have to be decided by the Iraqi parties themselves. The United

Nations is ready to facilitate these steps at the request of parties. I have observed growing consensus that the time has come to address the administrative arrangements for Kirkuk and other areas and to ensure long-term agreements on revenue-sharing and provision of security.

Next, a word on the Chapter VII mandates. A next post-election priority will be the endeavour to promote constructive neighbourhood relations between Iraq and Kuwait, in conclusion of a period of turbulence. My visit to Kuwait in January and the consultations with the Government of Iraq prior to the visit were intended to provide me with a first-hand impression of the positions of the two sides. I was pleased with the keen interest demonstrated by my interlocutors on both sides in resolving all outstanding issues in the period ahead. This would be an important step in the Council's deliberations on resolution 1859 (2008) and will hopefully pave the way for a new era in the relationship between Iraq and the United Nations.

On the policy agenda and development assistance, with a new Government starting its work in the course of the year, there is an opportunity for the United Nations to transform its support of primarily humanitarian tasks into a more development- and policy reform-oriented advisory role. Integration will be the name of the game for United Nations contributions. The United Nations family in Iraq has identified four key areas where the United Nations has specialized knowledge and demonstrated experience: post-election activities, including census and civil registration; broader engagement in the disputed internal boundaries areas in the context of local area economic and social development; reform of the public distribution system and the development of social safety nets; and water resources management and relevant issues of transborder cooperation.

We are also in the final stages of producing the first United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Iraq for the period 2011-2014, prepared in close consultation with the Government of Iraq and concurrently with the preparation of the Iraq National Development Plan. The agencies, funds and programmes have also discussed practical measures to ensure that the UNDAF will be fully funded, particularly in the light of the closure of the United Nations Development Group Iraq Trust Fund as from 30 June 2010.

Finally, a word on the future United Nations presence in Iraq: I would like to draw the Council's attention to this in anticipation of a more specific analysis on the next reporting occasion. With its National Development Plan, the Government of Iraq counts on enlarged support by the United Nations, increasingly operating from and in the country. Against the backdrop of the drawdown of the United States Forces in Iraq security and logistical support, there will be considerable implications for the way that the United Nations can organize itself to respond to future demand for presence and programmes.

In close cooperation with United Nations Headquarters, we are currently exploring the arrangements for the future. Continued presence, let alone increasing the United Nations footprint in different parts of Iraq, will come with a higher price tag. For the plans of the new Government and for our own operational preparation, it will be important to count on the Council's attention and guidance.

In conclusion, let me reiterate my gratitude to the men and women who, in still difficult circumstances, continue to keep the United Nations flag and spirit high. It is a privilege to work with this truly international community in assisting the people of Iraq. I was happy to recently welcome the new Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, Jerzy Skuratowicz of Poland, who in many places in the world has proven to be another true United Nations ambassador. In leading the mission together with him and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, Christine McNab, I look forward to the Council's ongoing guidance and support.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Melkert for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq.

Mr. Al Bayati (Iraq): Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I would also like to present our thanks to your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of China, for his distinguished efforts during his presidency in the month of January. Our thanks also go to Mr. Ad Melkert, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, and to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) team in Iraq and New York

for their tireless work to assist the Government and people of Iraq.

Let me also take this opportunity to congratulate the new members of the Security Council, the friendly countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Gabon, Lebanon and Nigeria on assuming their duties as non-permanent members of the Security Council. We wish them success in their work. I wish to express Iraq's deep appreciation to those members of the Security Council whose terms ended in December — the friendly countries of Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Viet Nam — for the great efforts exerted throughout their membership in the Council to assist the Iraqi people.

My delegation took note of the report of the Secretary-General on the work of UNAMI, issued in document number S/2010/76, and would like to make the following comments.

On the political and security levels, on 7 December 2009 the political blocs were able to adopt an amended Election Law and came through this difficult phase in which heated political controversy threatened to disrupt the political process. The Iraqi people have overcome many difficulties and challenges and are determined today to benefit from this experience, which gives them a strong motive for broad participation in the upcoming elections to select their representatives wisely.

The approval of the amended Election Law proves that the Iraqis have the ability to overcome their differences through dialogue in order to resolve outstanding issues. They were able to lift the final obstacles in order to pave the way to an epic campaign to strengthen national unity, build the rule of law and institutions, consolidate the democratic experience and achieve their national aspirations.

The Iraqi Government is working now to develop a security plan for the coming elections so that the atmosphere is conducive to holding elections on 7 March 2010, as specified in the Constitution, despite the determined efforts of the enemies of Iraq and the Iraqi people — such as Al-Qaida and the remnants of Saddam's dictatorial regime — to block the march of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. Two days ago, the leader of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq, which is affiliated with the Al-Qaida terrorist organization, threatened to disrupt the election process and to attack Iraqis who would participate in the elections.

In the context of developments in the upcoming national parliamentary elections, I would like to stress that the Accountability and Justice Commission is a constitutional and legal body, the establishment of which is stipulated in the Iraqi Constitution. The Iraqi Council of Representatives has also approved the Accountability and Justice Law. Today, however, we are witnessing political debates concerning the decision of the Accountability and Justice Commission to exclude a number of candidates. Following the recent meeting of the Presidency Council, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House, attended by the Chief Justice, it has been agreed that the Court of Cassation will only review the files of 177 candidates excluded from the elections and reach a decision before the start of the election campaign.

In an *Al Arabia* interview on 12 February, Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki emphasized that the majority of those excluded from the upcoming elections are Shia and that the majority of Sunnis are happy with the steps that have been taken and are expected to participate widely in the elections. The Prime Minister also mentioned that many senior military commanders from the time of Saddam are still in their positions because they did not commit any crime against the Iraqi people. Many were forced to join the Baath Party, the Prime Minister acknowledged, and will have no action taken against them so long as they respect the new Iraqi Constitution and laws.

It should be noted that the exclusion of certain candidates is related to the issuance of court rulings for non-political crimes or false documentation, and is not because of the Accountability and Justice Law.

The Independent High Electoral Commission announced on 9 February, at the Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, that the date of the start of the election campaigns of the candidates nominated by political entities and of the advertising campaigns would be 12 February 2010. The President of the Independent High Electoral Commission announced the preparation of 52,000 voting stations and the appointment of 350,000 staff members to manage the electoral process, which will involve 19 million voters. The Commission is also preparing for the voting that will take place in 16 countries in which Iraqis live abroad. Iraqis will be able to vote from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Austria, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom,

Australia, Turkey, Canada, and the United States of America.

The security situation in Iraq continues to improve, despite occasional attacks targeting Iraqi civilians. The latest statistics from the Ministries of Defence, Interior and Health indicate that 196 Iraqis died in attacks during the month of January 2010 — a 56 per cent decrease from December 2009, which witnessed 306 casualties.

I should also point out that the recent terrorist attacks that killed dozens and wounded hundreds of unarmed civilians, including men, women and children, targeted visitors who walk on foot from various regions of Iraq to visit the holy shrine of Imam Hussein bin Ali bin Abu Taleb, the grandson of Prophet Mohammad who was killed along with all of his family and followers in 680 A.D., during the time of the Umayyad Dynasty. Since that time, visitors have traditionally visited his grave. Saddam's regime tried to prevent visitors to the Imam Hussein shrine from travelling on foot, but they insisted on continuing to practice their faith, whatever the sacrifice, which led to clashes between the repressive apparatus of Saddam's regime and the visitors, who were killed and injured. The bombings prove that the enemies of Iraq, such as Al-Qaida and the violent remnants of Saddam's regime, will not hesitate to kill innocent men, women and children, and that there is no alternative for the Iraqi Government but to fight and destroy them in order to preserve the lives of its citizens.

Here, I would like to recall the letter of the Prime Minister dated 30 August 2009, in which he requested the establishment of an independent international commission of inquiry to investigate the terrorist attacks that rocked the country, since key elements involved in these attacks fell outside the jurisdiction of the Iraqi State. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed and thousands wounded in these attacks, and my Government still looks forward to a positive response from the Security Council to stop the bloodshed in Iraq.

As part of the Iraqi Government's efforts to improve the security situation in the city of Baghdad, the Ministry of Planning is now studying a project to install 10,000 surveillance cameras in Baghdad, aimed at securing greater monitoring and investigation capacity. Also, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Iraqi Air Force, the month of February

witnessed the graduation of 17 helicopter pilots who completed their training, the first group of its kind since 2003.

The improved security situation and the systematic plans for the Iraqi Government to bring home Iraqis displaced abroad have led to an increase in the number of Iraqis who have returned to the country. For example, the latest report issued by the International Organization for Migration indicates the return of 350,000 displaced Iraqis to their home areas. The problems faced by the majority of these people are the lack of employment opportunities and the lack of resources. In this context, the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration, has implemented the Programme of Human Security and Stability in Iraq to help some 8,500 families who have returned to their homes across Iraq, through financial support and the creation of jobs to eliminate unemployment in these families.

The recent poll conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said that about 200,000 displaced people want to return to Iraq, and explained that many Iraqis were eager to return home given the remarkable stability of the security situation. On 3 December 2009, the Iraqi Government signed a memorandum of understanding with the International Organization for Migration to facilitate that organization's work in providing services to displaced persons and returnees and to strengthen the ties of cooperation with the Iraqi Government, especially after the significant improvement in the security situation.

The Iraqi people's enjoyment of their fundamental rights, especially the freedom of expression, as stipulated by the constitution, is a cornerstone of the ongoing political process in the country. Iraq's participation in a recent poll by World Opinion in Washington which was conducted in 24 countries demonstrates that Iraq has become one of the countries that make and adopt opinion polls in complete freedom and transparency, and represents international recognition that Iraqis enjoy freedom of expression.

For the first time, Iraq was elected to membership of the Executive Board of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, for the period from 2010 to 2012, during the Meeting of States Parties to

the Convention held at The Hague from 30 November to 4 December 2009.

On the social and economic level, under the auspices of Prime Minister Nuri Kamel al-Maliki, on 11 December 2009 the Iraqi Government held a second round of competition for offers for oil-field service contracts. Here the Prime Minister stressed that the Government will provide all facilities for those companies that win oil licenses. This resulted in 15 companies from around the world winning service contracts for seven Iraqi oil fields. The holding of this round of oil and gas licensing is a second important turning point in the process of construction and reconstruction through open and transparent investment of oil wealth and is in the interest of the Iraqi people after decades of oil wealth having been disabled because of the policies of the former regime.

It is expected that oil-field development projects will increase Iraq's oil production and that average production will reach 6 million barrels per day during the next six years, and nearly 12 million barrels per day by 2020 — a strategic objective that the Iraqi Oil Ministry is now working towards. Exported oil production for the month of January 2010 increased to 1.98 million barrels per day, and the Iraqi Government is planning to increase the amount of oil exports in 2010 to 2.325 million barrels per day.

The Oil Minister, Mr. Hussain al-Shahristani, has announced the establishment of a fourth national oil company to oversee the development of oil fields in the middle of Iraq. This company will also be responsible for developing the oil fields located in Baghdad and surrounding provinces. Oil commissions have also been established in Dhi Qar in the south and Nineveh in the north in order to oversee the implementation of oil contracts in those provinces.

The Iraqi Government is working to ensure that its citizens benefit directly from the projected increase in oil production. Studies indicate that the average person's share of Iraqi oil revenues will rise from \$1,534 in 2010 to \$3,361 in 2015, and to \$9,488 in 2020. Federal budget expenditures in Iraq are also predicted to increase, to \$132 billion in 2015 and to \$256 billion in 2020, which will be reflected in accumulated investment allocations totalling \$138 billion between 2010 and 2015, and \$496 billion between 2010 and 2020. These accumulations will

attract and encourage both domestic and foreign investment in Iraq.

As part of the Iraqi Government's efforts to ensure the highest degree of transparency in the investment and management of oil wealth, on 10 January 2010 Iraq joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) following the recommendation of the EITI Initiative Department that Iraq be among the 34 countries that have joined so far.

Last month, the Iraqi Council of Representatives approved a federal budget for 2010 totalling \$72.4 billion, which includes \$51 billion to fund operating expenses and \$19.5 billion to be invested in financing reconstruction projects in the country.

On 29 January 2010, Baghdad witnessed the laying of the foundation stone of the largest tourist hotel in Iraq, with twin 26-storey towers and 550 rooms at an estimated cost of \$150 million. The mayor of Baghdad announced the beginning of more than 25 such investment projects in the third instalment of investment projects for the development of the city. These will include the establishment of major residential, industrial and shopping areas, hotels, modern restaurant chains and infrastructure projects. The National Investment Commission is also working to make 2010 a year of achievement, and has developed an investment plan involving 750 projects in Iraq.

The Iraqi Council of Ministers approved the national poverty reduction strategy recommended by the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation in collaboration with the World Bank. This strategy aims to increase the income of the poor and improve the quality of health and educational services provided to them, with the provision of adequate housing and effective social protection, in order to reduce poverty by 30 per cent from 2007 levels.

As part of the Iraqi Government's efforts to reactivate the central supermarkets, the Central Supermarkets Company made profits estimated at \$15.8 million in 2009, an increase of 169 per cent on 2008 profits.

In the context of regional and international openness, the recent period witnessed the visit of United States Vice-President Joseph Biden to Baghdad on 22 January 2010 to discuss strengthening bilateral

relations, and the visit of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic Mr. Jan Kohout on 25 November 2009. The visit of the European Union Commissioner for Energy, Mr. Andris Piebalgs, on 18 January 2010 witnessed the signing of a cooperation agreement in the field of energy between Iraq and the European Union.

On 7 January 2010, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Iraq and held talks about a number of files of bilateral interest to both countries and the formation of many of the relevant functional commissions to resolve outstanding issues. Of special importance was the issue of borders and the entrance of the Iranian forces into the Alfaka oil field inside Iraq, where the Iraqi Government was able to resolve the problem through negotiations that led to the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Iraqi territory.

Prime Minister Nuri Kamel al-Maliki visited Cairo on 21 December 2009 and met with His Excellency President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak to discuss the prospect of developing bilateral relations, and with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Amr Moussa, to discuss ways of enhancing the Arab presence in Baghdad. Vice-President Adil Abdul-Mahdi visited Washington, D.C., on 14 January to discuss the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq. On 1 February, Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi also visited Washington, D.C., where he met with a number of senior United States officials to discuss political developments in Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional President, Mr. Masoud Barzani, also visited Washington, D.C., on 25 January in response to a formal invitation from President Barack Obama.

The Foreign Minister, Mr. Hoshiyar Zebari, visited Rome and met with his Italian counterpart, Mr. Franco Frattini, during the meeting of the Iraqi-Italian Joint Commission on 14 December, and on 14 January participated in the Manama Dialogue conference, which discussed issues of regional security in the Gulf. Mr. Zebari also visited Oslo and met with Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre on 17 January to discuss the opening of a Norwegian embassy in Baghdad, its role in the development of bilateral relations, and the role of Norwegian companies in the development of the Iraqi oil industry.

On 1 February, in the framework of Iraq's efforts to resolve outstanding issues with Kuwait, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs published an announcement

requesting that Iraqi citizens possessing documents or any other Kuwaiti property seized by the former regime during the occupation of Kuwait in 1990 deliver them to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in order that they be returned to Kuwait.

In his report to the Security Council on the review of resolutions pertaining specifically to Iraq, the Secretary-General states:

"It is important to recognize that the Iraq of today is very different from Iraq prior to 2003. It is my hope that the Security Council will consider this report with a view to taking appropriate decisions that would help Iraq to fulfil its outstanding obligations in a timely manner" (S/2009/385, para. 67).

In regard to this, I refer to the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the President of the Security Council, dated 19 January 2010, regarding the

obligations of Iraq in the field of disarmament, which requested that the Security Council urgently look into the removal of all restrictions imposed pursuant to its resolutions on Iraq pertaining to disarmament and weapons of mass destruction, including resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).

In conclusion, I would like to stress my Government's gratitude to the Security Council for the role played by UNAMI in Iraq and for Mr. Melkert's support, offered at the Government's request and based on mutually agreed mechanisms.

The President (*spoke in French*): There are no further speakers on my list. In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussions on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.55 a.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

6272nd meeting

Tuesday, 16 February 2010, 12.45 p.m.

New York

Provisional

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Araud	(France)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Lutterotti
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Vukašinović
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. La Yifan
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Arima
	Lebanon	Ms. Ziade
	Mexico	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemola
	Russian Federation	Mr. Kravchenko
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Parham
	United States of America	Mr. Wolff

Agenda

Peace consolidation in West Africa

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.



The meeting was called to order at 12:45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Peace consolidation in West Africa

The President (*spoke in French*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

After consultations among members of the Security Council, I have been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council welcomes the recent positive developments in Guinea while remaining concerned by the situation. It reiterates the statement of its President (S/PRST/2009/27). It looks forward to the timely restoration of the normal constitutional order in a peaceful manner through a civilian-led transition.

"The Security Council reiterates its support for the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. It commends President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso for his mediation efforts and welcomes the communiqués of the International Contact Group on Guinea dated 26 January 2010 and of the African Union Summit dated 3 February 2010.

"The Security Council welcomes the Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou dated 15 January 2010, which, consistent with the proposals made on 6 January by the interim President, General Sékouba Konaté, provides in particular for the establishment of a National Unity Government led by a civilian Prime Minister designated by the opposition, the holding of elections within six months, the commitment that the Head of State of the transition, members of the Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement, the Prime Minister, members of the National Unity Government and the defence and security forces in active service will not stand in the forthcoming presidential elections.

"The Security Council welcomes further the appointment on 21 January 2010 of Mr. Jean-Marie Doré as Prime Minister and the designation

of a unity Government on 15 February 2010. It calls upon all Guinean stakeholders to implement the Joint Declaration of Ouagadougou in full, and to engage actively in the transition towards the restoration of the normal constitutional order through the holding of elections within six months. It calls upon the international community to lend its support to the Guinean authorities led by interim President Sékouba Konaté and Prime Minister Jean-Marie Doré, including with regard to comprehensive security and justice sectors reform, upon request from the Guinean authorities.

"The Security Council recalls that it strongly condemned the violence committed on 28 September 2009 and its aftermath. It urges the national authorities to prevent any further violence and uphold the rule of law, including promotion, protection and respect for human rights and due process, and stresses their obligations towards the victims and witnesses. It emphasizes the responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations to end impunity.

"The Security Council commends the work of the International Commission of Inquiry established by the Secretary-General and supported by ECOWAS and the African Union to investigate the facts and circumstances of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea consistent with its mandate (S/2009/556). It takes note positively of the submission by the Commission of its report (S/2009/693).

"The Security Council takes note that the International Contact Group invited relevant international stakeholders, including ECOWAS, the African Union and the Mediator, to consider deploying, as soon as possible and in consultation with the Guinean authorities, a possible joint civil-military mission in Guinea with a view to discussing modalities for defence and security sector reform and contributing to security conditions for the electoral process. It encourages them to plan for such a possible mission.

"The Security Council reiterates the call it made in its resolution 1888 (2009) to increase the representation of women in mediation processes and decision-making processes with regard to conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

"The Security Council expresses its intention to remain seized of the situation and to react as appropriate to any threat or action against the transition. It requests the Secretary-General to continue to update it as appropriate on the situation on the ground, the potential implications for the subregion, the fight against impunity, the efforts of ECOWAS and the African Union, and the actions of the Secretariat of the United Nations."

This statement will be issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/PRST/2010/3.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6273rd meeting

 Thursday, 18 February 2010, 10 a.m.
 New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Araud.	(France)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria.	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina.	Mr. Barbačić
	Brazil.	Mrs. Viotti
	China.	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Gabon.	Mr. Moungara Moussotsi
	Japan.	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon.	Ms. Ziade
	Mexico.	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria.	Mr. Onemola
	Russian Federation.	Mr. Churkin
	Turkey.	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda.	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.	Sir Mark Lyall Grant
	United States of America.	Ms. Rice

Agenda

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.



The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

It is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Lynn Pascoe, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Pascoe: Since the briefing of 27 January, efforts to bring about Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have continued. A proposal from United States Envoy Mitchell that the parties begin indirect talks with United States mediation is currently under serious consideration. Israel has indicated its readiness to work on this basis, while President Abbas has been engaged in intensive consultations and sought clarifications.

The Secretary-General hopes that President Abbas will move forward on the basis of this practical proposal so that serious talks can begin. He notes Prime Minister Netanyahu's stated commitment to a two-State solution, although confusion as to the Israeli Government's intentions arises from statements by various of its officials.

We continue to stress the importance of doing everything possible to ensure that negotiations lead in a clear time frame to an agreement resolving all final status issues, including Jerusalem, borders, refugees, security, settlements and water. We believe that the international consensus on what it will take to reach a sustainable agreement is strong and that an active Quartet will be vital to support the process.

The Israeli Government's partial restraint on settlement construction in the West Bank, excluding

East Jerusalem, remains in effect and has led to a slowdown of construction activity. However, violations of the restraint orders have been identified by Israeli authorities in at least 29 settlements, with the Defence Ministry that it is issuing demolition and stop-work orders against violators. While the Israeli Government's settlement restraint constitutes a step beyond previous positions, the settlements themselves are illegal and continued settlement activity violates Israel's Road Map obligations and prejudices the outcome of negotiations. We therefore urge additional measures to enforce the restraint. We also urge extension into a comprehensive freeze, including East Jerusalem, as well as its continuation beyond the current 10-month period.

There were no demolitions of Palestinian homes or evictions in East Jerusalem during the reporting period — a positive development which we hope will continue. We continue to call for the reopening of Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem in accordance with Road Map obligations. The status of Jerusalem is to be determined through negotiations, and we believe that a way must be found through negotiations for Jerusalem to emerge as the capital of two States.

The efforts of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to meet its Road Map obligations to combat terrorism have continued in the West Bank, reflecting impressive achievements in reform, professionalization and performance. It is important that the Palestinian Authority leadership continue to speak out against violence and incitement. On 10 February, an Israeli soldier was killed by a knife attack. The incident was condemned by Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad.

There were 79 Israeli army incursions into West Bank towns and villages in response to alleged security threats. Nearly 500 Palestinians were arrested. On 12 February, Israeli security forces shot and killed a Palestinian for attempting to stab a soldier in Hebron while 41 other Palestinians were injured in action with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Israeli security forces also carried out extensive operations in Shuafat refugee camp in East Jerusalem between 8 and 10 February.

Palestinian, Israeli and foreign protesters continued demonstrating against the barrier where it is being constructed within the West Bank in contravention of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. There have been raids into Ramallah against individuals and organizations involved in protests.

positive action, we note that Israel began work on 10 February to reroute a section of the barrier around the village of Bil'in to implement a 2007 Israeli High Court order, which is expected to return 700,000 square metres of arable land to the village, while leaving approximately 150,000 square metres west of the barrier.

We are also concerned at continued settler violence. There have been 8 reported attacks by settlers on Palestinians, including on 9 February when settlers shot and injured a Palestinian teenager. We note legitimate Israeli and Palestinian security concerns. Sustainable security will be best achieved through intensified cooperation, the continued empowerment of PA security efforts and PA performance, the curtailment of IDF incursions into Palestinian areas, full respect for legitimate non-violent protest, Israeli action to curb settler violence, Palestinian action against incitement, and progress in both political negotiations and economic development.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded the removal of 24 closure obstacles throughout the Hebron governorate, continuing the gradual easing of Palestinian movement in areas to the east of the barrier. However, as of 16 February, 550 obstacles to movement remain in place throughout the West Bank, of which 89 are permanently and partially staffed checkpoints. The Israeli Government recently allowed tourist buses to use the Jalameh vehicle crossing from northern Israel into the West Bank with the aim of boosting the Palestinian tourism sector. The Israeli Government is encouraged to continue to facilitate this access and to take more far-reaching measures as well.

The important work of Palestinian State-building through institutional reform and development is continuing. However, the recurrent financing requirements facing the Palestinian Authority are still substantial and projected at about \$1.2 billion in 2010, despite reduced spending on wages and subsidies. We encourage donors to channel their assistance first and foremost through the single treasury account and to support the priorities articulated by the Palestinian Authority for 2010. We welcome recent transfers and pledges and also strongly encourage those donors who have not yet done so to frontload financial support to allow for greater predictability. We also stress the importance of applying accepted principles of aid effectiveness to ensure better targeting and maximize programme impact.

On 8 February, the Palestinian Cabinet called for local elections to be held on 17 July 2010, in accordance with the local election law for all 335 municipal councils in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian Central Election Commission is planning to start registering voters on 6 March. We take this opportunity to urge Hamas to respond positively to this important part of the democratic process.

Senior Fatah and independent figures visited Gaza during the reporting period in an effort to ease tensions and promote reconciliation. Other factions in the Gaza Strip have also been active in this direction, and an Arab parliamentary group visited the Strip on 15 and 16 February. However, to date, there has been no further progress in finalizing an agreement based on Egypt's proposal.

It is deeply regrettable that there has been no breakthrough on a prisoner exchange to secure the release of Corporal Shalit and Palestinian prisoners, despite intensive efforts in recent months.

While the Hamas de facto authorities are reportedly exerting efforts to prevent the launching of rockets at Israel, 19 projectiles were fired from Gaza and 11 reached southern Israel during the reporting period, with no damage or injuries reported. Three barrels of explosives washed up on Israeli beaches between 1 and 3 February, with a further two detonating at sea. There was an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a convoy of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicles on 4 February, which damaged one vehicle, and two other IED attacks, reportedly by Salafist elements, killing one Hamas militant and injuring four others. One Palestinian was killed in an Israeli air strike, and seven others were injured in IDF incursions and operations. We continue to condemn rocket fire, and call for its cessation and on all parties to maintain calm and to strictly observe international humanitarian law.

We continue to receive reports of the smuggling of weapons supplied from within the region. Egypt is maintaining its efforts, as all States are called on to do in Security Council resolution 1860 (2009). Egypt is also seizing explosives and installing metal sheeting in areas along its border with Gaza. Those efforts further underscore the vital importance of opening all legitimate crossings for imports and exports, as envisaged in the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access and in resolution 1860 (2009).

The Israeli closure of Gaza remains in place. That counterproductive policy is empowering smugglers and militants, destroying legitimate commerce and causing unacceptable hardship for the civilian population, more than half of whom are children.

During the reporting period, food and hygiene products comprised 84 per cent of imports and a weekly average of 561 trucks entered the Strip, which is slightly more than the previous reporting period, but far short of the weekly average of 2,087 trucks before the Hamas takeover in June 2007. Cooking gas supplies met only 48 per cent of estimated weekly needs during the reporting period. We take positive note of the entry of a slightly wider range of materials, such as glass, electricity spare parts and one elevator for a maternity hospital. The first phase of the northern Gaza wastewater treatment plant project was completed in late January. We also note that the export of cut flowers and strawberries continued.

However, the scale and quantity of goods entering Gaza through the Israeli crossings, as well as the level of exports, remain far short of requirements. Sufficient materials to restart civilian reconstruction are still not entering Gaza through the Israeli crossings. We again express our disappointment that there has been no satisfactory Israeli response to the United Nations proposal to complete stalled projects for housing, schools and health facilities. We also continue to be concerned about fuel shortages at the Gaza power plant as a result of funding shortfalls and technical failures, leading to rolling blackouts.

If I may turn to the regional situation, we deplore the heightened and belligerent rhetoric during the reporting period and call for its cessation. We continue to support all efforts to revive the Israeli-Syrian track and a broader resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as envisaged in Security Council resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative. The situation in the occupied Syrian Golan remained calm despite continued settlement activity.

In Lebanon, on 14 February, a large rally took place in Beirut to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. On that occasion, leaders of the 14 March coalition commemorated Mr. Hariri's contribution to Lebanon's development and reaffirmed their determination to establish the truth behind his murder. Prime Minister Saad Hariri emphasized the importance of national unity and Lebanon's role with regard to inter-Arab

reconciliation. In a statement, the Secretary-General said that he stood with the people of Lebanon and reaffirmed the commitment of the United Nations to the efforts of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

On 15 February, clashes between members of radical Islamist movements and members of Fatah broke out in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain el-Helwe near Saida. At least one person was killed as a result of the fighting before calm was restored to the camp. The incident disrupted an otherwise generally calm situation in the camps.

Even as progress is being made in the reconstruction of the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp, funding remains a major concern. The United Nations urges the international community to renew its financial support for the reconstruction of Nahr el-Bared so that progress can be sustained.

The situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remains quiet. On 31 January 2010, the IFM apprehended a 17-year-old Lebanese shepherd in the vicinity of Kafr Shuba, alleging that he had crossed south of the Blue Line. On 1 February, the civilian was handed over to UNIFIL, which, in turn, handed him over to the Lebanese authorities. An investigation into the incident is ongoing. Israeli overflights have continued on an almost daily basis, with a marked increase on several days in early February.

We remain deeply concerned at the current stalemate. We call for the resumption of talks on final status issues, implementation of Road Map commitments, continued efforts to improve economic and security conditions, and a different and more positive approach to Gaza. We remain committed to an end to the occupation that began in 1967, an end to the conflict through the creation of an independent Palestinian State living side by side with Israel in peace and security, and comprehensive regional peace, in accordance with Security Council resolutions, previous agreements, the Road Map and the Arab Peace Initiative.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Pascoe for his briefing.

In accordance with the understanding reached at the Council's prior consultations, I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10 30 a.m.



Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6274th meeting

Friday, 19 February 2010, 10 a.m.
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Araud	(France)
<i>Members:</i>	Austria	Mr. Mayr-Harting
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalčić
	Brazil	Mrs. Viotti
	China	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Takasu
	Lebanon	Ms. Ziade
	Mexico	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria	Mrs. Ogwu
	Russian Federation	Mr. Dolgov
	Turkey	Mr. Çorman
	Uganda	Mr. Rugunda
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Parham
	United States of America	Mr. DeLaurentis

Agenda

The question concerning Haiti

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The question concerning Haiti

The President (*spoke in French*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Haiti, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mèrorès (Haiti) took a seat at the Council table.

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend invitations under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

It is so decided.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Council will hear briefings by Mr. John Holmes and Mr. Alain Le Roy. I now give the floor to Mr. Holmes.

Mr. Holmes: Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Council on my visit to Haiti and the Dominican Republic last week and on the humanitarian situation in Haiti.

The aim of my trip, following an initial visit with the Secretary-General four days after the earthquake, was to review on the ground the challenges the humanitarian community faces in the months ahead. In the Dominican Republic, a vital logistics hub and

staging area for the relief operation, I thanked the Government for its exemplary cooperation and its contribution to the relief effort in Haiti. I visited a public hospital, in which severely injured Haitians, including children, have been receiving life-saving medical treatment. I also visited the border area between the Dominican Republic and Haiti to see in particular the fragile and flood-prone road corridor through which large quantities of relief supplies enter Haiti. This road must be repaired and strengthened urgently, before the rainy season causes major damage and blocks it.

In Haiti I visited Léogâne, the epicentre of the earthquake, where its devastating effects were particularly clear, before going on to Port-au-Prince to look at progress there, as well as to meet the Government and the many actors, humanitarian and military, engaged in the relief operation.

Let me repeat first of all that the national and local authorities, civil society and the people of Haiti themselves have coped with extraordinary resilience and patience in the midst of devastation on a scale which has rarely been seen, particularly in a capital city. Life of all kinds was visibly returning to the streets. Meanwhile, a large and complex humanitarian response is in place, despite the destruction of government, United Nations and non-governmental organization (NGO) offices, the loss of many key personnel and the initial absence of so many basic services.

It was heartening to see the determination shown by United Nations, NGO and Red Cross/Red Crescent national and international staff in the field. They have worked tirelessly since just hours after the earthquake struck, in often dreadful working and living conditions themselves, to launch the relief operation in support of the Haitian people. Let me also pay tribute to the peacekeepers of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and United Nations police, as well as to the other military forces, who are all playing a vital role, using their indispensable assets and helping to distribute aid safely and to maintain public order.

The humanitarian situation is now gradually improving on a daily basis. The worst of the medical emergency is behind us. More than 3 million people have received food rations and continue to do so on an increasingly targeted basis. Clean water is available for

the vast majority of those in need. Essential infrastructure — such as the port, airport, electricity and telecommunications facilities and most roads, which during the first days and weeks were bottlenecks for relief and aid workers trying to get into the country — is increasingly operational. Every day, larger quantities of relief supplies are reaching Haiti and being distributed.

Nevertheless, it is clear that not everyone in need has yet been reached and that we have much more to do on the ground, particularly in terms of emergency shelter, other non-food items and sanitation. The estimated 1.2 million Haitians in need of emergency shelter support desperately need a waterproof cover over their heads, and we are still only 30 per cent there. We are straining every nerve to speed up the delivery of shelter materials, mainly plastic sheeting, but also tents, before the rains begin in earnest. This shelter and sanitation surge is the top priority.

While life may be returning in some ways, the devastating effect of the earthquake is still abundantly evident in the capital and elsewhere. Around 3 million people — one in every three Haitians — were badly affected by the earthquake. The majority of those are in the capital, Port-au-Prince, but also in other surrounding towns and cities, including Jacmel, and the epicentre, Léogâne, where 80 per cent of buildings were destroyed. It was encouraging to see in Léogâne that, despite the initial difficulties involved in reaching the city, a good deal was happening in terms of relief assistance. Over 70 organizations are on the ground in Léogâne, including an office of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Cooperation with the large and effective Canadian military presence was clearly good. Food and shelter distribution had made good progress.

However, it was also clear that some of the informal sites, where those unable to return to their homes were living, were not sustainable. They were overcrowded, liable to flood and at serious risk of fire from cooking in the makeshift shelters. The identification of alternative sites is a challenge, but land should be easier to find in Léogâne than in the more congested and geographically challenging context of Port-au-Prince itself.

In Port-au-Prince, I visited an informal camp in the grounds of the Pétienville Club, where tens of thousands of people have taken refuge. It was both

encouraging and worrying. It was encouraging because the camp seemed well organized and relatively clean, with good availability of food and shelter material, a rudimentary school already established and a calm atmosphere overall. There was excellent cooperation between the NGOs and the United States forces on the spot. But it was worrying, again, because of the very obvious unsuitability and unsustainability of the site once the rainy season begins. The steep slopes and floodable area at the bottom of the site mean that a lot of people must be moved out soon. But there is nowhere for them to go until alternative, more acceptable sites are made available. I give this detail because there are many similar sites with high risk of flooding that also need to be decongested. So, provision of suitable land is a high priority, and we are working with the Government on this.

In a meeting with President Préval and Government ministers, I thanked him for the Government's continued leadership and engagement with the United Nations and partners. He was understandably anxious to see faster progress, on shelter in particular. I assured him that we were doing our utmost to meet the emergency shelter and sanitation requirements before the rainy season, as well as making an early start on the huge task of rubble removal: rapid clearance of some urban sites would free up areas to which the people on currently congested sites could move. To do this, we need to mobilize urgently more heavy equipment, including assets which the military and the private sector can provide, to supplement the efforts of the 75,000 Haitians who have already been engaged in United Nations cash-for-work programmes. We also need to start a systematic effort to assess earthquake-affected structures, to decide which need demolition, which can be repaired and which can be used.

The cluster approach that the international humanitarian community has developed since the Asian tsunami five years ago is proving its worth in improving coordination and the effectiveness of the response. Local cluster leadership is being reinforced, faced with a catastrophe of this magnitude and the 900-plus organizations on the ground whose efforts need to be coordinated. A Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator has also now been deployed to Port-au-Prince, not least to strengthen and expand partnerships with key stakeholders, including bilateral donors, military forces and private actors.

The situation in Port-Au-Prince, the capital, and surrounding towns has been the main focus of relief efforts so far, but there are huge needs elsewhere too, which require a nationwide response. Nearly half a million people have left earthquake-affected areas and dispersed around the country. Many have gone to areas that were already highly vulnerable before the earthquake. Host families and communities have been very generous, but are poorly placed to feed and look after their guests for long. Help is badly needed for all concerned and is now a priority for the relief operation.

While we continue to refine our assessment of the humanitarian needs, the longer-term post-disaster needs assessment process is now under way in parallel to look at reconstruction and redevelopment requirements. We need to make sure that our relief efforts pave the way as effectively as possible for this phase to enable Haiti to be built back better, which is the overriding aim of us all.

On the resource mobilization front, I thank all Member States and private donors again for contributing generously to the relief operation and fully funding the initial six-month Haiti flash appeal. However, sustained and additional support will be necessary for the long haul before us. The Secretary-General and his Special Envoy for Haiti, President Clinton, launched yesterday the revised humanitarian appeal, taking into account not only relief needs but also early recovery help to be delivered within a 12-month time frame, including in key areas such as health, education and agriculture. The revised appeal, for a total of \$1.4 billion, includes the amounts raised in response to the initial six-month appeal. Unmet needs therefore amount to \$768 million, which is the amount we are asking for now to fund projects from 54 non-governmental organizations, 21 United Nations agencies and the International Organization for Migration. They include plans for the upcoming rainy and hurricane seasons, not least transitional shelter requirements, as well as vital disaster-risk reduction measures.

In sum, the humanitarian situation in Haiti is undoubtedly improving day by day, but we are under no illusion about the scale of the challenges still ahead for the next weeks and months. The international humanitarian community will continue to support the Haitian Government in addressing the most urgent needs and gaps as the longer-term recovery and reconstruction processes gather pace in parallel.

There are no instant solutions. It will take time to cover all these needs and care to maintain help to the most vulnerable without creating dangerous aid dependency. But we must not waver in helping several million people not only to survive this catastrophe, but also to rebuild better, more prosperous lives and livelihoods for the future.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Holmes for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Le Roy.

Mr. Le Roy (*spoke in French*): Since the tragedy of 12 January, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has focused on three main objectives: supporting and facilitating relief operations, ensuring law and order and security, and — given its enormous losses in personnel and infrastructure — restoring the Mission's capacities.

I should like to begin by referring to the Mission's capacities. MINUSTAH, as members of the Council are aware, has lost 91 staff members, including the head of Mission. Over the past five weeks, we have not only replaced our deceased colleagues, but also deployed additional personnel and resources. More than 300 officers have been dispatched to reinforce the Mission.

As everyone knows, military operations have continued, in particular led by the Brazilian and other contingents deployed to MINUSTAH and to our police forces. Thanks to the timely decision of the Security Council to increase authorized troop numbers, we are currently strengthening those military and police capabilities. We intend to deploy more than 1,500 troops and up to 500 additional police officers by the second week of March, and they should be operational in April. Of course, I wish to thank the many Member States that have offered troops and police to MINUSTAH in recent weeks. Those reinforcements are crucial at this very critical time.

A flexible approach to resource management allowed MINUSTAH to react immediately to the unprecedented challenges raised by the earthquake. In the coming weeks, we shall ask Member States for additional resources, initially on the basis of a preliminary study, before we submit a new, detailed budget.

In the days that followed the earthquake, MINUSTAH redirected its efforts and, to the extent

possible, supported the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance. Since then, in close cooperation with the United States and Canadian military on the ground, we have guaranteed security and provided logistical support to the humanitarian effort. This has been a true challenge, but I am convinced that the mechanisms we have established to coordinate the international presence in that area and its support of the Haitian authorities have considerably improved the situation.

Our United States and Canadian bilateral partners will gradually reduce their presence, although it is important that these reductions and withdrawals correspond to benchmarks and transfers scheduled jointly with MINUSTAH. I was very pleased to receive confirmation in Washington, D.C. yesterday that the United States shared that view.

Allow me to say a few words about the security situation and the rule of law as a whole. Following the earthquake, one of MINUSTAH's main priorities was to restore law and order in the affected zones and the capacities of the Haitian National Police (HNP). To that end, more than 70 per cent of the MINUSTAH police were redeployed in the affected zones. Like all Government institutions, the HNP was severely impacted by the earthquake. Some 40 per cent of its facilities and equipment is no longer operational. While the vast majority of officers have resumed their duties, the HNP's intervention capacity is severely limited by the loss of vehicles, communications systems and essential databases. Nevertheless, since the earthquake the HNP has proved to be very effective and has contributed significantly to restoring the general calm that has prevailed in the affected zones.

The judicial apparatus has also been affected. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Palace of Justice, the Court of Cassation and the trial courthouse have been destroyed. Several judges have been killed. Apart from the small number of particularly urgent cases, the judicial process has been largely suspended in the zones affected by the earthquake. Of the country's 17 prisons, eight have been totally or partially destroyed, and nearly 5,000 detainees — 60 per cent of the prison population — have escaped. Several hundred of these fugitives are considered to be particularly dangerous. Some 80 per cent of those who have escaped were in provisional custody.

Today, the security situation remains stable, but potentially fragile. The deterioration in living conditions has led to an increase in such crimes as robbery, mugging and looting. Of course, we fear a resumption of gang violence, despite the fact that it has hitherto been limited largely to internal power struggles, as those who escaped seek to regain control of their former turfs. The HNP and MINUSTAH are following the situation very closely.

Despite the relative stability, we are aware that the current calm is extremely precarious. If we are unable to meet humanitarian imperatives — in particular the need for shelter before the rainy season — Haitians will become increasingly frustrated, opening the door to possible political manipulation. We must critically address this potential source of instability in the weeks and months to come. Security will also depend on our ability to help the police, judicial and penal systems not only to recover the resources that were at their disposal before the earthquake, but also to increase them, *inter alia*, by training new officers.

(spoke in English)

Just as important as the physical security of Haiti and its people is the question of political stability, the lack of which has often caused violent tensions in the past. The legislative elections planned for the end of March have now been postponed by President Préval. They may be held later this year or even in 2011. While this decision has been broadly supported by all political forces, it raises very significant constitutional questions about the period following 10 May, when the mandates of the members of the lower house and of a large number of senators expire. Ensuring full legislative capacity beyond 10 May is a key challenge that will need to be resolved quickly.

There have also been calls to replace the current Government, for example with a *gouvernement de salut public* that would include members of the opposition. Others have emphasized the need to restructure the Government and form a new Cabinet that can deal with the complex challenges ahead. Some parties have accused the Government of political favouritism in the distribution of aid.

At the same time, there has been no shortage of ideas on how to move forward. Several political parties and electoral platforms have engaged in consultations on critical issues ranging from governance, elections and constitutional reform to decentralization. The

Prime Minister himself has advocated fundamental changes, including decentralization of the Government and greater focus on the regions. A number of high-profile private sector leaders are actively involved in the humanitarian response and see the current situation as an opportunity to steer reconstruction efforts towards a modernization of the State architecture by initiating critical socio-economic reforms.

It is of the utmost urgency that such discussions now be channelled into an executive-led dialogue on the political way forward. Otherwise, spoilers may take advantage of the fluid and fragile political situation to spark instability. President Préval, in recent weeks, has rightly focused on the relief activities, and his leadership is now required more than ever. It is now more important than ever for the Government to engage all political forces in substantive discussions on key governance issues, to work constructively with the private sector, and to enhance its communication and outreach efforts to the Haitian public. The Government of Haiti is fully aware of this and of the need to reach broad political consensus before the 31 March donors' conference, and the United Nations stands ready to support such an effort by the Government.

There is no doubt that the earthquake has fundamentally changed the context in which MINUSTAH is operating. And there is no doubt that this will have — as in fact it has already had — implications for the role of MINUSTAH and the broader United Nations. The damage to Haiti's legislative, administrative, socio-economic, educational and cultural centres has been unprecedented. The Government of Haiti has lost much of its infrastructure and a large number of its civil servants, with devastating consequences for its ability to deliver basic services and to deal with the emergency at hand.

That Haiti needs assistance — lots of it — is of course very clear. However, much less clear right now is exactly what kind of assistance is required and how such assistance should best be delivered. The post-disaster needs assessment — which was launched, as John Holmes said, on 18 February — should address much of this. It is a very important process which is led by the Haitian Government and supported by the United Nations, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the European Commission, and will provide a crucial basis for the 31 March donors' conference. The outcomes of the post-disaster

needs assessment and the discussions at the New York conference will provide a much better basis to plan for MINUSTAH's future and that of the broader United Nations engagement.

Yesterday, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Mulet attended a meeting of development ministers of the European Union on Haiti. Among the topics discussed were the important issue of shelter and the issue of division of labour among donors, which would help to lessen the burden of coordination on the Haitian Government. This issue will undoubtedly be taken up at the New York conference.

To conclude, I would like to recall that the earthquake hit Haiti at the moment when the country was, for the first time in nearly five decades, making significant strides toward stabilization and governance. With the support of MINUSTAH, Haiti had organized successful presidential and parliamentary elections, established an unprecedented level of security, and set strategies in motion for economic reconstruction and development that contributed to two years of successive economic growth. Planning for comprehensive constitutional and administrative reform was very much under way. Haiti finally had a national vision and a road map for sustainable peace and development.

The earthquake has, of course, caused unprecedented destruction and suffering, but it has not destroyed that vision. The international community and the United Nations must come together behind the Government of Haiti and align their interventions and long-term plans with a national vision for reconstruction. This will require a sustainable level of support, in terms of both resources and technical assistance. In doing so, we need to empower the Government and not supplant it.

I count on the Council's support to ensure that MINUSTAH will continue to have the means required to help Haiti through this challenge.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Le Roy for his briefing.

Before I give the floor to the Haitian Ambassador, all of my colleagues will no doubt join me in paying tribute to the work of United Nations personnel on the ground in difficult conditions. I would ask Mr. Holmes and Mr. Le Roy to convey the

appreciation of all Security Council members to their personnel.

I now give the floor to the representative of Haiti.

Mr. Mèrorès (Haiti) (*spoke in French*): I am very grateful to you, Sir, for having organized this meeting of the Council to hear the very edifying briefings of Mr. Holmes and Mr. Le Roy, which, in the view of the Haitian delegation, reflect the tireless commitment of the entire international community to the ongoing effort to assist, re-establish and rebuild my country.

The woes unleashed upon Haiti on 12 January have given the international community an opportunity each day to express its great solidarity and compassion for a wounded people that continues to be battered by fate. It is also another opportunity for me and for President Préval, as he has done many times, to sincerely thank the great comity of nations and to express the gratitude of the Government and people of Haiti for the overwhelming generosity exhibited in this tragic situation. I take this opportunity to once again convey the condolences of the people and Government of Haiti to the United Nations and the families of staff members of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) who have been so sorely tested.

The Haitian delegation welcomes resolution 1908 (2010), adopted last month, endorsing the recommendation of the Secretary-General to increase the overall force levels of MINUSTAH. We welcome that timely decision and, on behalf of the Government, thank the troop-contributing countries and through them their Governments that promptly acceded to that request.

In spite of improved conditions on the ground, as today's speakers have noted, the situation remains of great concern. The humanitarian needs are immense, and urgent action must therefore be taken to meet the requirements of the population. The heavy toll is known to all — more than 270,000 deaths, more than 250,000 public, commercial and residential buildings destroyed, and more than 1 million people living in the streets or public areas. These figures speak for themselves, and have also been reflected in televised images.

Until the situation is stabilized, and given the urgent need to prepare for the coming rainy season, assistance and recovery activities must be strengthened

quickly and extended to people and places throughout the country that have yet to receive them.

Thus, the revised \$1.44 billion flash appeal launched yesterday by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which will assist 3 million people gravely affected by the catastrophe by the end of the year, comes at the right moment. As we know, more than 1.2 million people require emergency assistance in terms of shelter and sanitation needs. At least 2 million people require food assistance. The host families and communities assisting displaced persons who have fled the most heavily impacted cities are bearing that weighty burden with virtually no help, and they need assistance as well. At the same time, the Government needs assistance to re-establish the agricultural sector as the hurricane season approaches.

A significant problem mentioned by Mr. Le Roy is public security. It is important to note that, although the security situation has remained relatively stable since 12 January, there have been various instances of banditry not only in the capital but also throughout the country. Over 4,000 escaped prisoners, including some of the most dangerous criminals, are still roaming the streets and beginning to resume their activities. They pose a potential threat to life and property, and the Government is in the process of tracking them down. With the assistance of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, the Haitian National Police is working to apprehend them to ensure that they can do no further harm.

The Government continues to mobilize itself to prepare for the ministerial meeting on Haiti's reconstruction to be held on 31 March. A comprehensive reconstruction plan will be presented to our various partners that will cover all the basic elements necessary to the viable reconstruction and sustainable development of the country. It will be an arduous task. International solidarity allowed us to quickly address the situation in the first few hours following the quake. The conference will be another step in the enormous effort of building the new Haiti sought by the Government and people of our country. That cannot be done without the support of the international community. I should like in advance, on behalf of the Government and people of Haiti, to thank the international community, which has always stood by us.

The President (*spoke in French*): As the representative of Haiti knows, he can count on the support of the entire Security Council in the great effort to provide emergency assistance and to rebuild Haiti.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. In accordance with the understanding reached in the course of its prior consultations, I now invite the members of the Council to informal consultations to continue our discussion of the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.



Security Council

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Official communiqué of the 6275th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

**Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Monday,
22 February 2010, at 3 p.m.**

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"On 22 February 2010, the Security Council, pursuant to resolution 1353 (2001), annex II, sections A and B, held its 6275th meeting in private with the troop- and police-contributing countries to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.

"The Security Council and the troop and police-contributing countries heard a briefing under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure by Ms. Ameerah Haq, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.

"Members of the Council, Ms. Haq and representatives of participating contributing countries had an exchange of views."

